A DISCOURSE OF Friendſhip.

By *E. G.* Gent.

LONDON,

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

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To the Honourable

The Lady *SARAH COOPER.*

Madam,

IT may be thought a presumption in me to affix your Name to the ensuing Leaves; I assure you (*Madam*) it was not their merit but you candour that induced me to make such an attempt, which also created in me a more then ordinarie confidence and belief that you would overlook all those defectsoccasioned by the unskilfulness of the Author, with a charitable allowance: you cannot expect from the ensuing discourse, that excellency and sublimity the subject requires; it neither suits with my ability nor designe, to send into the world a splendid Peice of Oratory: Truth was what I aimed at, which, though naked, will never shame its Master; and experience hath furnished me with arguments not wholly contemptible in this regard: and these must take place before any acquired accommodation, where the advancement of truth is the ultimate end: there needs no pompous words to usher in this subject: it carries so much worth and excellency in the nature of it as is enough to commend it without those triviall accomplishments; if nothing but blandishments should demonstrate the value and esteem we have for truth and ver-

tue, they would want their moſt affectionate advocates; but *Madam*, as Clouds and darker colours ſerve to ſet off thoſe which are beautiful and glorious, in this ſenſe my poor endeavours may be of ſome uſe to your Ladiſhip, and as a foil ſet off and commend your more curious notions: many perſons of learning and Ingenuity have offered at this ſubject, but it hath been ſo generally conſidered by them, that they have come ſhort of that ſatisfaction which might juſtly be expected from ſo ſollid and uſeful an undertaking as that of Friendſhip; neither have I taken upon me the task and exactneſſe of a Caſuiſt, in curiouſly anatomizing even the moſt hidden and ſmalleſt particulars reducible to each head; I have only drawn out the faireſt and plaineſt lines, leaving the more artificial diſcoveries to them of greater parts and learning, who I hartily intreat to lend their aſſiſtance to this great affair; if they would from hence conclude a call, to draw this blotted coppy fair, and throughly effect what I would gladly have done, and wiſh it were not above my reach, I mean (Madam) a ſolid ſatisfaction in ſo materiall and uſeful a concern as this is, I ſhould think this adventure no great crime: but I have been too tedious, give me leave to add, that the Author wiſheth to your Ladiſhip in the perfection of it what the work deſcribes, and am,

Madam,

Your moſt humble

and faithful Servant,

E. G.

The PREFACE To the READER.

THe Subject I am upon was never more neceſſary and ſeaſonable then in theſe unhappy times wherein we live, where we finde men generally ſo vicious that vertue is almoſt extirpate, and not a few become ſo monſtrouſly bruitiſh, that no philoſophy can ſweeten and allay their extream bitternesſe, and ſo flinty are their tempers, that love, that tender and delicate plant, can have no rooting among them; but that which is moſt to be lamented is, that perſons of a ſofter mould, and pliant, and yieldable enough to love and friendſhip, are foreſtalled by other objects, and ſo averted, that they do not think it worth their while to ſtudy and acquaint themſelves with this great affair: if any thing I have done could be ſo ſucceſsful as to prevail with them to conſult the reaſon, conveniency, and excellency of this great concern, and weigh things in the ballance of right reaſon; I dare ſay the ballance would incline another way then it doth with them now: I do not fear that any perſon though never ſo envious ſhould upon the firſt glance of this book take upon him to prejudge it, but rather expect the Title Page ſhould prove a powerful motive to induce and incline the Reader to a further ſearch into the nature of that ſubject, that hath ſo ſplendid an aſpect: yet I do not expect to paſſe this Diſcourſe through a vicious world and various tempers, without

out some reflections; the vain and vicious will be apt to quarrel at the confinement they will finde to their unlimitted fancyes and humour; the Critick will say, it is too trivially managed to please their curiosity, they can neither finde elegancy of stile, nor the advantage of History, which they will affirm are usually the most proper and principal parts of such an undertaking as this is, the subject in the nature of it is so rich, that it needs no varnish to set it off, the reward and pleasure which attends it is enough to commend it without complement; and indeed I designedly omitted quotations, not that I slighted History, but partly because I intended only to give my own particular notion of Friendship, as also what I had collected from my own experience and observation; and partly that I might leave sufficient encouragement to persons of more leasure and ability to enter upon this subject, and add that part which is not only most material for illustration and confirmation, bnt the most delightful part of the whole concern; I mean in relation to the composure of it, because as the experience of others is greatly confirming to the subject, so it is no lesse pleasing to the Author, who is never better satisfied then when the truths he asserts come attended with a cloud of witnesses; beside the Author of this present book may receive no small advantage, because hereby those errors may be corrected which unavoidably attend so unskilful an Undertaker: But not to detain or carry the Reader any further from my intended Subject, I shall leave him with with this assurance that I am his,

In the Service of Truth,

E G.

A DISCOURSE OF FRIENDSHIP.

THe ſubject of the enſuing Diſcourſe is of that excellency and importance, that it deſerves our diligence in the enquiring into the nature of it; it is the great Miſtery of Friendſhip which contains in it things worthy, weighty and exceeding neceſſary both for the pleaſure of the ſenſitive and rational appetite: men are tired in the chaſe of ſatisfaction from one thing to another, ſtill purſuing thoſe ſhadows that cannot be brought nearer, and the reaſon is, that in the humane nature there is an intenſe and continual deſire of pleaſure, without which life it ſelf hath no ſatisfaction; for life conſiſting in the operations of the ſoul, either the external of the ſenſes, or the internal of the minde, it is ſweetned by thoſe delights that are ſuitable to them: the ſubject I am upon

bids faireſt for a temporal ſatisfaction ; as having in it ſelf thoſe excellent accompliſhments which are the intermedial ſteps by which we climb and get within reach of it: Philoſophers in their vaſt enquiries into natural things were never ſo buſie wholly to decline this moral concern, and in the concluſion when they made up their experiments, they never reckoned thoſe they found in the way of friendſhp inferior or leſs conſiderable then thoſe that were bound up in natural cauſes ; for beſide the conveniency they finde in this relation for the uſe and improvements of their natural acquirements, they arrive at more true and ſolid contentment : men in tracing effects to their cauſes, as they finde pleaſure, ſo they finde labour, and many diſappointments, their knowledge not ſeldome proving the fruit of anxious enquiries, which mightily abates their content, and often they take up with little things they finde in their way, while they ſtill remain ſhort of the end they deſigne ; but Friendſhip, as it hath not ſuch cragged and obſcure ways, ſo it hath more certain and direct ends : men do not in this concern like fooliſh Chymiſts, who melt a great part of their eſtate in vain in expectation of the great *Elixir*, ſuch have riches and treaſures in notion and fancy, little in poſſeſſion ; but it is quite contrary here ; Friends have leaſt in notion, moſt in poſſeſſion ; when they attain this generous ſtate, they finde a reall enjoyment of what they thirſted after ; we do not value things only for their intrinſick beauty, but that which raiſeth the value, is the accomodation they have in them to

our

our ſatisfaction, that is the more deſirable part: now as there is nothing in all the creation ſo good as man, ſo there is nothing ſo ſuitable to the nature of man, as man himſelf; and that is the reaſon ingenious men finde ſo much content among themſelves; and this cannot but advance their content exceedingly, the ſymmetry and proportion men have in their natures and diſpoſitions is the greateſt content; ſatisfaction is derived from ſimilitude, if this be wanting, however things may appear, they are really unpleaſant and ungrateful; like a garment that is too looſe, or too ſtraight, however it may pleaſe and humour pride, it will not content the perſon, becauſe it wants proportion to that part to which it was aſſigned. Friends acts many parts in this relation, and all tend to profit and the pleaſure of each other; ſometimes they act high, and then they advance the pleaſure of the minde by communicating knowledge and experience ſuperiour and conſonant to the intelligent nature, other times they act ſo as to gratify ſences, which is both neceſſary and convenient, if a due obſervation and ſubordination be allowed to the rational faculties, and ſo equal ſatisfaction according to the ſeveral objects is obtained: theſe and many other inviting properties you will find in this concern, if you pleaſe to enter with me into the nature of it. But ſome perſons are averſe to all vertue, and conſequently to this concern, others through inadvertency wave and neglect the purſuit of it from a ſuppoſed incapacity in themſelves, or the difficulty that lies in their way to the obtain-

ing of it; this proceeds either from ignorance and unacquaintance with this concern, or from a careleſs and unconcerned temper; the firſt ſhould rather animate, and quicken then obſtruct and impede, becauſe nothing is more incident to the nature of men, then to prize thoſe things moſt that are ſcarce and rare, thoſe of an eaſie and cheap deſcent beget contempt: Friendſhip is not leſs conſiderable, becauſe it is like the ſun in its clearneſs, which though leſs approachable is moſt glorious; others they cannot admit of any diverſion from their ſecular affairs, ſo as to ſtudy this concern, they like the notion of it, and will commend it, but it is at a diſtance, according to the outward luſtre not inward beauty, they fancy it, like children that admire the gladning rays of the ſun that ſhines in their faces, without the leaſt conſideration of the utility and excellency of it; if theſe would make a true eſtimate of this material concern, it would ſwallow up the vanity of thoſe inferiour things in which men take ſuch complacency, and ſo elevate them, that no unworthy or abject end ſhould ſway their more noble part, which is the ſoul, and ſo enlarge and ſublimate their mindes, that nothing repugnant to its more direct dictates ſhould be allowed: would we take a view of this concern, we may inform our ſelves by looking into the ſuperiour ſchools and Academies, where we ſee men of all tempers, ſome maſters of their reaſon, others maſtered by ſenſuality; amongſt the firſt we finde the moſt perfect friendſhip which ſeems to be made, not ſo much for

pleaſure

pleaſure as utility, profit being firſt in their eye, that this deſigne may not be looked upon as ſpeculative only, & ſo be received with ſuſpicion as things not common to vulgar capacities are, till ſome experiment be made of them : I ſhall endeavour in a plain and familiar method to ſubmit the argument I am upon to every mans reaſon and experience : I ſhall not refer to remote Inſtances of this kinde, though I am not ignorant they would amplifie and illuſtrate the concern, but confine my ſelf to my own Obſervation and Experience : And becauſe a regular proceeding herein will be beſt underſtood, I ſhall caſt what I have to ſay into this Method.

Firſt, ſhew what Friendſhip is here meant, and the Import of it.

Secondly, The ſubjects fit for it both for number and qualities.

Thirdly, What qualifications are neceſſary.

Fourthly, The great ends aimed at in that relation.

Fifthly, The pleaſantneſs to be found in the ſtate of Friendſhip.

Sixthly, How Friends are to govern themſelves in this relation of Friendſhip.

Seventhly, The Concluſion by way of commendation.

Firſt, What Friendſhip is here meant comes firſt to be conſidered.

There are Four kindes of Friendſhip, and theſe all derive from different cauſes, and produce different effects.

Firſt, There is a Chriſtian Friendſhip.

Secondly, A common and univerſal Friendſhip.

Thirdly, A relative Friendſhip.

Fourthly, A morral Friendſhip.

Firſt, Of the Chriſtian Friendſhip: I ſhall not ſay any thing to this, but that it is the moſt excellent, ſweet and durable Friendſhip, and moſt to be ambitioned and deſired.

Secondly, there is a common Friendſhip which we have with all the world as our fellow creatures, and this is more or leſs according to our intereſt in them, or their merit and deſert; this is the meaſure of this Friendſhip; the rule that we go by is the benefit & advantage we expect, & the accomodation that it hath in it to our ſafety and tranquillity, and other ſuch like ends; or from charity which we are morally diſpoſed to as rational creatures: Friendſhip take it how you will, is very deſirable; conſider it under this conſideration as it is expatiated, or in a moral ſence where it is confined, in all reſpects it is eminent: this common Friendſhip is as general an advantage as the ſun, for as the ſun influences and enlightens the world, ſo Friendſhip preſerves a world for that light and influence: were it not for this binding and regulating concern, men like beaſts would devour one another, every man naturally ambitioning rule and hating ſubjection: were it not for this confinement that hath an univerſal influence upon all perſons and tranſactions, what tyranny would reign in the Courts of Princes? what rebellion among ſubjects? by this binding concern Princes are made

almoſt

almoſt unlimitable, and ſubjects moſt free: it is the undiſſembled affection of Princes upon which the freedom and happineſs of the people are firmly planted: Friendſhip, is that which ſecures Families, otherwiſe all things would be in confuſion there; Brethren like *Cain* would riſe up one againſt another, and a mans enemies be them of his own houſe: beſides this, the prejudice would yet go higher, and all men muſt ſtand as in *Nehemiahs* time, with their weapons in one hand, and work in the other: ſince the progeny of *Adam* is encreaſed to a vaſt ſociety and numerous iſſue, all manner of diſaſters, as Famine, Peſtilence, Deluge, Fire, Wilde Beaſts, have not been ſo deſtructive of man as man himſelf, which was occaſioned by this want of Friendſhip.

Thirdly, There is a Friendſhip among Relations, as that between Father and ſon, Husband and Wife, and Brethren, theſe Relations make Friendſhips, and ſuch as muſt not give place to any other; and this proceeds from natural principles, which obliges to duty and Obligations not to be violated; of which I ſhall ſpeak more in another place.

Fourthly, There is a Frendſhip that is grounded purely upon moral Principles, and for diſtinction we call it a moral Friendſhip: here is no Obligation preceeding, as in that of relation, but every man is left to his free choice and election, and is governed by prudential and moral ſwaſion; a Father beſide his own inclination is bound to love his ſon, the law of nature bindes

him to it, and a ſon his Father in like manner; but no man is bound to love any perſon with a complacential love, nor can he do it, except ſuch an one that he can finde upon prudent conſiderations agreeable to his reaſon and fancy, theſe are the moſt proper and powerful motives to excite the affections: Friendſhip is equal in it ſelf to all the world, and hath no difference, but is differenced by accidents, and by the capacities or incapacities of them that receive it; charity commands us not to be enemies to any, and reaſon and prudence directs us to be moſt friendly to them that are moſt uſeful and deſerving: if we have reaſon to love many, we have much more reaſon to love ſome more then others; and if my affection be according to reaſon, I muſt love moſt where I ſee moſt reaſon: this moral friendſhip as it flows from the moſt generous principles ſo it produceth the moſt deſirable effects; we may make an eſtimate of it by its cauſes and effects, for its cauſes it derives either from a native candour and generoſity of minde, or from a noble and ingenious education, or ſomething jointly from both; theſe ſeem as good originals as any thing meerly moral can proceed from; and hence it is that we finde thoſe of great minds and extraction moſt obliging; whereas thoſe of abject births and ſpirits are of a quite differing nature; ths firſt are governed by reaſon which is ſtill the ſame, and will act equally and conſonant to it ſelf, excluding an arbitrary will; for he that doth things this moment becauſe he will, may the next have as weighty arguments to do ſome contrary,

contrary, and ſo ſpend his whole time in unravelling his ſpiders webs, ſtill lying under the lath of the ſuperiour faculties, which will be conſtantly following him with grating reflections, who reſiſt its more direct admonitions, numerous are the effects that proceeds from this cauſe: I ſhall point at two or three briefly.

Firſt, men are hereby made ſo like God, that nothing can more aſſimilate man to God, love being a ſupream attribute of the unchangeable being, & prepares and enables us to a conformity, to the Divine Law.

Secondly, Friendſhip calls home our wandring fancy, that haply may range after a thouſand vanities, which may allure the affections, but can never ſatisfie them, and contracts them to objects that are ſolid and excellent: all men naturally aſpire after happineſs, but few finde it, becauſe they either miſtake the way or the end; ſome place it in wiſdom, ſome in honour, others in riches, taking up with ſomething ſhort of the great end; there is more ſatisfaction to be had in a faithful ſerious friend then in all ſublunary things; nothing can reach our content, but that which can rationally engage the affections, and this cannot be done by riches, humane reaſon or pleaſure: we may adde, the moſt binding relations and the moſt powerful obligations that pleaſure can invent, not any of theſe nor all together can do it, and that becauſe there is not worth enongh in them to attract the heart and affections, nor weight enough in them to ſatisfie reaſon, nor power to lay any reſtraint upon exorbitant

orbitant passions & unlimited fancies, but friendship can do all this: there is love to attract, nothing so attractive as love it self: it comes always attended with the luere of reward and pleasure: and hereby it insinuates it self and lays constraints and limitations upon the person insensibiy without force or violence, and so makes an absolute conquest.

Thirdly, Friendship is exemplary vertue, and carries in its front the cleareſt conviction of vice: Philosophers were of opinion that no true love could be amongst any but ingenious men: persons that are vicious cannot build their wood, hay and stubble upon so solid a foundation as that of friendship, yet this concern harh such credit with the worst of men, that it hath not wanted advocates among its greatest enemies, which though they have been never so vicious and industrious to defame vertue and condemn it as men do the light, because their weak eyes cannot receive the luster of it, yet they judge it most amicable, and they can bestow praises upon vertuous men, and commend the radency of that state they employ their utmost power to circumvent and destroy: they can as well hold a Lion in a twine thred as confine their unruly passions, and grasp the air as give check to one lust: these are the unhappy subjects of those skilful Artificers that vitiate men in their persons to corrupt their principles, and when all hopes of vertue is lost, they will easily be perswaded into all the infelicity of a contrary state: these are so deeply plunged in vice, that they are contented that the last

should

ſhould be raiſed upon the ruine of the firſt, and while they catch after the one with impetuous violence, they can tamely endure the other to be vilifyed and deſpiſed: whereas virtuous men can view them in their hurry and maze, though with pity to them, with ſatisfaction to themſelves, while they with ſerenity and a calm minde can regulate their opinions, and confine a wandring fancy, and reduce things to their juſt value: and however this looſe age, the dreg of times, may contemn things in themſelves moſt deſerving, magnifying an arbitrary will, and trampling upon all that oppoſe it, theſe look upon their Trophees as miſerable that is built upon vertue and honour; as a clear day befriends us with more diſtinct proſpect of diſtant objects, ſo when there is quietneſs within, then we can look about us, and ſee what excellencys invite the reaſon and affection: when vain men as a juſt reward of their ſenſuality are clouded; and it is not ſeldom, that melancholy, that black paſſion overſpreads the mind like an Egyptian darkneſs, admitting no allay, but hurrying men blindefold into their own ruine: Let none think this a ſcheme of diſcourſe, ſince there is nothing more common then to ſee men vitiate their prineiples as well as their duties, and be worſe then their nature inclines them to: many evils are committed againſt the grain, and with violence to conſtitution: if the beſt ſenſuality be too trifling to maintain any proportion with vertue and honour, how far wide muſt they needs be that ſtand in competition with vertue; thoſe that have ſuch degenerate

degenerate wills as that they can exchange liberty for licentiousness, have lost their freedom, and are contracted to low and base objects: I would gladly vindicate vertue, and make it illustrious, it is my designe in this Discourse: there is but one way for the obtaining that end, and that is by making it as radiant as I can, that by the splendour of it mens eyes may be drawn off from worse objects; but some spirits are so dis-ingenious, that the most glorious rewards will not animate them, like brutes they are not concerned in all the happiness to be found above in the region of reason, but would relinquish or resigne any portion there, so they may secure and enjoy husks and draught: these prodigally spend their time and treasure upon such trifles that will reward them with poverty and vexation, the certain reward and portion of those that are not capable of more generous resentments; but it is time to take leave of this digression, and come to the point.

The next thing that comes under our consideration, is, *what a Moral Friendship imports*: It imports the closest union, the most generous contract, the sweetest communion, the strongest resolutions between persons that study nothing more then the satisfaction one of another in all things both divine and humane.

I purpose not to speak to every individual part of this Proposition, that would take up more time then I have designed for this undertaking, and swell this little Tract to a volume; as also beeause I shall occasionally take them all in the

Discourse

Diſcourſe that ſollows, I ſhall only at preſent explain my meaning in a general way, and ſo proceed: By Union I mean a union of hearts, which is moſt exeellent as to its original and effects; it hath a higher cauſe, and derives from the moſt noble ſpring, and its conſequents are proportionate: It is natural to every production to bear ſymetry and proportion to that which produceth it; from this heart-union ſprings the moſt complacential communion and fellowſhip: Friendſhip is love and ſociety mixt together, which make it moſt delightful in this ſociable ſtate; men do not only meet with uſeful diverſiſements, the want of which is the great ſpring of miſchief, but they finde ingenious advertiſements conſonant to the intelligent nature, together with an intire affection, which is the axes upon which this great concern turns, ſeconded with generoſity its moſt conſtant and grateful attendant; as alſo a fixed reſolution which makes the wheel, though always turning, never uncertain: By how much the more free any thing is, by ſo much the more laſting and durable fixedneſs twiſts all the other requiſites; ſo that they binde more ſtrongly; and this makes the union ſo intire, that friends have the ſame intereſt, the ſame choice, and in a ſence they communicate and exchange properties, and there is but one ſoul between them: Friendſhip is a tree loaden with precious fruit, well rooted & never decaying, no warmth is at its root; it is not like *Jonas's* gourd that came up in a night, and periſhed in a night; Frendſhip thus fixed is unmoveable to all the effects of contrary motives. Thirdly,

Thirdly, the ſubjects fit for this moral Friendſhip comes next to be conſidered, and we muſt conſider them,

1. As to their Numbers.
2. Their Acquaintance.
3. Their Qualities.
4. Their Equality.

Firſt, The number of perſons; this muſt be heedfully regarded: Friendſhip ſtrictly taken according to our method, excludes all perſons above two, more the Law calls riots, and love calls Rivals and Competitors, which cannot be allowed in this concern, but with hazard to the foundation, which is built on union & integrity beſides the expectation of friends are ſo large and vaſt, that nothing but a full and ample poſſeſſion is accounted any thing: I cannot divide my affection, and the heart remain intire, the heart goes out in them, and neceſſarily is divided; and that is ſo diametrically contrary to the nature of Friendſhip, that it is like the taking away of the Foundation, which draws the whole Fabrick after it, or ſuch a rent as muſt of neceſſity deſtroy the moſt eſſential props, after which it muſt inevitably moulder into its firſt nothing.

Secondly, perſons fit for this concern are no ſtrangers, as thoſe are not fit at all that are ſtrangers and unknown, ſo they are moſt fit that are beſt known in their natures and diſpoſitions, and hereby many inconveniencies are avoided; firſt diſappointments that are always croſs but cruel in love: prudence directs us to treat with perſons at a diſtance before we take them into our boſome,

boſome, leſt our ignorant occaſions, our vexation and trouble in caſe of diſappointment, our haſty fixing upon ſome unequal object, as it inſnares the affection and betrays them, ſo it puts an undervalue upon the judgment: men that have made an unequal choice how many inconveniencies do they draw upon themſelves, ſometimes the head is diſtracted, and this is deſtructive of their peace and tranquillity: the head is filled with troubleſom notions and contrivances, how it may handſomely manage a breath in that friendſhip that can neither rationally be continued nor credibly broken, that is a grating conviction that diſcovers errours in thoſe things to which the heart is nearly united; how to unite that knot that cannot be looſed without many a piece of ſelf-denial is not eaſily learned, becauſe it cannot be done without grief and trouble: a ſeparation from them we dearly love is very hard, though never ſo good reaſon appears for it, paſſion being violent, wilfull and impetuous, eaſily ſeduced in the firſt choice, afterward hardly reclaimed: for as nothing is more eaſily ſurpriſed then the fancy, ſo nothing will be more hardly convinced of its errour.

Secondly, The lower appetite may be prejudiced by precipitancy, for the troubles of the minde hath a mighty influence upon the body, and they often torment one the other: the pains of the body proves no ſmall detriment to the minde; ſharp pains in the body ſo diſcompoſeth the mind, that its made unfit for its high & noble operations, ſo that it cannot perform its acts with

that

that delight and freedom: Philoſophers took a great deal of care ſpeedily to cure all diſtempers of the body, that no obſtruction thereby might impede the purſuit of knowledge: As the calmneſs of the minde mightily prepares for every ſerious action, ſo perturbation hath a quite contrary effect, and ſo diſtracts the minde that it proves the greateſt prejudice imaginable, becauſe we often loſe our reaſon in that croud which is the only expedient to prevail with us againſt any thing unneceſſary or vexatious: This is a Maxim, that nothing ſerious can be done in haſte; Friendſhip is a ſerious thing, and muſt be well weighed both in its ſubſtance and circumſtances; Theſe things are very material in order to a well-grounded friendſhip, that there be excellency in the minde, ſweetneſs and affability in the diſpoſition, and reality in the affection; if we cannot be ſatisfied in all theſe, we can expect to arrive at no better end then diſappointment; now to acquaint our ſelves with all theſe, will require no ſmall diligence and obſervation, which will employ our moſt ſerious thoughts, and take up a conſiderable time: if a man be a ſervant to the meaneſt thing, upon which he placeth an inordinate affection, as indeed he is, then this ſhould awaken all our powers to contemplate this concern; leſt while we aim at pleaſure we careleſly inſlave our ſelves: It is not notion but experience that fixeth content, as nothing can deſtroy our happineſs but the experience of evil, ſo nothing can eſtabliſh our ſatisfaction but the experience of good: there is as much deceit in men as there

there is in ſtones, men may inſinuate themſelves by ſpecious pretences, yet groſs deceivers; It is hard for a man that is blinded with pride or paſſion, or any other deluſion, to underſtand himſelf; he is not ſeldom betrayed by himſelf, much leſs can he be underſtood by another: there are ſhining men as well as ſhining ſtones, otherwiſe that proverb had never been, *All is not gold that gliſters*; we know many a ſtone hath the Diamond cut and colour, yet but a counterfeit, and when we think we have a treaſure, it proves but a trifle: many men that through raſhneſs and inconſideration fix their affection before experience had of the true value of the object, are plainly cheated, prodigally giving away their hearts without any aſſurance of ſutable returns; and hence it comes to paſs, that we ſee ſome frendſhip broken and ſhattered, and in a ſhort time moulder and come to nothing; the Materials were deceitful; like a houſe that is ſlightly built, it appears ſtrong and fair to the eye, but ſoon decays; the defect was in the foundation, which though leaſt ſeen is moſt dangerous.

Thirdly, our too early fixing, as it inſnareth the affection, ſo it condemns the judgment; many will think themſelves concerned here, eſpecially the moſt vicious, that are curious in nothing but in praying into and ſearching after the failings of others; ſuch inquiſitions being more natural & gratifying extravagant humours, who are moſt ready to cenſure what they leaſt underſtand, and make cauſleſs exceptions, which if rightly argued, they cannot anſwer one of a thouſand. Frendſhip may be envied, it cannot be condem-

ned, while it remains pure and entire, yet upon the least failer it is liable to the greatest reproach and scorn: When *Hushai Davids* friend came to *Absalom* he was glad to see him, yet how ready doth he upbraid him, saying, *Is this thy kindness to thy friend? Absalom* was one of the worst of men, and the greatest traitor, but he hated treachery notwithstanding: few men so barbarous as to love deceit, hence that Proverb came, that *men love the Treason but hate the Traitor.*

The greatest ground of condemnation is drawn from this, especially our inconsiderateness in the first choice and election, where we ought to have been most curious and circumspect, and this is aggravated by two ungrateful circumstances: First, this seems to be a fundamental errour, and therefore most dangerous, and then it's obvious to vulgar inspection and observation; and this is a grating aggravation, and comes attended with exclamations, and often enforces a man to dissemble a kindeness to a person he could never do upon any other account then this, that he might defend his judgement from censure, and the relation of frendship from scorn and contempt; nothing more contrary to an ingenious man then to own a kindeness for him that once deceived him, especially in so material a concern as that of frendship, where he expected the contrary; yet prudence will not suffer him to deny him publickly: it's in this case as with him that hath bought a Jewell, which he thought most precious, but was cheated, that man will be ashamed to own the deceit, because thereby his ignorance is betrayed;

betrayed; and next to being deceived he hates to be upbraided; reputation is exposed to scandal in this case without remedy, which is equally dear to him as his life; what can he alledge, should he say, I thought my friend was worthy, amiable and sincerely affectionate, but I was mistaken, what a contemptible plea is this? as much as if he should say, I was a novice and knew not how to make a right choice, or I was careless and would not take the pains; if ignorant, how can he be a compleat Judge? by what rule can he assigne errours on another when for ought he knows the fault is his own: nothing will sooner misleade then ignorance, if negligent worthy to suffer: To prevent this, be well acquainted with the person before you make this contract, prevention is better then cure, the more perfect knowledge a man hath of his friend, the greater is his love to his person, if he be worthy; then acquaint your self with the law of frendship, love hath law as well as duty, and indispensable obligations, which if thrown off make unhappy breaches: It is necessary that there should be a principle of reason and choice in that person that is governed by this law; first, to consider the reason that enjoyns, Secondly, to descern the import of the concern; Thirdly, how to determine it self out of judgement and choice to accept it as worthy in it self, and advantagious to the receiver: no external force can compel the will to choose any thing but under a notion of comparative goodness, as the inferiour creatures are moved by the secret force of

natural inclination, so rational creatures are wrought upon and insensibly drawn by moral engagements, as the foresight of rewards or threatnings annexed invites them: Frendship cannot be without commands; if that be true, that the dispensing of benefits acquire to the giver a right to command, and lays on the receiver an obligation to obey, and these rights and obligations are measured by the nature of the benefit as their just rule: This is a *Maxim*, that every rational man readily assents to, no commands so pleasing as those of love: no duty so easy; because as the commands are easie without restraint, so they are equal without violence and oppression, which sweetly obliges to Obedience.

Lastly, That we may be secured in so weighty a matter, and build the material concern upon firm *bases*, know this, that not only reason but religion is necessary as the most transcendant and pregnant argument to engage the will and affections, those that are learned in the work of righteousness are the most excellently qualified for this concern: I admit a Frendship may be made between persons meerly moral; where there may be equality there may be amity, but it cannot be so sure and safe as the Christian Frendship, one being founded in heaven the other on earth; so that there is as much difference between them as between heaven and earth, and as their originals are unequal, so their objects and operations are unequal; reason cannot bear equal pace with religion, though it may arise high in respect of sence, yet it is very low compared with faith; I grant,

grant, that religion connot make Frendſhip compleat except rational accompliſhments and natural requiſites concur; as reaſon cannot convey grace, ſo religion cannot convey reaſon: many Idiots without queſtion are pious, yet not in any caſe capable of Frendſhip, becauſe there muſt be reaſon as well as religion to regulate things: that religion is not ſufficient of it ſelf to make Frendſhip, the caſe of *Barnabas* and *Paul* makes undeniable, who through diſpute and difference did that which is againſt the nature of Frendſhip, they parted and probably never met again; we cannot think they were enemies, but certainly they were leſs friends; this muſt be granted, where the reſtraint in Frendſhip begins, there begins the imperfection of it; and without any queſtion the moral Frendſhip was broken, only the Chriſtian Frendſhip remained intire, we muſt needs run a mighty hazard in making alliances with perſons impious: Firſt, the devil will deſigne a breach, either by planting in us ſome dividing principles, and afterward he will be as induſtrious to draw out theſe principles into dividing practiſes: ſometimes God himſelf will deſigne a breach, if God intend either party for himſelf, enmity will ſoon grow between them, there being a certain antipathy between the ſeed of the woman and the ſeed of the ſerpent: do not we ſee God curſe the greateſt comforts of the carnal men, and blaſt their faireſt hopes, and nip their promiſing bloſſoms? but if there be truth in the inward parts, and piety bears the ſway, the Frendſhip will be eſtabliſhed: and becauſe the

beſt Friendſhips may ſometimes want pleaſure, but never trouble, we had need be careful that we have an intereſt in him that can turn our waters of affliction into the wine of conſolation.

I come now to the Fourth thing, namely, the equality that muſt be in the perſons of friends previous to this concern: and here we ſhall firſt examine the perfections of the minde, and then thoſe inferiour though neceſſary requiſites to compleat this equality: the perſons muſt have in them that which will do theſe things, ſatisfie reaſon in a competent meaſure, raviſh and attract the affection, and preſerve harmony and agreement in all the tranſactions that relates to this concern: thoſe that are untainted with prejudice, and by being ſo have their judgments clear and unbiaſſed, conſider ſeriouſly the happineſs of this concern: Friendſhip is not guided by humour and fancy which hath much more ſway among the vulgar then judgment and reaſon, and that makes them ſo uncertain, they can ſhuffle paſſions, and hate next hour, what juſt now they adored; but it is a grave and deliberate act of the underſtanding and will, whereby we come to a right eſtimate of things; the rational faculties, which are the underſtanding and will, if rightly guided, are not to be ſlightly ſatisfied; outward blandiſhments will not do it, it muſt be ſomething that is really good, as that which is ſo ſubtilly diſguiſed under an appearance of good, that it cannot be diſcovered: things being thus preſented to the will, it cloſeth with them by a free and unconſtrained choice, and the affections are inclined

elined inſenſibly, vertue being the only ingratiating quality: for the better directing our inquiſition, it will be requiſite to enquire what thoſe qualities are that are univerſally and indiſpenſibly neceſſary, in order to the anſwering thoſe great ends before-mentioned: I conceive theſe three things will fully do it. *Eirſt*, worth and excellency in the minde, that will ſatisfie reaſon as to the choice of the object, that it is not baſe and abject but valuable: *Secondly*, courteous and affable conditions and inclinations, this will engage the affection: *Thirdly*, ſuch an equality as will anſwer in every thing requiſite in this material concern, and this will both create and preſerve harmony and agreement in all tranſactions, and is the beauty and comelineſſe of Frendſhip; when there is an Uniformity obſerved in things, how ſplendidly do they appear? and the more excellent the things are in themſelves, the more lovely they appear in uniformity: Frendſhip is not only to raiſe and inflame the heart with the love of the object in order to a ſenſual ſatisfaction, though that be neceſſary, becauſe from thence the felicity of the animal life proceeds, but rather to improve the ſuperiour faculties in order to a rational ſatisfaction, from whence the pleaſure of the minde proceeds; now our judgement and reaſon is abundantly ſatisfied, when we finde in the object of our affections the habits and acts of reaſon; for as the principles of reaſon inhances the valiue of the perſon, ſo the practiſes benefits others, not only as an example, though that be much, but as an improvement

of our knowledge and experience.

Firſt, we will conſider reaſon in its ſuperlative degree, as a King upon his throne, when reaſon keeps the throne, the will is right, and its impreſſions juſt and equal, ſo that the inferiour faculties are eaſily drawn to a ſubordination to its dictates and admonitions, and the affections are exerciſed with proportion to the quality of their objects, and reaſon is their inviolable rule, and love the ſupreme affection that gives being to all the reſt, to hatred it ſelf; for ſo much we hate any thing as it ſtands between and impedes our enjoyment of what we love; the rational faculties hath objects that highly excels thoſe of the ſenſitive, their capacities are more ſpatious, and their union with the object more cloſe and intimate, their perception more clear, and thereby become the greateſt inſtruments of pleaſure to the intelligent nature: the higheſt faculties are the underſtanding and will, to which the deſire of knowledge is moſt natural, and produceth the nobleſt and ſweeteſt pleaſure; and this according to the perfection and enjoyment of the object, proportionable to the degrees of excellency there is in any object, ſo much rational ſatisfaction accrues to the minde by the knowledge of it: Natural things greatly affect an intelligent man in his enquiring into their nature, I mean the works of God and his providential diſtributions, yet the excellencies they finde there are but dark and faint reſemblances of the infinite & unchangable perfection, the deſire of knowledge both natural and moral is marvellous quick and earneſt

neſt and in appearance, moſt worthy the rational nature, as being exceeding pleaſant and delicious to the ſoul: the retirements of nature are not without thoſe excellencies which invite the ſearch of intelligent men, but the miſtery of morallity hath much more perfection in the nature of it, to animate and quicken our enquiries, and that becauſe knowledge is attained here with leſs labour, more certainty, and with greater delight and pleaſure; and the reaſon is, we get ſome ſteps nearer the original of all perfection; the Impreſſions of God are ingraven upon all his works, but ſo darkly, that many naturally wiſe men could hardly finde light enough in their natural lamps to diſcover the true nature and characters of him: now morallity aſcends much nearer, it is a proſpect that makes clearer diſcoveries, and hereby we aſcend ſo near perfection, that we may diſcover much of the nature and excellency of the unchangeable and glorious being, yet this is but a glimmering light, and a low perfection comparatively, and will never reach happineſs; there is a ſtrong inclination in men to be happy, this deſire is born and bred up with him, and it is the firſt and univerſal principle from whence all moral conſequences are derived: this is the rule of our deſire, and the end of our actions: as in natural things the principle of their production operate according to their quality, ſo in moral things the end is as powerful to form the ſoul for its operations in order to it, therefore as all deſire to be happy, ſo they apply themſelves to thoſe means that hath a tendency to it:

it: men frame happineſs according to their tempers, and the apprehenſions of it are proportionable to the condition of the perſons: for happineſs is the pleſure that derives from the harmony and agreement that there is between the object and the appetite, that we may come to a more perfect knowledge of the ſupream being, and ſo conſequently be more happy then any man, though never ſo richly accompliſhed can be any other way: we muſt cloſe with religion to this capacity the beams of divine light are extended; it is not my deſigne ſo to magnifie humane reaſon as to neglect that knowledge that is divine, nor is it according to our method wholly to reſt there; the great import of Frendſhip as was promiſed was to ſtudy the happineſs one of another in all things both divine and humane; it is true, there is a ſecret acknowledgment in every mans breaſt of a ſuperiour power to whom he muſt give an account, this he hath by the light of nature, yet the clearneſs of the underſtanding is loſt notwithſtanding; and that light that remains is eclipſed; thoſe that are guided by this light led by ſenſe, fancy, and paſſion, they have no motives that ſhould raiſe them to higher things there is yet a clearer diſcovery to be made of God, and that is the office of faith, which lifts men up above the region of Reaſon, and ſo enlarges and ſublimates the minde that it can get very near the infinite perfection; as reaſon is greatly above ſenſe, ſo faith is infinitely above reaſon: if we conſider its original acts and ends faith is not the fruit of nature, no ſuch flowe

grow

grows in natures garden: it is the immediate giſt of God: none of the philoſophers could attain this in all their enquiries, and the reaſon was, they never underſtood the knowledge of God in Chriſt, they were not brought to ſee, that there were higher degrees of excellency in the objects of faith then in thoſe of reaſon, nor could they diſcern the infallibility of its rule, by which all actions are meaſured, if proportionable to the degree of excellency that there is in the object: our happineſs is more or leſs compleat: a Chriſtians happineſs muſt need be ſuperlative that hath God for his object who is beyond all degrees, and ſuperlative: the ſatisfaction of reaſon and that of faith are not the ſame thing, there is as much difference as between heaven and earth, the different ways they take exactly convinces, that there ends are not only different, but contrary; the rule or law that Chriſtians are directed by is infallible, and the rule by which all their actions are meaſured, is the perfect law of God, not the moral law written in every mans heart before the fall, the dark impreſſion whereof remains to this day, but I mean the law of faith which is not ſubject to any diſpute or doubt; we need not go ſo far about as heathens which knew God no otherwiſe but by the dark impreſſions they found of him in natural things, but we come to a perfect knowledge of him, by the Goſpel and ſee him face to face: Chriſtians as they have clearer manifeſtations, ſo they have more noble and excellent means by which they atttain thoſe ſplendid diſcoveries,& this moſt clearly demonſtrates

monstrats the glory & magnificency of their end: men that look at a temporal felicity they level at low ends that which engages a Christian in the pursuit of happiness, is no motive to them, and that is beauty and reward; nothing that is future can be any attractive to a carnal and sensual man, nor can beauty invite him: The viciousness of his eye hinders him from discerning the beauty: the shortness of his sight is such that he cannot reach things that are future: the most rational Philosophers that were most diligent to improve in knowledge, received with delight truths of lower descent and of infinitely less importance but rejected divine revelation: morality seems to come very near felicity; their professed designe was happiness, yet these because they could not admit a higher principle then natural reason, utterly disclaimed Gospel-light, and its more clear revelations; but God who hath commanded light to shine out of darkness, hath shined into the heart of a Christian and hath given the knowledge of God in the face of Christ; this is the sun that dazeled the eyes of Philosophers, but inlightens Christians more and more until the perfect day: men of the most exquisite natural parts and perfections, though there were no future state, should not be happy while they retain those natural insufficiences that are incident to the best of men that walk by a fallible rule; how frequently are they insnared, allurements may be so subtilly and artificially contrived and made, especially when the bait is reward and pleasure, that the rational and the sensitive appetite are at once betrayed;

betrayed; the two principles of action are the underſtanding and will, there is no particular good but may have the appearance of ſome evil, or ſomething that is ungrateful annexed to it, for which reaſon the will may reject it; ſo every particular evil may be ſo diſguiſed by the falſe appearance of goodneſs annexed to it, that the will may receive it: ſpacious objects convey themſelves through the unwary and unguarded ſences to the fancy, and from that to the underſtanding, which by neglect not conſidering the danger, or fondly believing the goodneſs of the end, will overballance the evil of the means, commends it to the will, and that embraces it, and the ſenſes that ſhould be ſentinels to give intelligence faithfully & diſcover dangers vigilantly, & make true reports of things to the minde reſpectfully as ſubordinate to the rational faculties, to hinder all diſturbances or diſquietneſs that might aſſault the minde, they not ſeldome act contrary, carelefly taking diſguiſed enemies for friends, othertimes by a falſe alarm affright the lower appetite, and cauſe ſuch confuſion that the command of reaſon cannot be obſerved; and this is done either by bringing in ſome amazing trouble or inſinuating ſome inviting pleaſure or any other diſtractions of the minde: thus the ſenſes wound and captivate the minde, ſo that there is no truſting to reaſon, ſence, or any thing but faith, which can neither deceive nor be deceived; this proſpective gives a true ſight of things, whether we conſider God the ſupreme object of our happineſs or the enjoyment of him which is ſubordinate:

ordinate: it's true we cannot come to a perfect knowledge of God in this imperfect state, but we may have our hearts inlarged here to receive that happiness that is reserved for a more perfect state, and may have happiness in the seed and principles of it; nothing shall alter our condition there but degrees, and we shall have a portion answerable to the spaciousness of the capacity so then we are not to judge of our selves as to happiness or misery by wisdome and humane reason, but by faith that cannot be mis-guided or controuled: this measure is not humane reason that may erre, but it is grace, not in our hand but in the hand of omnipotency, where erring and warping is impossible; as faith hath its illumination from him whose understanding is infinite, so it hath its strength from him that is Almighty By this light the understanding is rectifyed, the will is inclined, so that they cannot be inveigled by inferiour objects, and it substitutes such sobriety in the lower appetite, which keeps out all those intrusions that generally subvert it But I leave this point, and proceed, and shew how knowledge and mental perfection may read the benefit of others.

Secondly, Men do not love and value persons only for their intrinsick worth though that is valuable and inviting, but for the diffusive quality that is so natural to true excellency, that it cannot be divided, no more then the beams of the sun can be separated from the body: men think themselves happy in nothing but what comes attended with reward as well as pleasure, and therefo

therefore prizes frendſhip as having in it ſelf moſt accomodation and proportion thereunto: Love is the moſt free and generous Paſſion ſending forth continually that which is both profitable and greatly delightful, and this is moſt obliging: men are valued as all things elſe are, for their uſefulneſs; we have a good inſtance for this in melancholy perſons that have as large capacities as others, and are as induſtrous to acquire noble endowments as any, and attain as great perfection, yet being under the tyranny of that black paſſion, are not capable of Demonſtration, and ſo they draw themſelves under a cloud while they live, by obſcuring their perfections; and when they die, their excellencies with themſelves are buried in everlaſting oblivion; they live no uſe, and die without glory; whereas others who like the ſun have ſcattered their light, though ſhort of their excellencies and acquirements, have lived uſefully and dyed honorably. It is not notion but example that imbalms our duſt, and perpetuates renown; men of clear and inturrupted reaſon cannot content themſelves with themſelves, I mean no man can be ſatisfied from himſelf, that is Gods prerogative, and therefore are frequently taking in ſupplys from without; and this they could not do with conveniency, content, and ſatisfaction, had they not the advantage of communication, by which they tranſplant their precious flowers, as alſo convey from their divine ſprings thoſe ſtreams that would overflow all banks, if not carefully turned into convenient channels; neither would their felicity they intend

tend be compleat, could they confine their notions and experiences within the narrow territories of their own minds: Now that they may discharge themselves of the burthens of their weighty conceptions, which they may do while they retain the worth of them, and finde out a way for their capatious souls to empty themselves: They court all opportunities, among which Frendship presents its self as most suitable and proper, because receptive of all those generous overtures which are propounded, and so the will and affection are immediatly engaged, freely without any force or violence, to close with Frendship, as the most convenient scene upon which they may act those serious contrivances that terminate in vertue and honour: It is in this state and relation men chearfully pursue golden designes, and make use of those excellent experiments they have been long gathering, but by some harsh accident and unhappy incapacity have been hid and obscured: Now Frendship mainly intending the improvement of reason and advantage, every way both to the giver and receiver immediatly puts upon that employment, without which the most curious searches seems but idle things, and that is communication, whereby men both improve themselves and others; It is true, habitual excellency beautifies the minde, but it must be extended beyond that, else the reputation, which is very considerable among vertuous men will lose much honour; the more general the influence, the greater the glory, like the sun whose glory doth not only consist in the body,

body, though that be all light, and the fountain of light, but alſo in the ſpreading beams; they being of the moſt general advantage: But to bring this argument yet nearer our purpoſe, obſerve, that wiſe men in their firſt attempts, in order to the demonſtrating of their parts, are not haſty, raſh and precipitate; they will friendly diſcourſe their notions before they will ſcatter them publickly; this is readily aſſented to, that the moſt accompliſhed men are not ſecured from miſtakes, which will ofttimes attend unavoidably the moſt wary undertaker: men cannot ſo exactly ſhape their beſt thoughts, as that they ſhould appear comely to all, nor can he promiſe himſelf an exemption at all times from miſapprehenſion, paſſion or ſome other accident which may intervene between the intention and the action, theſe are incident to every man, and can be no more divided from the pureſt conſtitutions and innocent lives then light from the ſun: Again, conſiderate men are not ſo taken with their early conceptions as to believe them without exceptions or improvement, and none can ſo freely, innocently and without noiſe do it, as a faithful and judicious friend, who cannot be ſuſpected of envy or partiality on the other ſide: who more fit to pay thoſe juſt acknowledgements then he who will as chearfully commend any worthy quality as he would tenderly, prudently and carefully detect the contrary; that this act of Friendſhip is a ſingular advantage, will further appear upon this enquiry which follows: Examine great Schools and publike communities

and Academies, and you will finde they are not only intended for the ſtudy of Learning in their ſeveral apartments, but alſo for the benefit of Communion in a ſociable converſation, whereby learning is improved and extended in order to the publick benefit of the whole ſociety: We are not without multitude of examples of this kinde, it is by diſcourſe truth is diſputed, errour is expunged; the true meaſure of the capacity and incapacities of men lies originally in that rule that the art or ſcience he is about to acquire preſcribes, but the uſe is more extenſive, and ſo the meaſure is in every mans hand that hath skill to uſe it; and hereby a man comes to make a right eſtimate of all things, by applying the rule to them, which is done by diſcourſing with our ſelves or others: words are the ſhaping of the thoughts, and rally them into order and form: thoughts are beſt diſcerned in their dreſs whether they are trivial or weighty; naked thoughts ſometimes affright us, we dare not look on them, till by words they are adorned, and ſo made amiable; othertimes they ſeem ſo aiery that we cannot hold them, they ſlip from us; but when we have ſhaped them we have greater command of them, and can hold them till we have examined them, and at laſt we have liberty to keep them or reject them, according to their deſert and merit: a mans firſt conceptions may be overvalued or undervalued by accidents, as when melancholy or pride interpoſeth: Melancholy will not ſtay ſo long upon thoughts, being of a roving temper, as till they may be ſcanned, and

pride

pride will examine them overly and ſlightly, becauſe it thinks it cannot erre: We deal uprightly and judiciouſly when we examine things ſo as that we come to a right underſtanding of the nature of them, and can give every thing its true value without leſſening their luſtre, which conſiſts in their nature, uniformity and compoſition: It was the advice of a Grandee, eminent for Learning, and of an excellent judgment, that men ſhould diſcourſe their thoughts and when opportunities were not to be had of diſcourſing them otherwiſe, rather then wholly omit this neceſſary concern, they ſhould direct their diſcourſe to a ſtatue; but he that hath a faithful friend need not put himſelf upon this concluſion: Familiar converſe is always pleaſant and often very profitable and ſeaſonable; *Two wits are better then one*, is a Proverb not to be ſlighted: I may ſee an errour in my Friend he may not ſee in himſelf, (without being over-curious) and this may be ſo argued, that he may be convinced, and his reputation ſecured from reproach and ſcandal.

Secondly, there muſt be that in the object we pitch upon for Frendſhip, that muſt raviſh the affections, and that ſeems to be candour and affability in diſpoſitions and converſation, this is as neceſſary in order to content and the pleaſure of this concern, as reaſon is in order to the profit of it: as reaſon is neceſſary, ſo love and an equal converſation is as neceſſary, this was that which firſt created and ſtill ſupports it; nothing ſo indearing as civility and courteſie; and this

keeps up the reputation of Freendſhip in ſpight of all that envy that malicious perſons conceive againſt it: no cloud can eccliſpe the radiancy of this concern, when it is clothed with civility and courteſie, this is the conſtraining property of kindneſs, and in this ſence objects have a conſtraining force, though properly they have none, but derive their efficacy from the faculties to which they are agreeable: we may underſtand the excellency of this temper by comparing it with thoſe that are of moroſe and harſh ſpirits, ſuch have croſſneſs ſo natural to them, being born and bred up with them, that they cannot be otherwiſe: what torment are ſuch perſons to themſelves? every the leaſt contradiction ſo inflames and ſo ſtrangely tranſports them, and that to ſuch amazing paſſions, that they are not only ungrateful to others but frightful to themſelves; they arrive to ſuch extravagancies that miſchievous effects follow upon them: they are juſtly termed mad, elſe they would not bring upon themſelves a greater miſchief that they may do a leſs; theſe perſons are not fit for any ſerious undertaking; but now a calm and affable temper reduces paſſions, and ſo fortifies themſelves againſt them, that they neither diſquiet their own minds, nor others patience: theſe can paſs by the greateſt injuries inſenſibly; how prudently do they interpret all things in the beſt ſence that are meant in the worſt they do ſee, as to pity, but are blinde as to prejudice: theſe do not practiſe curioſity and a near inſpection into the faults of others, and yet will ſeverely enough detect

tect vice, without grating & upbraiding how amiable is ſuch a diſpoſition, and moſt incomparably fit for this great concern? this temper hath many excellent properties; I ſhall hint at ſome: It is free, pleaſant and complaſant; Love is noble, and admits the beloved into the heart, and gives him a peculiar intereſt there, and in all that he hath beſides, intereſt is ſo great a part of Frendſhip, that we conclude, no Intereſt no Frendſhip: It is the true meaſure of Love; as Intereſt is more or leſs perfect, ſo is the affection more or leſs compleat; proportionable to the intereſt, ſuch is the Frendſhip: All thoſe accompliſhments we have been diſcourſing of, are inſignificant to a perſon without intereſt, like the Gold in the *Indies*; only valuable in themſelves, but of little value to others which are at a diſtance: It is intereſt that inhanceth the worth of any thing, propriety is very indearing and obliging; it puts a beauty upon our enjoyments; how common is it for men to ſlight that in the poſſeſſion of another they admire, when the property is altered and they can call it their own.

Again, Frendſhip is pleſant without thoſe perplexities that attend other relations; as the temper of friends are more equal, ſo their commerce and fellowſhip is more pleaſing; equality ſweetneſs ſociety: Frendſhip is compounded of love and ſociety: how pleaſant are thoſe harmleſs diverſions that conſtantly attend thoſe ſociable companions? and that which makes it the more ſweet, is the utility and neceſſiity of it for the repair of the minde, that may and will be tired in

the moſt beneficial and excellent employments: the moſt diligent perſon cannot be always upon the wing, the lower appetite muſt have content as well as the ſuperiour; for as the diſturbances in the ſenſes much prejudice the operations of the minde, ſo that it cannot act either profitably or pleaſantly for that particular ſeaſon; ſo when the minde is too intent, the ſences are prejudiced, and ſo much ſometimes, that they cannot enjoy thoſe vacancies that prudence and conveniency aſſigns them for the repairs of the body and lower appetite, which may be ſo: weary in attending upon the rational appetite, that pleaſure may ſeem a burthen becauſe unſeaſonable, and they may prefer a ſleepy ſtupidity before the moſt grateful recreation; and the reaſon ſeems to be this becauſe ſence cannot bear equal pace with reaſon, the body with the minde; wiſe men in their moſt eager purſuit of knowledge had evermore a due reſpect to the body, which if impaired the minde could not make its returns either ſo pleaſant or beneficial as before: now it is the great deſigne of friends ſo to regulate their affairs that a general content ſhall be given both to ſence and reaſon, anſwerable to their reſpective capacity: Society as it is neceſſary upon a moral account, ſo it is moſt natural; God himſelf preached this doctrine in paradice, *it is not good for man to be alone*; *Adam* was no other way unhappy, Paradiſe with all its pleaſure could not make up this want, his ſociable nature was not to be contented without it: *Adam* was as perfect in his primitive ſtate as any creature could

could poſſibly be; look into his underſtanding and there you will finde perfect light; into his will, and their exact rectitude; his affections all pure, without any droſs, his body full of beauty and comelineſs: add hereunto his conſtant communion with God who treated him with no other terms but love and kindeneſs, yet after all this, the Lord as a further demonſtration of his favour to *Adam*, he aſſigns him a companion, the proportionableneſs of which is ſignified in that commendation he gives the woman, when he preſents her to *Adam*, ſaying, *ſhe was a help-meet for him*: all this illuſtrates the pleaſure of ſociety. If *Adam* in paradiſe wanted ſociety that was happy in every thing elſe, how pleaſant muſt Frendſhip be to us that are happy in nothing elſe comparatively? what complacency and delight muſt needs ſpring from a ſtate ſo peculiarly free and pleaſant, I might ſpeak much of the delight and ſatisfaction to be found in this regard, but that I ſhall reſerve to another place.

The Fourth and laſt thing promiſed by way of preparation to this great concern is this, that there muſt be ſo much equality in the perſon & capacity of Friends ~~which~~ as will be commenſurate and adequate in every thing material, relating to this relation and ſtate of Frendſhip: for the better directing our inquiſition in this great caſe, a method will be neceſſary. I would explain my meaning here with all caution and circumſpection, that I might not be miſ-underſtood, becauſe the intricacy of the whole Diſcourſe lies in this particular.

First, I do not mean by this equality such an absolute equality as will admit of no disparity that is almost impossible, and certainly unnecessary: Men cannot meet in this concern as lines in the center, no man can perfectly understand the heights and depths of his own minde so as to make a certain estimate of them, and it must needs be without the reach of any other; as the accidents of life in some inferiour things may make a difference as to the outward state, so the perfections of the minde, though not contrary may be unequal, and that because one man may and doth excell another in particular things; and this is so far from causing a disgust, that it promiseth singular advantage; for as a worthy man is dissatisfied though he hath treasured up great things while they remain obscure, so he is highly contented to part them between himself and his friend, and no less is he delighted to see his own worth outvied by his friend: for whatsoever the one possesseth the other cannot want: no matter where the propriety is when the use is in both: the trade that Friends drive is giving and receiving in order to a mutual satisfaction: beside were this seeming disparity wanting, friends would miss one of their great ends: no man is loved for himself: It were well if we could love God at that rate: there is a vast expectation of profit and pleasure among Friends, and much of their satisfaction lies in this, exchanging value for value, and hereby they are both gainers, and this upon a double account. First they add each to others treasure by some additional excellency,

and

and then to their content, becauſe its mutual: It is no cauſe of quarrel that one excels another in worthy qualities, the one never loſeth by the others gain; and then there is much more delight in ſubmitting the reaſon and wills in the voluntary intercourſes and acts of Frendſhip, then can be any other way, and that becauſe there is more love expreſſed in thoſe acts, and the more of love is in any thing, the more ſweet, gratifying and contenting it is: But to come to particulars.

And here I ſhall endeavour to ſhew what are thoſe inequalities that are abſolute, and can never be otherwiſe, and then what inequality that is that may be diſpenſed with and taken up when prudence ſpeaks it neceſſary: That I may not inſtead of explicating intricate this material concern, I ſhall prᵒmiſe theſe Four things wherein this inequality is to be found, and is ſo interwoven into the compoſition and condition of the perſons that no prudence can take up.

Firſt, The inequality between a Prince and a ſlave, a wiſe man and a fool, perſons of different perſwaſions in matters of religion, and in the laſt place, that inequality that is in ſome Relations.

Firſt, A Prince cannot without too baſe a condiſcention and diminution of his honour take his ſlave into his boſome, this is ſo great a diſparity, that no prudence can ever take up; this is both an unnatural and unreaſonable condeſcention.

Secondly, There can be no equality between a wiſe man and a fool; if a wiſe man cannot make Frendſhip with a perſon that is groſly ignorant, becauſe

becauſe of the diſparity that there is between them in reſpect of their reaſon, as I ſhall ſhew anon, much leſs with him that is ſo far from great reaſon, that he hath none at all: fools can never be ſo equallized as to comport with men of competent reaſon, much leſs with wiſe men; their natures are made up of contradiction: there is that madneſs, wilfulneſs and folly in the one that cannot conſiſt with that gravity, wiſdom and humility of the other, as one can never be raiſed to any congruity with the other, ſo the other can never be ſo depreſſed and degenerated as to bear any proportion with him: no ſuch amity can ſtand with ſo great an inequality: I need not uſe any further argument for the confirmation of this aſſertion; Give me leave to ſpeak a word to the ſuppoſition, which is, that men of high parts & ſublimated minds cannot be ſo equalized as to be made fit ſubjects for a Frendſhip with the ignorant: Men eminent in vertue, as they cannot in honour aſſociate themſelves with them that are vicious, ſo they cannot in wiſdom make alliance with the ignorant; and this will be yet more clear, if we conſider the diſtance they ſtand one to the other; a man of raiſed parts can never be ſo degenerated as to comport himſelf with them that are much inferiour; difference in perſon as to the outward ſtate is much, as appeared in the former inſtance between a Prince and a ſlave, but here it's more, becauſe there is all manner of diſtance both as to the minde and outward ſtate: what pleaſure can wiſe men take in ſowing barren ground, or ſcattering

their

their precious ſeed in a Common, or at beſt to ſow among thorns, where the ſeed will never ſpring up to any ſatisfaction: Every ſecular buſineſs ſhall be admitted to come in and choak it; that in which wiſe men are moſt excellent, the other regards not; the more a man underſtands the more he makes neceſſary to himſelf, which thoſe of vicious ſpirits call madneſs, and abject and low ſpirits call needleſs curioſity; and inſtead of putting that worth upon noble and generous actions they deſerve, diſparage them by their ſlights and reflections; and ſo put an undervalue upon the perſon, who the higher they act, the more prejudicial the leaſt aſperſion caſt upon them proves to be; as from theſe ſo unreaſonable a condeſcention cannot be deſired, ſo from the other ſo great an elevation cannot be expected, that true worth, value and excellency that ſhould greaten their minds, and inlarge their capacities: For ſuch alliance is a riddle they can never underſtand, a jewel they would never be at the coſt to purchaſe becauſe they can never be brought to think it neceſſary, no ſuch enemy to learning as the ignorant, but here comes in an objection; Some will be ready to ſay, I exclude all perſons from Frendſhip, but thoſe that are ſtars of the firſt magnitude, and ſo conſequently moſt men and all women are exempted: To this I anſwer, that I am not of that opinion, nor can I ſee any ground for it, I have laid down the rules of Frendſhip in the ſtricteſt ſence, as all material points ought to be, not ſuppoſing all can reach them; they that comes

neareſt do beſt: this muſt be allowed, that difference in vertues make a great difference in Frendſhips, as ſome men are more excellently qualified then others, ſo their alliances are more eſteemable, and fellowſhips more eminent: men differ in their extractions, natures and moral acquirements exceeding much; and then education addes much weight to all the reſt, if it be refined by art: it's true, nothing is more excellent then a natural *genius* when it is rightly directed, it is the ground-work and foundation of all ingenuity; but this is not alike in all, nature is more bountiful to ſome than others; and therefore art is intended to make up the defects of nature, and ſometimes it is ſo ſucceſsful in that behalf, that a man polliſhed by it comes to much perfection: we ſee boys that have been obſerved to be weakly accomodated in reſpect of natural ability, yet through the help of art, which by much diligence they have acquired, they have proved wiſe and uſeful men, though they could never arrive to that perfection that men both naturally wiſe and learned have done; there is as much difference between them as comparative and ſuperlative.

But to come to the Queſtion, I conceive high parts and titles to be no more of the Eſſence of Frendſhip then gay clothes to be of the eſſence of a man: A man eminent in Titles and gloriouſly arayed, may appear more ſplendidly then he that is clothed in rags, but there is as much of the nature of a man in the latter as in the former: men not ſo highly raiſed in their parts, perſons and Eſtates as the former may make a moral

Frendſhip

rendſhip, they have the capacity of it, and why ot the ſignifications of it : a competent reaſon vill ſerve among equalls : Men that look no igher then their particular calling and com-nerce in the world, may have reaſon as to uſeful earts as much united, their converſations as leaſant, their actions as equal as thoſe that tand in a higher ſphere: as reaſon is not ſo e-minent among theſe, ſo they can be happy with-ut it, becauſe they have not the ſame occaſion or it that others have, theſe can as dearly love nd as faithfully comport themſelves, and may rove as faſt and unchangeable friends as any o-her : It is not above the reach of any that hath ny ingenuity: ſome have been apt enough to y, that this is a Scheme of Diſcourſe, a kinde f Romance; rather what ingenious men wiſh ight be, then really what is or can be : If rea-on may be heard in this caſe, it would convince s, that we cannot be happy without Frendſhip, ough in the confluence of all enjoyments, eſ-ecially women that have as much reaſon to im-rove this argument as any other : but they e excluded ſome ſay for want of mental accom-iſhment: theſe would have women appear as ntemptible to themſelves as they have rend-d them in their invectives: how come women ſo ort of men in this regard ? this queſtion is not eaſily anſwered ; compare the perſonal ex-llency of the ſexes, particularly the under-nding and will, theſe ſeem all one, therefore annot be a natural defect in the one, or per-ſtion in the other that muſt make this diffe-

rence;

rence: therefore it muſt be learning and Edu
cation that muſt adde weight to the ballance o
the mans ſide: who can deny that women hav
been eminent for learning, valour and other wor
thy qualities, and why they are not generally ſo
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ple, by which they are corrupted, ſo that th
will looſeth its freedom, and is contracted to lo
and baſe objects, or elſe this comes to paſs fro
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have reaſon it: I do not cenſure them, yet I ca
not but conclude, that there can hardly be t
moral Frendſhip among married women, who
affection, reaſon and freedom muſt attend up
and be commanded by their husbands, who n
ſeldom make it their buſineſs to croſs their wiv
though their ends be never ſo innocent fair; a
handſome: I do not ſay all men are of this u
grateful temper. Secondly

Secondly, there is inequality that may be taken up and diſpenſed with, and that is when the diſtance lies in things not material; I inſtance in riches and commands: A man may not be ſo rich as another, this is no inequality, but what prudence will finde arguments enough to take up or diſpence with; what is riches to reaſon, a noble title to a noble minde; money may elevate abject and ſordid ſpirits, but a generous man would be ſo far from valluing himſelf by it, that he would trample upon it, if it ſtood in competition with vertue and honour; noble minds aſſend the throne when men of vicious principles and practiſes are caſt down with ſhame and ſcorn; witneſſe *Haman*, what a ſtain remains upon his glory we all know: blinde fortune ſeldome makes a juſt eſtimate of things, ſhe diſtributes her favours promiſcuouſly, and men ſcrabble for them, and the ſtrongeſt and thoſe that leaſt deſerves them gets the greateſt ſhare: they pride themſelves in their unmerited gains and Titles, yet they in their higheſt elivations are like fools upon a Theatre, attended with reproach and contempt: men take but a low level at greatneſſe that vallue themſelves by ſuch inſignificant Titles like a great letter in the Alphabet, they take up more room and look bigger but ſignifie no more then the leaſt letter there, like the crackling of thorns under a pot, they make a great noiſe, and blaſt, but after a little while this blaze will extinguiſh; they are more in noiſe then in notion, more in ſhew then in ſubſtance; but men that derive their Titles from merit

rit and desert are so splendid, that no envious cloud, though never so dark can ecclipse their lustre; it's true, men may sooner get a noble Title then a noble minde, there are instances enough of this at hand in this present age, the most unhappy times that vertuous men ever saw, the golden clue hath led many a worthless man into the pallace of Princes, who with the spider carry their poyson thither, serving only by their principles to corrupt, & by their practises to defile the Court: how often have we seen as little things as the change of a besom comparitively, sweep down those cobwebs; those to whom fortune hath given an unexpected and undeserved grandure; are of all others most subject to changes, the interest they first had, presently grows cold and faint, and languishing: as nothing can purchase the treasure of a noble minde, so nothing can depresse or extinguish the glory of it: Times must be beyond all parrellell barbarous wherein such men shall be degraded, Philosophers that were of raised mindes would not part with, nor Exchange one single vertue for all the gold in both the *Indies*, they vallued time better then to expend it npon such trifles: men proportion their care to their value, these are the persons that are expert in all vertue, and consequently most fit for this generouss state because they are most acquainted with sublimity, and their intendment are beyond all Expceptions.

Secondly, Command and duty most be Examined, and ~~there~~ they seem unequal whereever they are, yet it may somtimes be otherwise: In-

stances

ſtances there are many whoſe conditions are far wide from ſervitude, yet they are ſervants in a proper ſence, and muſt own an inequality between them & their maſters, but this diſparity in the ſtricteſt ſence is but a ſubordination in ſome things, and for ſome ſpace of time, or ſome particular buſineſs when the time is expired, and the buſineſs finiſhed, the maſter and ſervant are both equal, the Inequallity did not conſiſt in the eſſential but in the circumſtantial part, not in perſon and condition, but in the art and ſcience which when taught and learned, the Maſter and ſervant are both equal; ſo that there remains no more diſtinction of Maſter and ſervant; but we will ſuppoſe the inequality yet greater, and that there is abſolute power in the Maſter to command without any reſtriction and proportionable obligations on the ſervant to obey beyond diſpute; yet it doth not follow, that theſe commands and duties are always alike, and that they can never be diſpenſed with; it is moſt true, it is not in the power of the inferiour to leſſen his own obedience and duty, or extenuate the ſuperiour authority, yet the ſuperiour may abate and leſſen his own power, according to his will and pleaſure, and ſo they come to be more equal, though the one cannot ſhrink the other can ſtretch; a ſervant cannot upon any juſt pretence deny his obedience to his Maſter, yet his Maſter when it ſeems convenient either for profit or pleaſure, or any other way expedient, can abate or leſſen his own property in the ſervant, without the leaſt injuſtice, and diſcharge him from any or all his obligations;

and this seems to be the way of princes, and the method that they use in raising persons from a low condition to eminency; sometimes it consists with the sagacity and prudence of a prince as well as his fancy, to advance men of low extraction but of noble spirits to places of high trust and honour: some men by the vastness of their natural parts and ability, are most admirably accomodated for the most honourable and noble services, and for emergences of state, may be more useful then those much above them by extraction and titles: these cannot be admitted, though they are qualified for princely receptions, but by the favour of the prince extended toward them: and this doth not diminish nor impair the dominion of the prince, or lessen the subjects obligation, but rather advance and magnifie them; it brightens the Princes glory and makes it more illustrious, it strengthens the Favorites obedience, and makes them more faithful, though not so servile: such condescentions swallows up much of the distance, so that they are not so unequal as before; greatness is neither debased nor diminished by goodness; the sun that glorious and raised body may shine upon a dunghill, yet looses none of its glory, and though there be noisomness in the dunghill, it can contract none of the defilement, so princes when they shine upon their Favorites in the beams of their generosity and benignity, their honour is not in the least impaired thereby: there is no distance so unequal, but it may be taken up, except that which is so twisted with the composition of the persons, that no art

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can looſen, and ſo natural to the relations, that it would be both impious and impudent to endeavour it: ~~and that is~~ baſeneſs of ſpirit, that complexive incongruity to vertue and honour; men of low principles can never level at high and generous actions, nor bear any ſymetry with thoſe of contrary tempers and affections; but if the minde be right, that beginning that was mean may reach a glorious and magnificent end.

Thirdly, perſons of different ſexes cannot comport themſelves for friendſhip according to our method, they muſt be either men or women, not a man and a woman, and that becauſe as their natures are contrary, ſo ~~is~~ their condition, fancy & buſineſs; nor can they rationally deſign, that equal converſation without which Friendſhip is very imperfect, and but a lame attainment; nor can there be that familiar converſe and intimacy neceſſary to this concern, without reflections, if not temptations: ſhould I enter into this argument I might finde enough to ſay, but I judge it neither grateful nor expedient; Let thoſe that are concerned inform themſelves from the inconveniences that daily accrue upon ſuch adventures; they need go no further then common experience and obſervation to ſatisfie their curioſity.

The fourth inequality to be avoided, is, that of Religion, if there be a confluence of all other requiſites, and there be no harmony and agreement, here the Friendſhip will be ſhort lived: nothing do more unite or divide perſons then Religion, if they agree in principles, religion won-

derfully strengthens the Frendship, and engages their hearts one towards another; and this must needs be so, for if men agree in things of the greatest consequence, it is likely they may accord in things less considerable: It is observed that no differences are so great as those occasioned by religion, and no spirits so bitter and inexorable as such as are by disputes in Religion exasperated: how hardly are small dissentings in Religion, though but in one single point, composed? what difficulty then must there needs be in reducing those to compliance that differ in substantial points, in the doctrine as well as in the manner of worship; and if this be not done, the Frendship will be uncertain. I grant, there may be some circumstantial dissenting among friends, and no great prejudice thereby, because those may be argued with indifference and moderation, and a reconciliation is not impossible, but very probable, because in this case the best reason carries it, but in substantial points the matter is not so soon done: Matter of Faith seems too sacred to submit to the best reason while conscience remains unsatisfied, who though misguided and led by examples and custome that have no foundation in the word of God the most infallible rule, yet these shall have such influences upon the seduced conscience, that they will not give place to the most infallible and divine truths, and having made the first impression will pleade their propriety, and oppose it against the commands of divine justice: there is much arguing in this case, little yielding and compliance, when men

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are tainted with corrupt principles, arguing may beget diſguſts and heats, and ingage the paſſions, and ſet them all a quarrelling, and winde up the differences to ſuch heights as will admit of no pacifying arguments: this is plainly proved by common experience; witneſs the Church of *Rome*, and the Reformed Churches; what vaſt endeavours has there been for an accomodation, but with no ſucceſs; the animoſity grows higher, and a reconciliation more impoſſible, as is evident by the vaſt treaſures that have been expended, and effuſion of blood that hath been ſpilt, and is ſtill ſhedding: Look a little nearer, even among our ſelves, where the diſſentings are not ſo univerſal, and we ſhall finde much vexation and trouble: Is it not obſervable, that perſons that have lived and converſed together a great while, have at laſt parted, and no cauſe viſible appearing; there ſeems to be a twofold reaſon for this, Firſt, from the difference in opinion which prevails ſo over the paſſions, that love the maſter-affection which for ſome time hath preſerved unity, has now changed its property, and by accident, occaſions the greateſt quarrel: had men no religion, they would not be ſo liable to diſſentions, there being no cauſe for diſpute; they were equal in ſuch a condition, I had almoſt ſaid equally unhappy, but it may be ſuppoſed, that prudence may do much to compoſe things, it may keep in the fire a while, but not long, it will at laſt break out into a flame: nothing more common then for men to be great friends, while neuters in religion, but if either come to be ſin-

cerely pious, they fall a quarrelling presently, it is not the religion that doth it, but the contrariety of the one against the Religion of the other; if a man loves his friend, he cannot see him walking in ways of death and not reprove him, and that smartly; and this cannot be born what amity can continue: where there can be no arguing without quarelling, no reproof without retorting; now friends begin to treat one the other with suspision and absent themselves from that equal conversation and intimacy which first made the amity and must still preserve it.

Secondly, the efficacy of piety and religion it self insensibly loosens the knot of this alliance, because the one cannot bear the convictions and restraints that will be laid on him by the other, which though not by designe, and intentially, but by example and accidentally, will be very severe and confining to his extravagant temper: I have read a story of a young gallant, who had a pious Father, that had given him many admonitions, but he little minding the counsel and example of his father, became vilely vicious, and when he intended to drink to excess or be any other way debauched in the room where the effiges of his dead father hung, he would first draw a curtain before the picture, saying, he could not be frolick while he saw any thing of his father, who had so often reproved him; such convictions attended him: I shall only add, that in all alliances, religion, if sincere, is the surest tie; nothing we enjoy can be constant and durable without this: this is the fruit of the tree of

life,

life, which if we feed on, will make our comforts not onely long laſting, but our happineſs everlaſting.

Laſtly, the inequality of relations comes to be conſidered; but before I proceed, give me leave to take notice of an objection which ſeems ready to aſſault me at my firſt entrance into this part of the diſcourſe, and that is, that I have endeavoured all along to confine friendſhip, and limit it to a moral capacity and ſo have excluded relations which in truth, are more capable & receptive of it: there are three relations eſpecially that make this challenge; Father and Son, Husband and Wife, and Brethren: Pray give me leave to leade theſe Objectors into the nature of theſe relations, and there they will ſatisfie themſelves of the invalidity of this ſplendid ſcruple, which is more in ſhew then in ſubſtance.

To begin with the firſt, namely, Father and Son, this relation is ſo far from equality, that it intends and commands the contrary, it is a compoſition of diſparity, which is ſo natural to the relation that it can neither have a being nor well-being without it: Inſtance, the power and authority of the Father, which can never be leſſened, the fear and duty of the Son, which cannot be excuſed: a father is much more bound in this relation then any other ſuperiour, for they may ſometimes diſpence with their propriety in this regard, without prejudice to themſelves, and with advantage to the inferiour, but a parent cannot abate any of his juſt authority, but with

injury both to himself and his son; to himself by failing in his duty, which is ever to keep up his power in all lawful things; to his son, in laying before him a temptation to disobedience, by his example, while he omits his duty: *I*ndulgence is the inlet to all other traps and snares: sad *I*nstances we have had of this in our present Age, where all vices are made almost indifferent, but such as disturb the tranquility of the Kingdom: there are many things of the nature of this relation that cannot consist with a moral Friendship: Instance, the power and command of the Father, the fear and obedience of the son, these are contrary to that personal equality, which cannot be exempted from Friendship; it being as natural to the being and well-being of that concern as inequality is to this of relations: the propereſt expressions between Friends is that which a Father and son never do, as constant, familiar converse, equal conversation, wherein they always submit their wills and affections each to other: there are many things in friendship that cannot be admitted where there is a challenge of duty and command: it is no prejudice to a parent, and the duty *I* owe him, to pay all possible endearments to my Friend, because there are many things due to the one, the other cannot challenge: *I*t is not my designe to derogate from any relation, that just esteem they ought to have: this must be allowed, that this relation makes great dearness and a most inviolable Friendship, and under such real obligations, as the laws of God and men hath made indispensable, and that because

cauſe there are duties that obliged them before any other Frendſhip could be made, and have left ſuch impreſſion as muſt abide, and will never give place to any other, becauſe of their propriety which is ſupreme: There are two things eſpecially I ſhall point at, wherein this relation differs from a moral Friendſhip, and that is, firſt, in their ſprings from whence they flow, and Secondly, in their ends and deſignes: Firſt, the love and frendſhip of the relation is grounded purely upon natural cauſes, and therefore called natural affection: there is no need of prudence in this caſe, no man conſults his reaſon, whether he ſhall love his ſon or not, a natural inſtinct inclines him to that, but if his ſon be rebellious, then he hath need of prudence to direct him how to regulate his affections, ſo as his indulgence may not prejudice his ſon: There are many things binding to perſons in this relation, as the law of God, the law of nature, and their love to themſelves: parents love their children becauſe they love themſelves they are perpetuated in their children, poſterity being the inſtruments of a civil immortality; likewiſe the ſon cannot diſpute his obedience to his father, he being bound with his father by the ſame laws, and under more obligations then the father can be. 1. he has his being from his father, by which he is capacitated for al the reſt that follow, as his preſervation, education, example, ſupply, & all theſe adde to the ſons obligations, but moral frendſhip has no law or obligation prediſpoſing the perſons for frendſhip, but is grounded upon

upon moral principles, and is animated by that profit, reward & pleaſure that is annexed to the object: Love in this reſpect is the effect of an unconſtrained choice, and thereſore is not ſubject to thoſe uncertainties that natural affections are; nothing holds the affection ſtronger and longer then a free choice, we experience this; the love of relations is not much to be truſted in, as the duties ſo the love of relations is changeable, and much altered by accidents; inſtance, parents much abate in their affections to their children that once they dearly loved, haply occaſioned by ſome rebellious & unworthy carriage & actions againſt commands, perſwaſions, threatnings and intreaties, which aggravate the crimes and make them inexcuſable: ſometimes croſs marriages become a great ground of quarrell, when they are inferiour or unequal: Again, when ſons put themſelves upon diſhonourable deſignes, and by their extravaganees brings a general ruine upon themſelves and families, and grow ſo deſparate, that inſtead of cheriſhing and ſupporting their parents againſt the injuries of others, lay violent hands on them themſelves, and imbrew their hands in their bloud, or conſent with others, unnaturally deſigning againſt them, from whom they have their being: *David* had ſuch a ſon in *Abſalom*, all which ſo alienates the hearts of parents, that they cannot give them a favorable aſpect without cenſure, nor a place in their thoughts, but with reluctancies, and the aggravations which ſecond theſe high provocations are ſo many and hainous, that natural affection ſometimes

ometimes is thereby quit, and abandoned, and hat upon just and solid grounds: Othertimes parents fail in their duty to their children, and carry t unnaturally toward them that have deserved better, nothing more notorious, then for men to forsake the sons of their love, preferring some *Dalilah* before them, upon whom they prodigally spend their substance, discouraging and corrupting their children together, which they do by their inhumane actions and vicious practises, and this is worthy our consideration, how separation will alienate the affections of relations, so that there shall not remain in them a powerful inclination, either to sollicit or endeavour the prosperity one of another, but shall prefer a faithful servant before the relation: this hath been so amazing to me, that I have thought natural affection one of the greatest uncertainties of humane life, and not to be confided in, because men so strangely degenerate in this respect, that they make themselves inferiour to the brutes.

Secondly, as the original from whence the love of this relation comes is incongruous to that of Frendship, so their ends are contrary: Frendship designes nothing more then the pleasure of society, whereby by communicating each others joys and hopes, afflictions and disappointments, they come to obtain the proper and most useful effects of Frendship, but parents have no such expectation, they do not aim at a sociable contentment in their children, nor children in their parents: how freely do parents and children consent to be divided, sometimes into the farthest

part

part of the world, one from another; if their persons, estates, or content may be advanced by it, and are very well satisfied, to meet once or twice in their whole lives, or to converse together in a few lines, which are uncertainly ventured, and seldom arrive at the desired place, and when they come can do no more but tell them they left a relation alive, but how long he hath continued so since is most uncertain: men account themselves rich in relations, when their propriety is so far removed that they serve only for contemplation and generation, both which gives but a general no particular contentment; it is otherwise among friends, they cannot satisfie themselves in contemplation, fruition is that which compleats their felicity: Friends are like the turtles, they never associate themselves with other birds, they never sing and fly abroad for recreation as other birds do, but they have their peculiar notes for each other, and when the one dies, the other droops till he dies; so friends, they need none of those vanities that are remote, they never search after them, the chatting of Friends is to themselves a most pleasing note; they live in the embraces of each other, and if one dies how impatiently doth the other lament after him until he die also: So then it is plain by what has appeared in this argument, that this relation of Father and son hath not in it the capacity of a moral Friendship, how then can it have the signification of it?

The Second Relation to be examined is Husband and Wife, the former relation was grounded upon natural causes, but this upon

justice

juſtice and reaſon, purſuant to a ſolemn league and Covenant, which cannot be violated, but by the worſt perfidiouſneſs, and as the love of that relation was natural this is conjugal, and in ſome reſpect greater then natural affection, becauſe here are greater obligations and more binding duties annexed to this relation then to any other, and that by a twofold law, the law of God, and the law of man. I muſt expect to meet with many perſons that will think themſelves diſobliged by this argument, therefore I muſt ſay ſomething to ſatisfie them: I muſt confeſs, I have leſs pleaſure in this part of the diſcourſe, then in all the reſt; This relation by a groundleſs ſuppoſition has been deemed the beſt capacity for Frendſhip, as having in it ſelf all that accomodation neceſſary: Let us conſider the perſons, and then the relation, the perſons ſtrictly conſidered, are not fit for this concern, not only becauſe of the difference in ſexes, though that be ſomething, but upon many other material conſiderations.

Firſt, There is the greateſt inequality poſſible in the perſons, and it is conſtituted by the relation it ſelf; perſons may be equall before marriage, they cannot be ſo afterwards: now what makes the change, only the relation, nothing elſe could do it; if a King gives his Crown and throne to a ſlave, it's no wonder if the ſlave poſſeſſes that throne and Crown, and he be degraded, but this is not ſo great a prejudice, as ſometimes happens in marriages, for the ſlave is but an uſurper, and there is no law to confirm him in that undeſerved grandure but thoſe that make a like

adventure

adventure in this relation; they do not only throw away their robes, and become equal in subjection to persons of abject spirits, and conditions, and subservient to such as were slave before, or so inferiour that they would have thought it preferment enough to have had the meanest imploy about their persons; and that which aggravates it, is that this bondage cannot be thrown off, as in the former instance, but is confirmed by a Law both civil and moral, which cannot be violated: there are many things of the nature of Frendship, and such as are most eminent, which cannot stand with this relation; instance they cannot submit their judgments and wills one to another in all things, this Frendship must do or it cannot be, and this is expected among Frends which are equal, but not among those that cannot be so: for a superiour to submit his judgment and will to an inferiour, is neither just nor convenient, but for the inferior to submit both to the superiour, is just and necessary: it is true, there is command and duty in Frendship but those that command, and them that obey are equal, and though they may sometimes command different things they have not different wills, but this cannot be, where command and duty is severally in the persons, because where there is an absolute power to command, there follows a proportionable obligation to obey as a just due that cannot be excused or omitted: and because power is not alwaies so regular and just as it ought to be, therefore it is, that there is such difference & jarring among inferiors and superiors;

rs; and this will ever be ſo long as men have ny thing of pride, or paſſion, and ſo they ugment or leſſen their authority by theſe ules, and hereby ſometimes the ſtate of marri- ge is ſo imbittered that it becomes harſh and un- grateful, they will pleade the threatning, thy deſire ſhall be to thy husband, and he ſhall rule over thee, and the laws of men are ſeldom favou- able in this kinde, but impoſe more upon it, as we finde by the civil law of Nations, which commands the man proving bankrupt and caſt into priſon, his wife be ſold, if ſhe be worth it to redeem her husband; and as if the bondage were not ſevere enough, the conſent of the wife comes in, and twiſts the cord, and makes it yet ſtronger; the woman is obliged by no law, till ſhe bindes her ſelf by a voluntary conſent, nei- ther law of God nor man doth conſtrain her to come under theſe reſtrictions, but finding her there lays more obligations upon her.

2ly, let us examine the relation it ſelf (ſome ſay) that conveys Frendſhip, we will look into the firſt marriage, that in Paradiſe, if a perfect frendſhip, can be conveyed by the relation, we ſhall finde there *Adam* had as much reaſon to contract a perfect frendſhip with *Eve* as any man ever had, ſhe being made of the body of *Adam* in a more peculiar maner then any elſe ever was, and becauſe ſhe was the gift of God immedialty delivered to *Adam* as a token of ſpecial favour, and becauſe there was no creature ſo ſuitable to him as ſhe was; and this ſimilitude was ſome in- ducement from a natural principle that inclines every

every creature to love its like; yet notwithstanding all this, we see that in *Adam* that seems contrary to Friendship in many things, especially this, that he so readily and upbradingly laid that blame upon his wife, a true friend would have taken upon himself, so that there seems a want of Friendship in paradise, and this may very well be, paradise was not without its wants, man wanted a wife for generation, and why not a friend for counsel, advice, and conversation? had *Eve* had a faithful friend, who would have encouraged and strengthned her against the insinuations of the serpent, she might have baffled his arguments, and repelled his strongest temptations: on the other side, had *Adam* been so happy to have had a faithful monitor, in the *intermi*, when the temptation lay before him, he would not have so rashly ventured upon the breach of that primitive and positive command, yet he had a greater advantage then the woman, in that he might have argued the point with the woman (with less surprise) then the woman could with the Serpent; he had the advantage of discourse with her: he might have demanded of her, how she could think to escape the penalty of so peremptory a law, and by what arguments she was invited to the breach of so positive a command, and what advantage she propounded to her self in so bold and criminal an undertaking; such argüing might have given some check to the temptation; much arguing there was between the woman and the Serpent: where was *Adam* then? had there been Friendship *Adam* could

could not have been ſo long from *Eve*, being in the ſame garden with her, till the Serpent could accompliſh ſo great a work; this ſeems to be a work of time: neither is it likely, had there been this amity, that ſhe would have intended, much leſs have acted any thing, till ſhe had acquainted *Adam* with it, with whom ſhe would have had inclination enough to adviſe with in ſuch a difficult caſe, there being always a communication of affairs between friends: no wonder the woman was ſeduced when all the wit and policy of hell was imployed to do it: but *Adam* without that was betrayed; he haſtily ventures without reſervation and exception upon the breach of ſo poſitive a command.

Again, if this relation could convey the beſt Frendſhip, none in that relation could miſs it, but experience evinces the contrary: we finde not ſeldom their open enmity; if the relation could convey it, though there was little love before marriage, there would be no want of it after, but this is clear to common obſervation, that where perſons have ventured into this relation before, the affection and fancy hath been fixed, the relation hath been ſo far from engaging the affections and uniting the heart, that it hath encreaſed the enmity, and ſometimes to murther and other violent acts; and I might bring many reaſons for this, but I do not love to rake in a kennel.

Again, as repeated fruition is the moſt binding thing among Friends, in this relation it is moſt looſening; I have heard ſome ſay, and ſeriouſly to, that repeated fruition is a dull thing,

& blunts the edge of the greatest affection, Frendship in this relation would be arbitrary, and therefore it is that there are such strong commands obliging persons to the duties of it, as is evident by the laws of God and man : It is observable, that Frendship is most tied, and yet most free; there are no laws confining friends, they have no need of coaction to obedience, love is a law to it self, this shews the natural unfixedness of the one and the stability of the other : some men were they left to their liberty as frends are, they would change their wives as often as they put off their clothes; men are much guided by humour and fancy, small things deludes the fancy at one time, and things as contemptible will alter it at another ; men hastily catch at a wife, she pleaseth him well, after a little while fancy hath found out some new object, and then we hear them say, they cannot fancy the old, the new is better; but Frendship is ever guided by reason and judgment, and findes more amiableness and lovelines in the object every day : give me leave to adde, that persons in this relation are not capable of those convenient and necessary acts of kindeness that friends are, Instance in emergences of state or times of war, a frend may be eminently useful in either, but what can a wife do, she can have no vote in Council, nor command in war : The wife of *David*, though the daughter of *Saul*, and therefore did not want interest when he left the Court and betook himself to the wars, signified little to him, but *Jonathan* his friend was more useful then then ever;

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and this is moſt conſiderable, the advantage frendſhip has beyond relations, for perſonal kindeneſs which comes to paſs from hence, becauſe they are united in heart though not in perſon in a legal ſenſe as men and their wives are; and this is no ſmall advantage, hereby they are more uſeful in times of extremity, where none will aſſiſt and help but them alone; many acts of frendſhip women are not capable of, if a husband be arreſted, his wife cannot bail him, but his friend can; if her teſtimony be never ſo full and pertinent, it will not be taken for her husband: I might inſtance in many other things, but I haſten from this ungratefull argument.

Laſtly, If Frendſhip were made by this relation, then no man would ſeek it elſewhere, but we ſee thoſe perſons who have as much content as the relation can give ambition, this ſtate of frendſhip and they make the firmeſt and ſtrongeſt alliances in this regard, and the reaſon they give is this, that they would finde ſatisfaction moſt ſuitable to their nature and being, and that (ſay they) can be no where but among equals, where this only can be found, that the hearts are united and the perſons free to all friendly acts and entercourſes, and this cannot be among relations, where the perſons are joyned, but too often the hearts are free: I hope none will miſtake and think I have no true value for this relation, I have really a great reſpect for this relation, and highly eſteem it where it is in truth rightly managed: They are moſt happy that meet with leaſt diſappointments every one will conclude; poverty

and ſickneſs what a change do they make, perſons in this relation aim at many ends, which if they miſs they are impatient, and that becauſe there doth not ſeem efficacy enough in the relation to command a ſubmiſſion to any great diſappointment: And by how much the more evils cannot be foreſeen, by ſo much the more intolerable they be: I ſhall point at but one end and that is children, if they fail of this end, as ſometimes they do, what an alienation doth this make, or rather a ſeparation: I am loth to ſay, it is plain enough, but friends can miſs their ends in many things without diſtraction, croſſes doth not ſeparate them, but rather unite them: *Ionathan* and *David* were never ſo united as then when affliction ſeized them, then it was that they renewed their covenant and ſtrengthned their affections one towards another: Thus I have led you through two relations, the one grounded upon the principles of nature, and therefore binding, the other upon a promiſe or covenant no leſs obliging, & to both theſe friendſhip is due, but not that friendſhip or love I am treating of; there is natural affection due to the one and a conjugal love due to the other, which muſt be paid with all care and circumſpection.

I ſhall touch a little briefly upon the third relation, and ſo come to what I moſt aim at.

The Third Relation I am to ſpeak to is, that of Brethren; I ſhall conſider the perſons and relation jointly; brethren having in them all that worthineſs that friendſhip requires, are the fit-

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teſt ſubjects for friendſhip, but they do not paſs into it upon the account of relation, nature paſſes but little, but as they are diſpoſed and prepared for it, either by natural qualities or moral excellencies: We ſee brothers that live apart, and adopt themſelves to Families remote, they have little love: Frendſhip is nouriſhed by the ſame matter by which it was firſt made, it was created by communion and fellowſhip in an equal converſation, and muſt live by the ſame: the Wiſe man obſerved, that in a time of ſeparation frendſhip was of a ſmall ſignification: *Better* (ſaith he) *is a neighbour near then a brother afar off*; and he draws his argument from the incapacity of the one, and the capacity of the other; for all friendly acts & intercourſes, its true frendſhip may laſt, when by ſome accident the perſons are divided, but not in that vigour it did before: it is a languiſhing friendſhip; we may underſtand this by the ſimilitude of the love of the iron to the loadſtone, which ariſeth from a hidden quality, the motion of the iron towards the loadſtone is ſlow while at a diſtance, but quick when near, and when it doth but touch it, it cleaves ſo faſt, that unleſs forced, 'twill never part, and when it is parted 'twill at the furtheſt part of the world retain the vertue of the touch; ſo Friends while at a diſtance move ſlowly, but when together are ſo united, that they cannot be ſeparated without great force and violence, and their ſeparation is like the dividing the heart from the body: now that there is nothing in the bare relation that can amount to friendſhip, will be further evident by

our daily experience, which furniſheth us with inſtances of the great animoſities among brethren, and ſuch averſions as cannot conſiſt with friendſhip: Look into the family of *Adam*, and there you ſee murther; into the Family of *Iſaac*, you would think you ſhould not miſs of kindeneſs there, yet inſtead thereof we finde *Eſau* conſulting with himſelf how he ſhould ſlay his brother: this is moſt true, that there may be much indeared affection between brethren, occaſioned by the equalneſs of their perſons and converſation, they having in them all other requiſites, are firſt to be choſen as the moſt fit perſons for friendſhip, the relation being ſomething, and when both theſe meet the relation and frendſhip, they exemplifie one the other, and ſhine moſt illuſtriouſly; but ſome may think, I have purſued this ſubject too far, I am ſure it was with no deſigne to derogate from the juſt deſert due to any relation, yet I would not have them monopolize our eſteem, ſo as to ſnuffle out Frendſhip, which ſo truly deſerves our value.

I come now to the qualifications which are neceſſary in order to a well grounded frendſhip: all that *I* have ſaid hitherto is previous to what remains: *I* hope none will expect frendſhip in an artificial dreſs, attended with elegant phraſes, and words well accented, this being both above my ability, and far wide of my deſigne, which is a general ſatisfaction in this material concern, in the plaineſt way that *I* can; glaſing and gaudy embelliſhments being trivial accompliſhments where truth is concerned, which

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ſhines bright enough without them.

The Firſt qualification is this, there muſt be an intire affection and love among friends, this is the principal hindge upon which this concern turns, this being a philoſophical diſcourſe it will be neceſſary to touch upon love in general. Love in the general nature of it is either rational and ſupream, or ſenſual and ſubordinate, in the firſt ſence love is the moſt vigorous, potent, ſovereign, affectionate; it ſits as Queen-Regent in the will, and governs all the faculties; love is the ſpring of humane actions, and gives life, being, and motion to them all; the other affections, as deſire, hope, joy, fear, anger, all theſe are but the ſeveral forms and ſhapes of love; for as the object of love is affected with this or that circumſtance, ſo is love proportionably inveſted with this or that form; if the object be abſent, love goes out to meet it in deſire, if preſent, it ſolaceth it ſelf in fruition and delight; if under danger and hazard, love trembleth with fear: if it be impeded or hindred, love waxeth angry and impatient, when there is any poſſibility of enjoying the object: love moves nimbly after it if impoſſible of enjoyment; ſo that the object be loſt, love clothes it ſelf in mourning habit: there is alſo a kinde of love in the ſenſual and animal part, but this is more paſſionate, that in the ſuperiour part more rational; this is more uncertain, that more fixed; this more confuſed, that more regular and uniform.

There is a threefold love,

Firſt Divine, and that is altogether ſpiritual

and highly rational.

Secondly, there is a natural love, and that may be bruitish as well as rational.

Thirdly, there is a moral love, and that consists in a mean betwixt both, evermore the thing beloved gives the denomination to love; if the object be divine, it is a divine love; if sensual, it is a bruitish love; if moral, it is a moral love.

Love is an affection of union whereby we desire and enjoy perpetual union with the thing beloved, and there are these two effects that immediatly flow from this union: First, it is transforming and changing, by love we are changed into a thing more noble or more vile; so that we debase our selves when we love any unworthy and inferiour thing, whatever we love we give a kinde of dominion over us, so that the will loseth its dignity when it loves abject things.

Again, Love inlarges and widens the heart, not only for the reception of the bounty and generosity of the object, but the object it self is that the heart goes out after when the will is filled with love, it awakens all the powers, and moves all the faculties towards the object, the understanding meditates and is enquiring after the excellency of the thing beloved, still musing and plodding about it; the will is obstinate and will not be charmed of its object; the thoughts they are still kindling the affections who are in eager pursuit after the thing beloved, but *I* shall speak more particularly to this matter, and explain my meaning in this particularly. My meaning is, that there must be an intire love not

only to the qualities of the minde, though thoſe be moſt worthy, but this love muſt reach the ſuperficies of the body, if that be ungrateful there cannot be a complacential Frendſhip; As the interiour part muſt have Analogy to reaſon, ſo the external part muſt be accommodated to the fancy: in ſhort, there muſt not be conceived in the fancy a diſguſt againſt the form and condition of the perſon, all love begins with the perſon, if that be diſpleaſing and ungrateful, nothing will ſatisfie, there is that in the perſon of every man that either obligeth or diſobligeth the fancy: inſtance, there may be ſome perſonal defects which are ſo natural, that they cannot be divided from the perſon, and theſe may be very diſpleaſing; or there may be ſome croſs diſpoſitions, & they may be ſo riveted by cuſtome, that they will hardly (if ever) be cured; Love ſtudies the perſon in the firſt place, and it is moſt neceſſary, becauſe as there is a kinde of antipathy in ſome perſons to ſome creatures, ſo that they cannot be brought to take any pleaſure in them, ſo many times we ſee an antipathy in men againſt ſuch particular perſons; there is no more reaſon to be given for the latter then the former, yet the contrariety is as evident in the one as the other, and this may be occaſioned by the miſtake of fancy, rather then any real defect in the object; the eye of fancy may be ſo vitiated, that it may not be able to behold the clearneſſe of a ſplendid object with complacency and delight, a weak eye cannot look with content upon a clear air, much leſſe can it behold the ſun, there is ſuch a contrariety

riety in them; ſo that we often draw a curtain between them as a ſcreen or veil, not that the air or ſun are not both excellent in themſelves but the reaſon why they are not deſirable, is the eye is not receptive of them, becauſe of its own imbecility and weakneſſe: fancy is often ſurpriſed in the firſt choice and election, ſometimes it's blinde, and declines objects moſt worthy, and purſues thoſe that are moſt baſe and abject, it ſeldom conſults reaſon, but often betrays it; ſpacious objects convey themſelves through the fancy to the will; the ſenſes they inveagle the fancy, and the fancy betrays and captivates the will: Fancy othertimes is ſo idle that it will not take the pains to examine things but is put off with outward gaudineſs, it ſeldome is ſo circumſpect to act by rule, and that is the reaſon we are ſo uncertain in our firſt elections of perſons and things: Fancy raſhly fixeth without the conſent of reaſon, to which it ought to be ſubſervient, rather complying with ſence, which makes it ſtray and warp from the exact rule; it is very hard to ſecure the fancy which lies open to ſo many temptations; and if it be betrayed and deluded, it is as hard to reclaim it: *I* have thought that paſſage in *Samuel* worth obſervation, when he was ſent to anoint *David*, *Eliab* the elder brother paſſed before him, he fancies him preſently, becauſe he was a comely perſon: we experience this among our ſelves, when we come into a room where we ſee many ſtrange faces, we take an affection to one more then the reſt: *Jonathans* heart was knit to *David*, while he was diſcourſing

diſcourſing with *Saul*, and he loved him as his own ſoul: there is no reaſon to be given why a man ſhould pitch upon one perſon with delight without the leaſt concern for the reſt, but this fancy is ſurprized, and that ſo ſtrangely ſometimes, that reaſon cannot prevail to break thoſe fetters the man is manacled with haply to his great prejudice and utter ruine.

As there are ſeveral things that may betray and delude the fancy, ſo there are things that diſpleaſe it, that may be removed as a ſupercilious gravity, this is very ungrateful, yet may not be ſo rivited as never to be taken away, as a harſh and ſevere aſpect, and the like: but thoſe things that cannot be divided from the perſon muſt (though never ſo ungrateful in themſelves) be kindely accepted: that which ſeems deformity to another which ſtands at a diſtance to the object, may appear pleaſant to me who am more united, and therefore I may ſee comelineſs where they fancy nothing but the contrary: this being the prudence of friendſhip to reconcile it ſelf to every thing that at the firſt view may ſeem not grateful; if this cannot be done fancy is ſtill uneaſy; where there is a latitude, every faculty will endeavour a ſatisfaction; fancy bears ſo great a ſway in all matters of Love and friendſhip, that it will be humored and that in the firſt place, and the rather becauſe it ſtands nearer then any other faculty to that object about which it is converſant, it is ſo conſiderable, that nothing can be done without it. So there are many things very pleaſing and acceptable to the fancy, if it be rightly guided, as

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an humble demonier, a sweet and amiable conversation: the wise-man observed, that *the countenance of a man rejoyceth his friend*, if I cannot look upon my friend with delight I cannot love him, looking breeds liking, and proves the inlet to affection: *Jonathan* embraced the person of *David*; very pleasant was *Jonathan* to *David*, his love passed the love of the most passionate woman.

Secondly, as we must love the person of our friend, so we must love his conditions, we cannot love his person and hate his conditions, this is a paradox, and altogether impossible: I do not say, but we may and must love the persons of our enemies, though we must hate aud abominate their conditions, if they be evil; but this is with a love of charity, it cannot be with a complacential love; what felicity can a vertuous man take in a vicious person, he may love him so as to pitty and pardon, and converse with him at distance, but never so as to court his society, and place him in his bosome, it may be my friend is not the most affable courteous and obliging, or the patientest, or the best humoured man in the world, yet I may love him; one worthy quality is enough to make friendship, but the more worthy the greater the reason: a friend must endeavour a reconciliation to the condition of his friend as well as his person, as far as possible, and throw the mantle of love over those defects that are either accidental, or such as are not so riveted that they cannot by contrary examples and friendly arguments be

expunged: inſtance, a paſſionate man may ſee ſo much ſweetneſs in patience that he may abhor contention, and ſo much pleaſure in a free and equal converſation, that he may hate reſervedneſs, and ſo much grace and beauty in humility, that pride may be caſt out as moſt contemptible: reaſon will mightily prevail with ingenious perſons in this regard, and they may eaſily be convinced of theſe vanities which cannot conſiſt with Frendſhip: love cannot be ſupported but by that which is ſubſtantial, and this muſt be allowed, that there are ſome diſpoſitions that cannot comport themſelves for Frendſhip: there are diſpoſitions or rather evil qualities that I could never be reconciled to, and they are eſpecially four, covetouſneſs, and deep melancholy, pride and envy; I couple them together as thoſe tyrants which aim at a perfect conqueſt over the heart, and life, theſe can never ſtand with this relation and ſtate of Frendſhip, becauſe they are diametrically contrary, and the only poyſon that corrupt and deſtroy it,

Firſt, *Covetouſneſs* ingroſſes the whole heart, and will endure nothing in the leaſt contradictory. Covetouſneſs ſo debaſes the heart, that no noble quality can inhabite there; it bends and ſubmits all to the mettal it ſo dearly loves and ſo highly values, and that is thick clay. Reaſon, conſcience, and affection are all entangled in this golden web, ſo that they cannot ſoare aloft either to fix upon, or contemplate thoſe things that ennoble a man, and makes him act like himſelf according to his moral excellencies and immorta-

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lity of the ſoul. A covetous man will lay all things at ſtake, rather than his mony; his reputation, life, ſoul, any thing ſhall go; ſee this in *Gebezi* and in *Demas*, the one imbraced a leproſie, rather than looſe a talent; the other forſook God to imbrace this preſent world. Have we not inſtances of this before our eyes every day, when we ſee men lay their honour in the duſt, ſacrifice life, content and every thing to this dumb Idol; that man that loves mony more than himſelf, or God, muſt needs love it better than his friend, and therefore above all perſons fit to be excluded.

Secondly, *melancholy* in the extremity of it comes next to be examined, and this always accompanies the former; that fills the heart with diſtracting cares, vehement deſires, which if croſſed, preſently this is ready, as an effect of that cauſe; as appears in wicked *Haman*; he coveted not only riches but honour, as moſt covetous men do; though they never do a generous act to deſerve it; and becauſe he could not obtain it from *Mordecai* an inconſiderable perſon in his eſteem, he preſently falls into a fit of melancholy, and though he had more to boaſt of then moſt men in reſpect of his honour, riches, and favour with the King, yet all this ſignified nothing, as long as *Mordecai* ſtood in the kings gate, who refuſed that obeiſance to *Haman*, he ſo eagerly coveted, and ſo impartiently pined after, and hereupon the devil deludes him, and helps him to hammer out this device in his own ſhop, (which is melancholy) to hang *Mordecai*.

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This was the anvil *Haman* had been working at before, when he had framed an engine to deſtroy all the Jews. I cannot find any ill quality excluded from melancholy, as wrath, malice, envy, uncharitableneſs, miſ-truſt, ſelf-love in the higheſt degree, and where all theſe are, we may juſtly conclude there cannot be frendſhip : they love nothing but themſelves, they indulge themſelves, they admire themſelves, as if God had created them for no other purpoſe , or to any other end ; and ſo extream wilful are they, if they will their own deſtruction, they will effect it, they are naturally the greateſt cowards in the world, and they cannot be otherwiſe, except carried out by ſome violent motion, as pride, jealouſie, covetouſneſs, or malice ; *&c.* they will lay violent hands upon themſelves, and this they call reſolution, but it is the cowardlyeſt act poſſible to come upon nature when it is naked, and deſtroy it, when by ſtarving or diſcontent nature is brought low, to lay violent hands upon it this cannot be valour. I dread nothing more than this pettiſh humour and diſpoſition ; I could never make friendſhip with a perſon who in all reſpects *I* might believe would be as prodigal of my life, ſhould *I* truſt it with him as of his own. Many Examples we have of this daily, and much blood hath been ſhed by melancholy, that often harbours ſuch diſcontents, that nothing but blood can ſatisfy, and not ſeldom the blood of thoſe they have moſt reaſon to preſerve ; *Judas* was ſuch a one, who through covetouſnes firſt betrayed his maſter, and after through melancholy

lancholy hanged himself.

Secondly, let us consider the other couple pride and envy. A proud man cannot be a true friend because he cannot deny himself, in any respect: He wholy aimes at himself in his thoughs, words, and actions; his honour, pleasure, ease is all he looks after; he is not sollicitous how it fares with others: He will be a *Diotrephos* and have the preheminence: he cannot give place: himself is his end, and his will is his rule, by which he squares all his actions, and the Law he endeavours passionately to bring all others unto subjection to, at least all those that are under his power and jurisdiction: like *Haman* he will rather lose his life, then abate any thing of his pride, is contentious and clamorous and cannot stand with friendship. *Iehu*-like he carries on all his designes: he is well learned in the art of multiplication and addition, but a novice in the rule of substraction, except from others to himself. Pride is an unbecoming garment, let it be never so splendid in shew, it is but a fools coate: a proud man is still building up his own reputation with the ruine of others, he thinks himself always degraded when another is valued; and whatsoever is attributed unto another, though never so just, he thinks it a wrong done to him: he would willingly ingrosse all the applause unto himself, though he never appear in any generous action to deserve it: he cares not who loses, so that he may gain: he will rather rob God himself, as *Herod* did, then deny applause: he will blaze abroad any thing that

that hath but the appearance of good, but will ſeldom or never do any praiſe-worthy act: upon an adreſs to him, let the complaint be never ſo juſt, and the adreſſe never ſo humble, and the object never ſo deprorable, he is no way affected, but like *Nabal* a man cannot ſpeake to him: he covets to be admired by all, but obliges none: feared he may be, but never loved: this man may promiſe fair, but he is ſo uncertain, you cannot truſt him: by all which it is clear that a proud man cannot be fit for frendſhip, that requires all the contrary diſpoſitions, and muſt poſſeſs them, or cannot be at all.

Secondly, Let us conſider a little of Envy. *Solomon* ſaith, make no frendſhip with an angry man, and with the envious thou ſhalt not go: and here (that I may not be miſunderſtood,) we muſt diſtinguiſh of anger. I do not mean by anger here, the boiling of the blood, which comes from a natural cauſe, this is like a flaſh of lightning, ſoon come and ſoon gone: This is found to be the conſequence of the beſt diſpoſition; but I mean by this anger, that which ariſeth from an envious heart, that cannot ſleep except they have done miſchief. Theſe are like thunderclaps ſecretly wounding to the very heart, and bears down all before it. *Solomon* obſerved this, who can ſtand (ſaith he) before envy. Such have thoſe things in their hearts, and practiſes that cannot poſſibly abide with frendſhip, but would immediately, like a worm, eat out the ſubſtance of it. This anger or rather revenge reſts in the boſome of theſe fools: It is not a wayfaring man

that continues for a night, but an inhabitant that is always at home plotting and contriving how to tread down credit, eſtate, life, and all, if it ſtand in its way. An envious man hath theſe qualities, he is ſoon diſobliged, never reconciled. He can forgive (he will ſay) but never forget: he is conſtant in nothing but vexation: his tongue a perſecutor: his heart like the troubled waters, caſting up nothing but mire and durt: Such a one was *Simei*, his revenge to his ſervant was ſo great, that he muſt follow him with the peril of his own life. You know what *Simei* was, by his railing at *David*: doubtleſs he was an envious and a malicious man: he that will prefer his paſſion before his own life, will hardly value the life of his friend. The calm temper is the beſt accommodated for frendſhip: *how much better is a handful of green herbs, where quietneſs is, then a ſtalled oxe with ſtrife.* A malitious man cannot be grateful; he is ſatisfyed with nothing: if a man be good he grudges that; if he be evil he will revile him, though he be worſe abundantly himſelf: he is like the witches, that put on their eyes when they went abroad, but when they came home, they put them in their pockets: if he fancies an undervalue, he will hate a man for that, and he will never be ſerious about the cauſe of that hatred, but pronounce judgment right or wrong upon the perſon offending (as he pretends,) he will diſpence with all manner of juſtice in this caſe: he will do as *Felix* did by *Paul*, may be, promiſe a hearing at a more convenient ſeaſon, but that ſeaſon ſhall never come,

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he having much more pleaſure in aggravating quarrels, then ſtudying peace.

Secondly, The ſecond qualification is ſutableneſs in converſation and expreſſion. There muſt be an agreement here, or elſe no amity, and herein is moſt of the ſweetneſs of frendſhip; can two walk together except they are agreed? walking ſignifies all manner of familiar converſe, and ſociable delight, and this is very pleaſant: I would rather have a friend that could delight me, than one that could enrich me: there is a vaſt content in the converſation of friends, eſpecially in their communications, recreations, & negotiations. In converſation we expreſs thoſe endearments and affections that feed a real frendſhip; in communicating our joys and griefs, the firſt is doubled, the laſt is divided: with how much ſatisfaction do friends chat away ſad times, that otherwiſe would ſeem tedious, either by diſappointments or actual ſufferings; not ſeldom they diſcourſe themſelves out of a pettiſh humour, changing diſtracting thoughts and ungrounded reſolutions, for a calm and ſerious temper, and this may be done by ſolid and ſerious argnments, wherein there is not only profit but beauty. *Solomon* ſays, *a word ſpoken in ſeaſon* how good is it? *It is like apples of gold in pictures of ſilver*; friends they have much variety of buſineſs to communicate, as their fears, and doubts, perfections, and imperfections; their hopes, and delights, eſpecially their affections, and covenant of frendſhip which is often renewed. There muſt be this intercourſe between frends to avoid

suspition if they will be happy ; and this is exceeding necessary, because fear offers violence to nature, takes away mans strength, draws a cloud upon all his comforts, and lies like a talent of lead upon the heart, we are most times more unhappy in what we fear, then in what we feel : How did *Belshazars knees smite one against another, and his very joynts were loosed when the hand-writing appeared upon the wall?* Is it not many times so with the best of us, when God writes bitter things against us ? a friend in this extremity of affairs comes like the shepherds with tidings of great joy, & declares our peace with God, his good will towards us. These are the heart-chearing arguments, that winds up the heart above those fears, and like the sun dissipates the clouds, and opens a door of hope : fear overwhelms a man, casts him into a swouning fit : a gracious and serious friend revives and restores him to his strength again. Doubts are as inseparable to men in their most serene temper, as motes from the air in the clearest day, or spots from the moon in the brightest night; there is much cause of hesitation in men of the purest and most innocent conversations, they are not without their entanglements, many a perplexing web they spin ; but these may be unravelled by a judicious friend, who happily may be skilful, as *Ioseph* was to answer those riddles of providence, and resolve those doubts that at present seems intricate, and past finding out. *Ioseph* was such a friend to the chief butler : men are many times reasoned off their doubts, and inforced to throw them away, because

cauſe they cannot abide the teſt and conviction of reaſon. *Ionathan* and *David* the beſt friends we ever read of, ~~they~~ ſpent much time in communicating their diſpondences and trouble. Saith *David*, *there is but a ſtep betwixt me and death*: how affectionately did *Ionathan* reſolve this doubt; who alone was the moſt likely inſtrument to ſecure *David*: which he did, more then promiſe, in his anſwer to *Davids* ſcruple, where he ſaith, *whatever thy ſoul deſires, I will do it for thee*, and ſo goes on with pregnant arguments of his faithfulneſs to *David*, whereby he cleared the moſt puzling doubt of all by expreſſing his care and kindneſs in a matter that concerned *Davids* life: the preſerving of which muſt looſe *Ionathan* his crown. *Ionathan* lying under this temptation, no wonder if *David* had doubts in ſuch times as theſe are; friends muſt renew their covenants, as they did, and acquieſce in the faithfulneſs of each other.

Again, friends communicate their Joys and hopes; joy will ſtrengthen nature as effectually as fear will impair it: he is no friend that will not be more ready to impart his comforts then his ſorrows, which he may do with more freedom & leſs caution, and may promiſe himſelf a mutual ſatisfaction, which doubles the content. There are many things that cheers the heart, but theſe being according to the conditions of the perſon concerned we cannot well define them, but this in the general obſerve, that whatever is abſolutely neceſſary, earneſtly expected, juſtly due, if accompliſhed is a matter of joy & delight, and

cannot faithfully be concealed; whatever my friend takes pleasure in, I must not withhold but rather augment, illustrate and amplify it, always annexing a complacent behaviour, as the fittest temper for that season, when the heart is upon the wing of hope & joy, that will raise the social communication of friends to a high pitch of satisfaction; when the heart is full of pleasure, it is full of love, and resolution; these being as natural to joy and hope, as discontent and harshnes is to fear and doubt: a merry heart makes a joyful countenance: what is more pleasing then a cheerful aspect? hope is to the soul as the anchor is to the ship: it keeps it steady among the most perplexing waves: Joy is a passion arising from the apprehension of some good we have in hand or in hope, relating to our selves or others: did I apprehend any thing in my self, in the world or in my friend that could be matter of pleasure unto him, I could be neither kind nor civil to conceal it, nor could any thing be matter of joy unto me if I could not impart it, at best it would be but a half joy.

Lastly, love and delight must be imparted also in this equal conversation: love is the hand within the wheel which turns the whole concern; as the heart must not be without the habits of an intire affection, so our conversation must not be without the acts in our daily commerce: Love is workful and watchful: this passion is very industrious, it's never off from action, nor doth it ever want expression: It shrinks at neither service nor suffering: it is oyl to the wheel of acti-

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on: It thinks no ſuffering intolerable ſo long as it enjoys the help of a true friend, who will take up the heavyeſt end of the burthen, putting oyle into the wound, and joy into the heart by cheering conſiderations. In afflictions (ſayth *Job*) pitty ſhould be ſhewed by a friend. This is the diſcriminating time; a friend is known in adverſity. If a man can delight in his friend when under a cloud, when his luſtre is obſcured (this ſpeaks a faſt friend) and adminiſters great delight: we do not much value our entertainment in a proſperous eſtate, all will admire the riſing ſun, but to have an equal reſpect when declining this is rare, and can proceed from nothing, but an unchangable affection, which excellently improves all opportunities and ſeaſons to expreſſe that love and delight which is conſonant unto it ſelf: nothing more ſweet then endeared expreſſions, theſe leave a tincture upon the heart many days after. How do we rowle ſuch expreſſions in our thoughts as hony under our tongue. Love is full of contemplation and invention, and therefore cannot be wanting in expreſſion.

Suitableneſſe in recreation and buſineſſe in the world is alſo conſiderable as that which compleats the happineſs of this concern exceedingly; if friends differ here, much of their ſociety will be loſt. Inſtance, one man affects ſerious recreation, another thoſe that are moſt ſenſual; theſe cannot hold correſpondency one with another long, but muſt certainly one time or another hazard a breach, becauſe that their recreations are not only different but diametrically contrary, and

conſequently will occaſion diſcontent on both ſides. A ſerious man though he may bear while he thinks there is ſome hopes of reclaiming, yet he cannot alwaies do it becauſe contrary to his reaſon, affection and humour, nor can he long ſuſpend his cenſures; on the other ſide pleaſure will ſo prevail with him that loves it that he will defend it, and contemn reaſon and religion too, if it ſtand in oppoſition to, or in competition with it, pleaſure being very attractive and prevailing, nothing more.

Let your buſineſs as much as poſſible be the ſame, at leaſt not contrary; much of the ſweetneſs of Friendſhip ſtands in living, walking, working together; there is nothing a man is more impatient of then the abſence of his friend: O how he longs for his communion! as the laſt ſweetens and ſhortens time, ſo the firſt imbitters it and makes it tedious; the reaſon is ready, becauſe there is nothing ſo harſh as diſappointments, eſpecially in thoſe things wherein we expect the higheſt ſatisfaction and pleaſure; ſuitable to mens negotiations ſuch are their conditions and affections; If a mans buſineſſe carry him far away, ſo that he ſtands at a great diſtance to the object, you will ſoon ſee coldneſſe in affection, careleſneſſe and unconcernedeeſſe will follow immediatly; and as clouds will darken the ſplendour of Frendſhip, though it ſhined never ſo bright before, and that becauſe they cannot be capable of thoſe acts of kindeneſſe which beautifies and maintains Frendſhip: beſides they meet with many diverſions and temptations,

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which like a moth will ſoon deface the beauty and glory of this concern.

There muſt be ſuitableneſſe in the expreſſion of our love; we muſt not obſerve different methods in the expreſſing of our affections: there is more in this then at the firſt view doth appear or we think of: the want of this hath occaſioned much difference among Friends, and created many cauſleſs ſuſpicions, when their manner of expreſſions hath been contrary: Inſtance, ſome are more open and free, others more cloſe and reſerved; the firſt cannot believe any temper ſo contrary to generoſity, can haveany conſiſtency with Frendſhip; the latter ſuſpects the former, as altogether appearing in hyperboles, thinking that they riſe to high in their expreſſion to be real and ſo cenſure and ſlight it, though it be never ſo ingenious and certain. But when the method is the ſame, how confirmed and fixed is the frendſhip; and this is not hard to be brought to paſſe among prudent perſons, which though at the firſt they ſeem very different, yet they will ſoon agree: if they argue the caſe, and yield on both ſides to that which comes neareſt the rules of a perfect friendſhip in that latitude in which it ought to be conſidered, I think this would be one of the firſt things I would ſtudy, were I to contract a well grounded friendſhip. I never affected hyperboles in friendſhip; though ſome ſay in love they are moſt comely; becauſe by the ſame reaſon I may not believe ſome, I may queſtion all that is expreſſed by them. A true expreſſion is moſt pleaſing and inſinuating: ſome truths may be

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more valued than others ; not that there is any defect in truth, but there may be in them that receives it. We value all truths, but eſpecially thoſe we beſt underſtand, and is of greateſt uſe unto us. Some truths may be ſo high that we cannot reach them : others may be ſo contrary to ſome tempers that they will not believe them, and hereby truth paſſes under a notion of falſhood, men are hardly brought to believe that in others which they cannot finde in themſelves ; never inſiſting upon their own incapacity for it, becauſe that were a ſecret reproof, and a cloſe reflexion, and therefore are more prone to conclude things impoſſible they cannot poſſeſſe, then prize or value them in another. Neither would I be too low in my expreſſions ; this were coming as ſhort as the other was ſhooting beyond the mark; becauſe high affections are alwaies accompanied with proportionable expreſſions. Nor could any thing mean be accepted ; where there are ſuch vaſt expectations, as in friendſhip ; but prudence may ſo regulate this affair, that neither demonſtration nor expreſſion, confirmation nor affection ſhall be wanting ; as alſo bend all things to the perfect rule, ſo as there ſhall appear ſo much equality as ſhall reach and continue a real ſatisfaction and a right underſtanding of all things that at firſt ſeemed to render this fameneſs in expreſſion impoſſible or at leaſt uneaſy.

Laſtly, above all diſparity be careful of this, that there be ſome proportion in your eſtates ; covet not a perſon much richer than your ſelf to make a friend of : you may run into more inconveniences

veniences then you are aware of in this reſpect; ſutableneſs here is as conſiderable as in any of the former: I would not aim at an advantage here, becauſe as I would not have a friend that could not do me courteſies, ſo I would not have too great a dependance upon him: it is a more bleſſed thing to give, than to receive. I would rather take a friend that ſhould ſhare with me, then one that ſhould think my affection a purchaſe he made by his money. If you fancy a friend that is rich, or rather for his riches, ſit down firſt and conſider the charge; this may coſt you more than it is worth: we muſt be very diſcreet in this caſe, men cannot long love chargeable things: ſuch perſons may expect too much diſtance, obligation, and ſervice to ſtand with this relation: you muſt wiſely weigh all circumſtances, and not depend too much, if you intend to be happy: Money will beat down the price of friendſhip and contend for ſuperiority; and will think it very hard to be denyed when the leaſt reaſon of challenge appears, we know, it is too baſe to be compared with friendſhip, yet it would be honoured becauſe it has a ſplendida ſpect, it carries its value in its face, & like an uſurper endeavours to ſubmit to ſlavery & contempt, that which is infinitely more valuable; true it is a vertuous man may be outwardly mean and contemptible, yet hath a minde more glorious than the gold that periſheth. I cannot but ſmile when I ſee perſons valued for their money, and they take very kindely, that which would be a vexation to me, which is, to ſee my ſervant honoured above my ſelf. How

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contemptible would many be, (though they make a great noise in the world, and are cloathed in gorgeous apparel) if their golden servant were gone, that they are adored for: such a man would be despised though he be now like *Dives*, as *Lazarus* upon the dunghill, there is no real worth in gold, all is but fancy: there is more worth in a peece of bread, or in a draught of water then in all the silver and gold in both the *Indies*; Heathens could see this.

We read of the *Medes* that they did not care for silver, and for gold they had no delight in it; It is hardly to be creditted how wise men do adore this dumb Idol, and value themselves by it, stripping themselves of robes and clothing themselves with rags, I mean when they debase their reason which is the crop and glory of man in his moral capacity, and cloathe themselves with thick clay, I could never honor nor esteem a worthlesse man, though I saw him tumble in gold, no more than I could value a puppet because he had glittering attire. I cannot admire persons, as they admire themselves if their greatest excellency be riches, and are only happy that they have what their mony can procure, making a hundred things necessary to themselves, men of real worth could live and be happy without. I will never make a friendship with one that must maintain me: it is ten to one if ever I should be brought to set so high a value upon an estate, as those whose property it is would expect, if all the gold & silver in the world were put into one scale and a vertuous man in the other, the latter would

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mightily overballance. I will bleſs God for plenty, but abundance I would be afraid of; and evermore remember what we are taught in our Litany to pray, which is, *in time of our wealth, good Lord deliver us.* If money were as little valued as vertue, and a greater price put upon goodneſs, we might yet live to ſee ſome happy days. There is nothing more contemptible than thoſe that look no higher then money; they cannot be honeſt, they will make ſhipwrack of a good conſcience to get it, nor are they deſirable, becauſe ſo low in their ends and aims, that they do not think it worth their while to drive any other trade, but their profit: they will not be rational for fear they ſhould not be rich; they cannot look off from their wealth, nor ſtudy any other miſtery: Theſe perſons will never be at the charge of frendſhip: all your endeavour there will be like water ſpilt upon the ground, that can never be gathered up again, no ſuitable returns can be expected.

The third qualification, is ſelf-denyall: this is moſt neceſſary in frendſhip: friends muſt not be wilful; there may be ſeaſons when they cannot deſerve that name, if they cannot deny themſelves. *Jonathan* denied himſelf eminently for *David*, they were both obliging, but *Jonathan* exceeded, becauſe though he knew *David* would prove a ſupplanter, yet he conſulted how to preſerve him, hazarding the loſſe of his crown and kingdom. A man will in ſome reſpects do more for his friend than himſelf, in a way of ſelf-deniall: many men would be reduced to great ſtraights,

straights, rather than court some persons for themselves, yet can cheerfully do it for their friend, I could deny my self estate, habitation, relations, any thing for my friend, but reputation and conscience; to sacrifice the first were to lie under a crime unpardonable among men: the violating of the last a sin inexcusable before God: both which would make me too base for this concern; no person fit to be trusted with friendship, that can prodigally part with those things so precious, that nothing can repair, or expiate.

The fourth qualification: there must be freeness and openness of heart; freedom and friendship are inseparable; and can no more be divided then the cause from the effect; Reservedness cannot be admitted: It is too late to lock the cabinet when the Jewel is gone: where I can give my heart, I can reserve nothing: true love allows neither reservation nor exception, all is free; their intercourse is without violence. How insinuating is affection! how easily it winds it self into the heart? If I cannot live in the heart of my friend, he is no friend to me. And if he be an open-hearted man he is open-handed: he that hath accesse to my heart, hath a key to my cabinet, or else no freedom, and consequently no real friendship. A generous man can as freely give as receive, he hates covetousness: If there can be no friendship without exchange of hearts, surely then the heart comprehends all things else inferiour, and speaks a full possession of all things that are near and dear to a man. There is a reciprocation of affairs between friends: all things

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are common: there is but one common ſtock between them it is true, the property may be in one, but the uſe muſt be in both: there is nothing ſo low as money among friends in their eſteem and value: and if they can part with every thing elſe, they will never grudge that; nor can any prudence reſtrain a man who hath voluntarily put his friend into poſſeſſion, and bound himſelf to maintain it, and can no way be diſobliged but by the worſt perfidiouſneſs poſſible; there is no contending for propriety in this ſtate: if my eſtate ſhall not ſerve my friend, I will never give him that name.

The fifth qualification is Wiſdom: a man of underſtanding is of an excellent ſpirit; wiſdom makes the face of man to ſhine upon his friend with heart-gladning rayes. *Solomon* is ſaid in reſpect of his wiſdom that *he was as an angel of God.* And indeed nothing makes a man in his moral eſtate more divine than wiſdome. A man cannot be happy except his friend hath competent wiſdom. I grant that there are differences in men: ſome are not ſo capable as others: proportionable to the wiſdom of our friend, ſo is our wealth in him; that is the greateſt treaſure becauſe moſt excellent and uſeful: there are many intricacies a man winds himſelf into; ſometimes by impudence, othertimes by ignorance; the clue is in the heart & hand of a judicious friend, that may bring him out: If my friend be wiſe, I can confide in him in the worſt of times: many plain-hearted men have been undone for want of this: how oft do we hear them complaining? all

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this evil is come upon me, because I had no serious, wise, and faithful friend to advise me in this or the other affair, but now it is too late, I am ruined: If *Joabs* wisdom had not interposed, *David* had been undone in that case concerning *Absolon*. A wise man can see an evil before it comes, and extenuate it when it is come. *A prudent man foresees the evil, and hideth himself* and his friend both; they will be together. It was no small advantage to *Pharaoh* that *Joseph* foresaw the evil of famine coming upon the land of *Egypt*, when it came how easy it was made by the wisdom of *Joseph*, the story will inform us. There are many things to be done before we come to an undoing necessity: a wise man foresees that, and does that now by way of prevention that an imprudent man would wish he had done, when the extremity is upon him. Wisdom is most desirable in this regard, because there is no great want, where it is rightly improved: it is the ladder by which men climb up to honour, and is useful in all conditions; in prosperity a wise man will remember that he is in slippery places, and therefore will look well to his steps; in adversity, that he hath many temptations, and therefore must be serious and considerate. Let a wise man be cast into never so much mire, and trampled upon, he sparkles like a diamond still; nothing can deprive him of his worth and excellency. True it is, that wise men are not always rich, nor rich men are not always wise, yet the former may and shall have the preheminency, riches and greatness being both subordinate to wisdom:

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the poor wise man delivered the city, when the king could not do it by his honour, wealth, and strength: Have we matters of high trust? none more fit to commit them to, then a wise man: In troubles he will support, in straights he will direct, in most perplexing business and puzling doubts he will advise when to be active, when to sit still; none fit for friendship but these: many there are that are faithful and affectionate, and would be very active, if they knew how, or in what method, but for want of wisdom; They conclude all their good desires in a few empty wishes, which may satisfy themselves, but never serve their friends: but wise men are most useful, therefore much to be ambitioned: this is an indispensable quality for friendship which must be endeavoured with all possible care.

The Sixth qualification is faithfulnesse: this is the cabinet that contains our most precious jewel, I mean the secrets of the heart): secrecy in a friend is the most precious part of friendship, and that because there is assigned to that part the highest trust imaginable; a defect here cannot be without the greatest treachery conceivable; because it makes a perfect divorce, and strikes against the very nature and essence of friendship; *Solomon* observed that a faithful man conceales the matter. There are many things between friends, that are in no case fit to be revealed, nor cannot be done but with the greatest treachery, because thereby a man betrays the highest trust, which nothing can make a crime more unpardonable. The intercourses between friends, can-

not be revealed without detriment, becauſe expreſſions of kindneſs (though innocent) may by an unfaithful repetition, prove prejudicial and ſlaunderous. There are theſe things eſpecially in a faithful man, that challenge our reſpect and value, and render him exceeding precious, Firſt, he is true, you may truſt him: he doth not wear like *Jezabel*, a painted outſide; or like the gallants of our times, that hath the moſt endeared expreſſions in their mouthes, their voice is the voice of *Jacob*, but their hands the hands of *Eſau*. And this is very much to be admired, eſpecially in perſons of ingenuity, becauſe men naturally love truth, and value things according to truth, Inſtance, a picture if it be never ſo curiouſly drawn, ſhall obtain no reputation, if it do not reſemble the perſon it repreſents. No wonder there is no more love in the world, men cannot truſt one another, *Joab*-like they cry, my brother, and ſmite deadly. Is not a faithful friend to be valued in ſuch times as theſe; when there is a lye in the right hand of thoſe that in complement pretend the greateſt reallity, if I cannot believe a man, I cannot truſt him, nor treat him without ſuſpicion, nor value him; nothing more deſtructive to friendſhip, than falſhood; nothing more obliging than faithfulneſs.

As a faithful man is true, ſo he is honeſt and juſt: he is a covenant-keeping man, as well as a covenant-making man; and this is conſiderable, becauſe in all friendſhips there muſt be covenants: you ſee that between *David* and *Jonathan* the pattern of friendſhip: the covenant of God

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was between them: it is called the covenant of God by way of eminency: for every thing in Scripture that hath the name of God annexed to it, as the city of God, or the mountain of God, or the temple of God, this ſpeaks the eminency of thoſe things. The covenant between friends is not a trivial thing, but weighty, and ſeriouſly to be heeded: we ought not to break promiſe with an enemy, God hath ſeverely fallen upon covenant breakers, and good men have been very conſciencious in making good their covenants, as we may ſee in the caſe of the *Gibeonites*, *Joſh.* 9. 15. *Joſhua* knew that they were deceivers, and that they had ſiniſterly brought him into league with them, yet the league being made *Joſhua* could be no way diſcharged by any manner of prudence, piety or policy. Many men make covenants, but few keep them. Covenants are very binding to men of honeſt and juſt principles, they bind the conſcience, as well as the reputation, a prudent man will not be brought into covenant, when he foreſees a breach unavoidable; becauſe as a man cannot be wiſe, raſhly to promiſe, ſo he cannot be juſt, if he doth not exactly keep it. There is nothing next to holyneſſe more valuable than juſtice, next to believe and be ſaved that golden rule takes place, *do as you would be done unto.* A man that is faithful cannot be bribed by profit, nor biaſſed by pleaſure to prejudice his friend, he cannot be uncertain, you may know where to finde him: he is not a friend to day, and an enemy to morrow; as he never fixed without deliberation, ſo he can never

alter without great provocation. The place where our treaſure lyes muſt be certain, or elſe the treaſure cannot be ſafe: none can pick this lock. A faithfull man will not only hate unfaithfulneſs in himſelf, but he will endeavour to make others faithfull, with whom his friend is concerned: the concernments, as well as the perſon of his friend is conſiderable to him; in all diſputable matters he will make the caſe his own; he will never ſee his friend condemned where he ought to be juſtified: in all actions that concern him his help and aſſiſtance is never wanting: he will not ſay, am I my brothers keeper? but will be a wing to cover: a ſuccour in the moſt uncomfortable times: a faithful witneſs for him, and will have a due reſpect unto all his concerns.

The Seventh qualification is humility: This is like oyl that makes the wheels of friendſhip go more ſmoothly: how amiable is humility? It not only ſweetens the converſation of friends, but graces & adorns them more than honour; before honour is humility, ſaith the wiſe man; humility is acceptable both to God and man; God aſcribes wiſdom unto it, with the lowly is wiſdom, and man gives him greateſt reverence and reſpect; an humble man is a ſelf-denying man; he can heighten his friend and undervalue himſelf, he contentedly will decreaſe, that his friend may increaſe: how willingly will he throw of that applauſe from himſelf, he would court for his friend. Humility is a garment that becomes the greateſt prince in the world: An humble

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man ſtudies not ſo much his perfection, as his imperfections : he contentedly paſſes under a cloud without any noiſe, and thinks himſelf moſt happy when leaſt obſerved : can retreat when there is no reaſon for it, but his humility : he readily and freely ſubmits rather than make a quarrel whoever doth the injury : he is always on the yielding ſide; I do not mean a baſe ſubmiſſion by this compliance, as a transferring that crime, which is properly anothers to my ſelf : this is the picking of a thorn out of another mans foot, and putting it into my own. Religion bids me ſubmit where there is cauſe, and reaſon tells me it is baſeneſs and puſillanimity to do it where there is none. I ever abhorred an unworthy detraction and ſubmiſſion, as being againſt my reaſon and conſcience : it appearing unto me as high a piece of hypocriſie to condemn my ſelf, where I am ſure I am innocent, as it would be pride to juſtify my ſelf where I know I am guilty; beſides, hereby I put my ſelf into a neceſſity to beg that pardon from another, which otherwiſe he would have ſeen reaſon enough to have deſired of me : ſuch complements as theſe I could never fancy, nor rationally approve, becauſe I never ſaw any other effect proceeding from that cauſe, but ſhame and ſcorn, for men though never ſo criminal would gladly be thought innocent, yet they will not not be at charge to deſerve it : nor will men willingly conſult reaſon againſt themſelves; they will go thus far, and judge by the rule of contraries, if you are guilty, I muſt be innocent, How irra-

tional is it, for a man to brand himself to please another, thereby making himself liable to those reflections that may one time or another prove more prejudiciall to his peace and credit, than any present advantage he could propound unto himself, in so base a piece of self-denyall: I never thought submission the best way of reconciling quarrels among equals, but rather the most effectual way to augment and heighten them. I would yield very far before I would make a quarrel with them I love, but if there could be no prevention of a just quarrel, I would not submit; because if I submit, thereby I make my accuser my judge in his own case, and must stand to his mercy, and though he might reprieve and not condemn me at present, yet still I lie under the lash of his judgment, whenever he pleases to impose it; the fear of which would make me a perpetual slave, and still confirm his jurisdiction over me, which I can never wrest out of his hand, (having voluntarily invested him with it) without hazarding a greater quarrel then before; and that because by this act I put an undervalue upon him, and think him not worthy of that place I had first invested him with by my own voluntary act; which he will now hardly part with, because complyance and submission is so grateful to most persons, that they having once obtained it, they will contend hard for it, rather than make a surrender. The most advisable thing in this case, is, to forget the quarrel, and time will wear off that animosity, and convince that the interest of friends is to make peace, rather then

improve

improve quarrels, and to be always studying that method that may effect this to a mutual content and the least prejudice. But I return from this digression. In short, humility hath these things to commend it: an humble man will easily admit of all manner of adresses; he is not loudly and stately, nor doth he stand at so great a distance, as a proud man doth: this is very insinuating & captivates the heart, by this means *Absolon* stole the hearts of the men of *Israel* again; an humble man cheerfully receives all complaints, and seriously studies all manner of satisfaction to the complainants, and willingly complyes to all just and handsom things.

The eighth qualification is resolution; Neither time, place, nor person can make a true friend unfixed: time that wears every thing else, will rather beautify, strengthen, and augment, then impair friendship, because every day heapes up new endearments, by which it is made more compleat and confirmed. There is a tye upon friends that is like the marriage-knot, nothing but death can dissolve; and indeed they have need to be resolved, else they will never stand and fall together, which they must do, if they are real: courage in a friend is most necessary, especially in time of imminent danger: a friend will not cowardly loose the life or reputation of his friend; he will hazard two in this case, rather than loose one. *Jonathan* was a resolved man, neither honour, life, or any thing could make him unfaithful to *David*: every man is at his liberty before the friendship is made, but not afterward; there-

ſore muſt be reſolved, There is no wiſdom in firſt reſolving and then making inquiries: we muſt conſider the charge of friendſhip before we begin and be ſatisfied in this, which is a great truth, that though friendſhip be moſt deſireable, yet it is not without trouble; no eſtate nor perſon without exception in this lower land; you will finde diſappointments entailed upon the beſt of perſons and things, which ſhould quicken our diligence and care, and heighten our reſolutions; friends muſt not be like bowls, that every ſmall rub will put off their byaſs: they muſt expect many apples of ſtrife to be thrown between them by the devil and men of dividing principles: both envying the beauty and comelineſſe of that ſtate; friendſhip always attracts the eye: we ſee many gazing upon it, but not the heart, becauſe few underſtand it. They that have a near inſpection into the excellency of this ſtate have a high value for it, not ſo much for its outward beauty, as inward excellency: and theſe greatly eſteem a true and faithful friend though they have not alwaies opportunity to obtain it, others are utterly uncapable of ever obtaining it, & they hate the perſons in whom they ſee a capacity for it, meerly for their friendſhip; like the fallen angels that kept not their firſt eſtate, and therefore hates all thoſe, that are not plunged with them in the ſame unhappy eſtate. I have ſeen perſons greatly reſpected while they carryed it at a diſtance each to other, but afterwards when they have been obſerved to unite in their affections, have been hated, vilified, ſcorned, and ſcandalized;

ſuch

ſuch is the enmity there is in ſome perſons to this relation: and this may proceed from one of theſe cauſes.

First, Satan ſeems to be concerned in this matter: knowing that the improvement of reaſon and vertue mightily prepares the heart for grace, the young man in the Gôſpel in reſpect of his morality was a great proficient, he is ſaid by the beſt teſtimony to be not farr from the kingdome of God. Men in friendſhip much improve, becauſe they are alwayes ſtudying things grateful, comely, and acceptable, and in this united capacity, are not lyable to thoſe various temptations that men of contrary tempers are inſnared by, Satan perceiving this, ſtudies all poſſible means to imbitter this ſtate, and as an effectual means to reach that end, he ſets profane men at enmity againſt thoſe innocent perſons; and theſe are not only enemies to the pleaſure and profit of friendſhip, but are at enmity with the perſons, & this proceeds from their ignorance as well as ſatans malice; they underſtand nothing of what they cenſure and revile, fondly conceiving, that every attainment they have no part nor intereſt in, not worth the having; never conſidering their own incapacity for it, who are ſo turbulent in their humors, croſſe in their qualities, that they can never arrive at ſo much compoſednes, as will comport with this temper: nor is it altogether ignorance, but envy alſo will be concerned, which delights in nothing more than to ſpot this innocent garment. I would never eſteem that friend that were not reſolved never

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to decline me upon any account whatsoever. This was a great amplification of *Jonathans* love unto *David*, his resolution never to desert him, rather running the hazard of his fathers displeasure, the losse of his crown and kingdome, and which is more his precious life, then deal falsly in this covenant. I would take my friend, as a man takes his wife, for better for worse, and resolve with *Ruth*, whither thou goest I will go; where thou lodgest I will lodge, thy people shall be my people, thy God shall be my God, where thou dyest, I will dye, and there will I be buried: resolution is the note and character of a true friendship, and lowdly speaks it neither tottering nor unsound. If *Jonathan* could have been corrupted in his love to *David* by any temptations, there was enough to do it; if threatnings, accusations, or intreaties could have prevailed, it would have been done, as the history will inform us: but *Jonathan* could not fear the one, nor credit the other against his friend; nor is it every little slip in friendship it self would do it: it must be some capital crime that can make a separation; True it is that a man is not alwayes grateful to himself, and therefore cannot be so to any other, at all times, sometimes friendship comes gloriously arrayed, othertimes is clothed in rags; shall a man decline his friend, because he doth not appear always so splendid as at other times, and say he is no friend? this is as irrational, as to say a man is no man, because he hath not on his best clothes: there are many accidents that may render a man lesse pleasing and

acceptable

acceptable at one time than another: the various tempers of body and minde doth make a great change: theſe muſt be conſidered and allowed: little things will not ſtick with a reſolved friend.

The ninth qualification is compaſſion and tenderneſs of heart: this is the cordial of friendſhip, and the hand that binds up the breaches in the heart, that which repairs the defects of nature and puts life into a dying perſon, this is that oyl that ſweetly runs into the wounds of a perplexed heart and heals it, that hand that wipes tears from the eye, and takes the burthen from the heart: it was not the ſmalleſt part of *Jobs* miſery, that he had not compaſſionate friends in his afflictions: *In affliction* (ſaith he) *pitty ſhould be ſhewed by a friend*, but miſerable comforters are you all. If there can be pleaſure in affliction this is it, that I have a concerned friend: every compaſſionate friend is a man of bowels; he is afflicted in all that his friend is afflicted, and will as freely ſhare with him in his ſorrows, as in his comforts; this is matter of great lamentation in affliction that we have none to pitty us, the conſideration of that doubles the miſery and adds weight to the burden, but this cannot be the caſe of him that has a true friend: upon a ſick bed who makes the bed ſo eaſie, as a compaſſionate friend? no ſociety ſo pleaſant and diverting as he: in pain who is ſo merciful? in penury who is ſo bountiful? many will paſſe by in ſtraights, as the prieſt and the Levite did by the poor traveller; but a friend will, like the good Samaritan, give oyl for his wounds, and wine

wine for his heart, he will put his soul in his souls stead, and do for him what he would desire for himself, were the present case his own. Here the golden rule shines brightly, do you as you would be done unto. This was the season *Jonathan* made use of to express his bounty and compassion unto *David*. There is nothing more obliging in frendship than compassion: a fellow-feeling and sympathy in our friend is very grateful, when like the two twins History speaks of, these sociable companions laugh and weep together; these are like the strings of a viol, touch one and the other trembles. As their sufferings are mutual so are their satisfactions. A man is not seldom more concerned for his friend then for himself. I have experienced this, who have somtimes born afflictions with so much the more paence and satisfaction, because it passed by my friend, and kindly took me: the reason is ready, because a great crosse upon the body is more easily born, than that which is smaller upon the minde. It is with the minde as with the body, those distempers that touch the vitals are more dangerous, than them that are accompanied with more exquisite pains in the body; so heart-afflictions are most vexatious: when my friend is under any affliction, my minde is troubled, and I feel that pain in my heart for him, that perhaps he feels far enough from his. I have been more amazed and affrighted at the sufferings of my friends, than I could have been at the apprehension of my own death, and would willingly have purchased life to them, by loosing my own.

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As compassion is free, so it is pleasant: how cheerfully will a compassionate man look upon his friend in distresse? not that he is not sorry for his affliction, but to shew how pleased he is to help and assist him: *God loves a cheerful giver*, so doth man. The aspect of a man in giving and receiving doth very often discover the heart of the giver; for men can hardly, handsomly dissemble it here: when favours come from persons only moved by credit and relation, and not from love, how slowly do they come, the chariot-wheels do move heavily then, but when they come from a compassionate friend, they fly and come insensibly, nor is this all; compassion goes farther, to acts of clemency also: that is a true friend, who can heartily forgive, and pass by infirmities, without reflection: he will not make a quarrel upon every slight occasion, he is more prone to pitty then to reprove, he doth not study exceptions but complyance: he will ever make the best interpretation possible: and look over the mistakes of his friend with allowance, and where he finds a blot he will draw it fair again: he will treat him with all civility and tenderness, reprove kindly and seasonably, excluding all manner of harshness, cloathing himself with all humility, gravity, and civility: and upon the discovery of any error, if it be not very criminal, he will say as *Eli* did of his sons, *this is not a good report I hear of you, friend.* Wisdom as well as tenderness is also necessary in this case: the well management of a reproof is a very nice point, few understands it, and as few are acceptable and

successful

successful in this regard. Amiableness in the countenance, sweetness in the expression are the best expedients, and seems to be the most effectual means, to convince without leaving the least scar on the reputation, or disquietness in the minde: few persons love a reprover, yet *Solomon* observed, that men of wisdom do, *reprove a wise man and he will love thee.*

The tenth qualification, there must be complacency and delight as well as profit in a friend, a man takes more pleasure in his friend, than in all the world beside: all other things are to him at a distance, and we know things remote give no great delight; the more united, the more pleasure: the sun under a cloud is not so desirable, because it stands at a greater distance to the visive faculty, as when it shines clearly without any interposition. *Solomon* observed, that *it was a pleasant thing for the eye to behold the sun*, in its rayes, when nothing intervened between the faculty and the object: here are two things especially to be considered in friendship in order to compleat delight and complacency; that is, proportion and propriety: These seems to be the *basis* upon which that fabrick stands: proportion not only prepares for it, but greatly supports it, and propriety conveys the pleasure and sweetness of friendship to the respective persons, by multiplying endearments, and such expressions which immediately proceed from a well-grounded affection: how pleasant is a Romance that doth but feign friendship? and is not friendly comerce and communion that is reall more consi-

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erable? can a picture though never ſo well rawn give the content the perſon can that it epreſents? we finde they oftner draw teares om our eyes then convey pleaſure to the heart, ecauſe they oftentimes tell us, that our deareſt riends are either loſt, or at ſo great a diſtance, hat we finde more reaſon to deſpair then hope, nd this fills our hearts with ſighs and cares: pro- riety in a friend is the ſureſt tye, and the grea- eſt obligation: certainly there is a ſuperlative atisfaction there, which appears not more in he communion than in the heart-breaking houghts and languiſhing deſires in caſe of ab- ence: and this is moſt evident by our longing & ghing after that perſon we have happily fixed o much upon, ever to be contented without the eal poſſeſſion and conſtant enjoyment of; yet ſo nhappy becauſe of ſome cruel accident inter- ening, that we cannot enjoy the object; that there s a tranſcendent content and pleaſure in the re- ation and ſtate of friendſhip, we cannot want rguments enough to prove, eſpecially this, be- auſe we finde there, that which in the higheſt ncaſure will gratifie both the rational and ſenſi- ive appetite: and this is done when by arguing & uſeful diſcourſes doubts are removed, & fears y away; how gladly do we welcome that per- on that can inform us of thoſe things that are the auſes or conſequences of our joys and griefs; eaſon will command reverence, and comes with hat power and efficacy as irreſiſtable; paſſions ay be reproved, but reaſon muſt be honoured; o which perſons that are not wholly brutiſh will

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easily consent because of the nature of it which is sublime and excellent, and yet easy and necessary: there we finde such depths that the Elephant may swim, such sholes that the lamb may wade; no greater pleasure to the senses (which must be satisfied as well as reason) then the delight of friendship, which is elivated by the pleasantness of the person and the certainty of the interest that he hath in that person: *David* saith of *Jonathan*, that *his love passed the love of women*: proprietie and interest raises the affections and compleats the felicity of this concern: the words of a frend drops like an hony-comb, much more is a solid reason accepted, which is like musick to the ear, light to the eye, and a cordial to the heart; strips the person from his fears, and clothes him with serenity and peace; I can never fully speak the excellency of this concern: give me leave to call in the testimony of those that have fully enjoyed it at one time, but unhappily lost it at another: these can more pathetically speak the excellency of that state; we never come seriously to prize things till after we have lost them; and in our mourning habit we are most talkative about the pretiousness of that we can never recall: that which aggravates any loss, is the speciality that is upon it: an only son or an only friend, this is that which imbitters the cross; *David* sadly resented the death of *Jonathan*, it was a loss as cruel as death, *Davids* complaint for *Absolon* is the complaint of frinds when providence makes a finall separation, *would to God I had died for thee, my friend, my friend*: may we

not go higher, and with truth affirm, it's like the rending of the ſoul from the body, it is that one ſtroke which cuts the nerves and ſinews of all our comforts, pleaſure and delight: the complacenſe of friendſhip is beyond the expreſſion of the beſt reaſon; therefore I cannot aim at a perfect diſcovery: *I* have given you my twilight apprehenſions of it; I proceed to the fourth thing which is the great end aimed at in the relation and ſtate friendſhip.

Firſt, the advantage and utility of friendſhip is firſt in our eye, as I could never fancy any man whoſe perſon was ungrateful, ſo I could not love one whoſe parts are not deſirable: I can love my friend for any worthy quality, and the more worthy the more he hath of my affections: perſons may without cenſure expect profit as well as pleaſure in thoſe things they dearly love, and this is neither mercinary nor unreaſonable, but moſt commenſurate and equivalent to the greateſt end of friendſhip; their ends in that concern are the ſame that his was ſpoken of in the parable, that ſold all to purchaſe the field in which the pearl was. It was not the field but the treaſure he aimed at; ſo a man doth not love any perſon barely for himſelf, but as the cabinet that contains the Jewel he values, he doth not love the Jewel becauſe of the cabinet, but the cabinet with the reſpect to the Jewel: we rationally prize things, when we value them according to their uſefulneſs: we prize water, the ſun, and bread, becauſe theſe are ſo neceſſary, that we cannot live without them; friendſhip in

some respect is as necessary; as our nature cannot subsist without strengthning and nourishment, no more as we are sociable can we be happy without society: *David* was fully satisfied in *Jonathan*, not more for the pleasure he had in his embraces, as the benefit and profit of his counsel, advice, and directions, as also his example, which might prove as great an advantage to *David*, if not greater than any of the rest: without question that faithfulness and humility of *Jonathan* was as exemplary to *David*, as his assistance, and friendship was desireable. A true and faithful friend is one of the richest talents God entrusteth us with: a rich man takes much delight to contemplate his money that lies in such or such a place, it is his only treasure, *and where the treasure is there the heart will be*, a mans friend is his treasure, and as *Solomon* observed, *money answers all things*, that is to say, that money can reach; with as great truth we may say that an ingenious man answers all things that are necessary to a sociable happiness.

Secondly, Society is one of the greatest ends of frendship, that alliance was first contrived to promote sociable happiness; man is a sociable creature, and there is nothing more equall and consonant to his being and nature then society, because hereby he is most capable of doing and receiving good in that method and manner which is most suitable to his reason and nature, as also his inclination which is generous and not mercenary, he doth not wholly aim at himself; but that which amplifies the enjoyment is, that it is mutual,

tual, and can reach the content both of the ſubject and the object: an ingenious man would not have a friend that cannot benefit him, becauſe then he could not be uſeful, nor will he ſo ſpend and confine his affection, if he ſees a worthy perſon till he knows his reward, or receives earneſt by ſomething extraordinary: a true friend doth not ſtudy how to inrich himſelf by his friends bounty, but how to better himſelf by his virtues, or elſe by generous acts and obligations: he is evermore making ſuitable returns, nothing more contrary to vertuous perſons then to level at low ends; moſt ends are too low for love that noble affection, yet we cannot erre here, if our ſcope and aim be at religious principles and rational accompliſhments, the laſt makes us happy as men, the firſt as Chriſtians.

Thirdly, a mutual ſatisfaction is aimed at in this relation of Friendſhip, and that beyond what can poſſibly be obtained any where elſe: what relation is there that will ſo far comply as a true friend? there is none bound to ſtudy my humours but by my friend, who muſt do it, or he can never deport himſelf for this relation: there are many paradoxes in friendſhip, but it is to them that are ſtrangers to the nature of this concern, the miſteries of friendſhip are very deep, and cannot be fathomed by perſons that are wholy ſtrangers and unacquainted with this concern: the ſociable delight and mutual ſatisfaction between friends, though it be very well underſtood amongſt themſelves, is very intricate to thoſe at a diſtance, the conformity of friends are ſpeaking

and acting alike, and ſubmitting the reaſon and will each to other: theſe are the hidden parts of frendſhip, and not viſible to every eye, the ſameneſs and ſimilitude that is between them is not apprehended by others, yet brings vaſt contentment to the perſons concerned, and exceedingly ſtrengthens and confirms the alliance: we love thoſe that are like our relations, much more thoſe that are like our ſelves; how pleaſantly can a father look upon his image in his ſon? and the more ſuitableneſs appears in their diſpoſitions, the more rooted and grounded is their affection; we plainly ſee, there can be no frendſhip between perſons of contrary tempers, but rather antipathies, that which we call prudence is not known among them; for if a man hates a perſon, he diſlikes all things that are about him; ſo if he loves a perſon he approves of all things that concern him: when the will of friends are melted, and like lead run into the ſame mold, then this conformity and the mutual ſatisfaction of both perſons is attained: contrary tempers are like contrary creatures, ſtill at variance: Pride and humility, patience and paſſion, folly and ingenuity, piety and carnal policy, theſe can never conſiſt together; contrarieties neither agree in whole nor in part; In ſhort, this conformity is not only excellent in it ſelf, but alſo in its concomitants, and they are reſolution and contentedneſs with every thing, eſpecially that which cannot be divided but with a fundamental deſtruction: To be ſatisfied with the comfort of frendſhip without ſubmiſſion to the croſſes, is a foundation-errour,

and

and will occaſion a breach irreparable; in our humane ſtate, ſuch natural defects that cannot be cured: theſe therefore muſt not be reflected on in a way of diſcontent; to reprove or impoſe an impoſſibility is alike irrational; it's moſt unreaſonable to diſpute impoſſibilities, and unkinde to make grating reflections, becauſe they ſtill turn to ſcorn and ſcandal, if they be publick, and to diſcontent and trouble, though they be never ſo private: I can look upon the natural defects of my friends with more pleaſure then the perfections of another, becauſe they are parts of what I dearly love, and ſo much of himſelf that they cannot poſſibly be divided, otherwiſe I would ſooner take part of them my ſelf then diſlike them in him: In the firſt choice I had my freedom, &might have declined the whole if I could not be reconciled to every part, but now I cannot make exceptions but at this hazard, the loſs of my friend, or at the leaſt a perſwaſion in him that I cannot love him ſo intirely as I ought, and the relation juſtly challenges: Beauty is not much in frendſhip, a ſociable and amicable diſpoſition is much more neceſſary, if this be wanting, it is not like ſome natural defects in the body that art can mend, nothing can ſupply; all the art of reaſon and religion together cannot do it; we ſee this in angry *Jonas*, whom God could not pleaſe, he thought he did well to be angry with God himſelf. I have ſometimes taken much pleaſure in contemplating the ſatisfaction I have obſerved among friends, how ſtudious they have been to pleaſe each other? how ready

to serve? how impatient of any interruption to their social delights? how unsatisfied if they could not in all respects reach a mutual content? If to have the greatest contrivance, how to promote our interest in the world in respect of credit, estate, or life, be a satisfaction, friendship is that. If the greatest love, the highest value, the sweetest embraces, the most constant and pleasing communion, care, love, goodness, faithfulness, bounty, ready service be desirable, then friendship is most incomparable. How easy suffering, how pleasant service, and how inconsiderable do life appear, where mutual satisfaction is in view; where a man would otherwise indulge himself and sit down and consider the expence of a chargeable and painful undertaking before he will venture upon it; it is very observable where mutual satisfaction is aimed at, especially in great enterprises and high undertakings, let the conclusion be never so good, if death or any cruel accident have divided the friends, the content is not half what it would have been, had it been mutual: the end aimed at was the satisfaction of both, which being ardently desired, but really lost, is constantly lamented, and instead of a gainful possession there remains nothing but a melancholy diversion; this constantly torments the minde, which if unquiet will imbitter the sweetest enjoyments. *David* could not receive the news of victory with any satisfaction, because *Absolon* was slain, who probably he intended rather to reduce then destroy: promising himself a mutual benefit by that victory, how eager are

friends

friends to promote the pleaſure one of another? they remove all impediments and ſtudy all expedients to that effect. He is no friend that hath not experienced this, that upon any offence given as occaſioned by him he finds as much trouble in his own heart, as can poſſibly poſſeſs the heart of his friend: grief and anger are preſently employed; the firſt that any occaſion ſhould be given, or taken to diſcompoſe his friend; the laſt, that he ſhould do any thing to procure it together with thoughts and cares how this breach may be made up again; It is probable every method will not do it. I would bear with any thing rather than conſent to a quarrel with a perſon I dearly loved, but if offences were cauſeleſly taken, I would think it more prudence to diſpute it than ſubmit. If I ſubmit I am not only beholding for a pardon, but confeſs the crime, and become my own judge to condemn my ſelf. I have obſerved, let the ſubmiſſion be never ſo ingenious, if the fault be thought great, it will prove but the skinning over the wound, and upon a more muture conſideration ſeem but a ſmall ſatisfaction. If credit and reputation are concerned in the quarrels and unavoidably ſow the ſeed of ſuſpition in the heart; to prevent this, deliberation ſeems moſt adviſeable, in which time the preſent paſſion and animoſity may wear of, and reaſon may be heard on both ſides, and they may be inclined, rather to loſe ſomething of their own right, then appear exact or punctual, the law of friendſhip abſolutely forbidding all ſuch exactneſs. I would make any interpretation ſerve, rather than en-

danger a fundamental difference, because I never yet could be convinced by the observations that I yet could make, that a fundamental breach could be repaired. I mean by this, that which strikes against the nature & essence of friendship. Instance, as the revealing of a secret, a treacherous blow, revilings, by which my reputation may be impaired for ever: if such as these occasion a breach, it is like that of a venice glasse that can never piece again; art may mend it, but nothing can cement and repair it: there may be reasonings pro and con, and the best argument may carry it for the present, but there cannot be a difference occasioned by any wilful disobligation in any case allowed it being a crime unpardonable, and that which I would never ask forgiveness of; nor could I be satisfied in any friendship I forsaw any thing could intervene destructive to it. I could never love one, I thought, I could possibly be induced to hate: such a thought would prove a grief, that would drown my comfort, and fill my heart with those doubts that never could admit of satisfaction. I come now to the fifth thing premised, *viz.* the pleasure and delight the ways of friendship is strewed with. Here are many flagrant flowers, we shall gather them as we go.

The first fragrant flower is this; a man hath something secure in the most uncertain times, and that is no small advantage: you know fortune is very uncertain; the wheel is up to day and down to morrow, and what more common, than to see men valued or undervalued according to their

their preſent ſtate, in relation to outward things? all admire thoſe that are uppermoſt, trampling upon every thing beneath them, looking more at the outward varniſh, then the inward luſtre; painted ſepulchres make a gaudy ſhew, yet have no real pleaſure in them, becauſe though they are fair to the eye, they are filled with nothing but rottenneſs and corruption. Moſt perſons look at the ſuperficial part of a man, wholly judging according to ſenſe without the leaſt appeal to reaſon, which ought to be firſt ſatisfied in every doubtful caſe, elſe we may be byaſſed, and being in the dark miſtake things to our prejudice. I have read a ſtory of a traveller, that came to a painter in a kinde of diſguiſe, and deſired to be imployed, being of the ſame profeſſion, and though a great artiſt very meanly accoutred, the painter received him, and treated him according to the meanneſs of his preſent capacity; bread and cheeſe was his fare, which this artiſt thought a diet too courſe for his fine art; he preſently paints his mean food moſt exquiſitely, and goes his way, leaving his new maſter to lament his ignorance and prejudice in looſing ſo gainful a ſervant, which was aggravated by the circumſtances that attended it; the maſter returning miſſed his ſervant, but found his breakfaſt (as he ſuppoſed,) and though he were an artiſt, he ingeniouſly confeſſed, that the repreſentation ſeemed as real to his ſenſes, as the true food did to his reaſon. The hidden parts of frendſhip are not viſible to all the world, perſons in the relation doth not like money carry their value in their faces,

ces, yet they are not without true worth, a man can prize his friend in rags as well as in robes. *Jonathan* would rather strip himself for *David* than despise him, for want of robes he did not abate his affection to *David* though he was thrown out of all his honour and splendour he had in *Sauls* court, and was hunted up and down as a pattridge upon the mountains; in prosperity a man will be present with his friend, and consult him how to manage that estate with humility and general content; times of prosperity requires the help of a friend as much as adversity. The rich hath many friends, few true friends. It is much harder to manage a great estate, than that which is meaner. Men of great estates have commonly greater hearts, and that is the reason they have no more content; in the midst of their sufficiencies, they are in straights: they have many flatterers, few real friends, as *Rehoboam* had: many that are at their table, that eat their bread, insinuate into their secrets, and yet lift up their heel against them. *Davids* table was not without these, many a good natured man is ruined for want of a faithful friend; we finde that while *Iehojada* lived, *Ioas* did well, he was a faithful friend, but when he died, *Ioas* was soon ruined and undone.

A faithful man is sure in all times, and upon all occasions. Many accidents may rob a man of his estate, nothing but death can take away his friend. A man can suffer the losse of all earthly comforts, and not think himself quite undone, so long as he hath his friend, which may prove

strength

ſtrength in weakneſs, pleaſure in perplexity, treaſure in poverty, a ſympathizer with him in all conditions, and will be with him in all places, nothing but death ſhall be able to make a final ſeparation; he will ſtick at nothing; ingenuity is noble and generous; neither priſon nor penury ſhall frighten him: theſe are the ſeaſons which he rather courts than fears, becauſe he can here beſt evidence his immutability.

Secondly, the ſecond flower we ſhall gather in this way of friendſhip, is a ſupport in the moſt dreadful afflictions; in proſperity help is near, in adverſity it ſtands at a diſtance: the rich have many friends, but the poor is hated of his neighbour: how ſeaſonable is ſupport in time of extremity; at ſuch a time we value kindneſs at a high rate, that being the proper ſeaſon for it, becauſe we try our friends then whether they will aſſiſt, when others will not or cannot: there are no ſeaſons ſo proper and convenient for this purpoſe as times of great ſtraits & extremites, when may be the condition of a man muſt not be known by his deareſt relations, nor can be but at a hazard of his life or credit: ſuch was *Davids* caſe, when he fled from *Saul*; and ſuch is many a mans caſe: inſtance, in time of great loſſes and other calamities, yet a friend muſt acquaint himſelf with theſe puzling affairs, elſe he cannot diſcharge the duty and obligation he lies under: he is bound not to deſert his friend, and reſolves with *Peter* concerning his maſter; though all forſake, he will never forſake him. I would be more diligent to enquire after the neceſſities of my friend, than

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after any other thing that concern him, not that I love trouble and sorrow, but I love my friend, and cannot decline that which is inseparable from him; and if I cannot enjoy him no where else, but in the furnace of affliction, I should not think that too hot, a prison would be sweeter to me were he present than a palace without him, because I accept sufferings more heartily with him then pleasure without him, and this is no *paradox*, If the serenity of the minde be beyond the ease of the body, and reason more to be indulged then sense: it's true prudence may facilitate troubles if the heart be calm, but nothing can do it if that be unquiet; the heart knows his own bitterness, no person else can, except a friend, because hearts are united in friendship, and there is a sympathy; I will study all methods to support & supply my friend, and when I could do it no longer, I would voluntarily suffer with him rather than forsake him: love that warm affection maks adversity easy, at least not so intollerable.

The third flower we gather in the way of frendship, is a counsellor in doubts. Many scruples doth assail and perplex the heart of a man which in credit and conscience he dares not reveal to strangers. This hath proved the ruine of many a man, and hath betrayed them into many sad temptations, as murther, rapine, and all manner of cruelty, not only against their neareſt relations, but against their deareſt lifes, occasioned either through melancholy, inprudence, rashness, *&c.* these might have been prevented by a judicious frend, by whom they might have been awed,

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conſelled, and prevailed with to avoid thoſe ways and methods that lead to ſuch extremities, and by whom their ſcruples might have received a ready and ſatisfactory reſolution, whoſe tenderneſs would have invited him to uſe all perſwaſive and pacifying argumenrs. I have ſeen direful effects my ſelf ariſing from ſuch cauſes, how happy had ſome been of my near acquaintance, had they had a faithful friend to have divided their cares, and untye thoſe knots, melancholy was dayly tying to their deſtruction: how eaſily might thoſe webs that ſeemed intricate to them ſpun by the policy of Satan, and cruel melancholy (that irrational and black companion) have been uuravelled, before they could have attained thoſe dreadful ends that have been the conſequences of them, you know that a man ſuddenly unravels that which hath been the work of time: a few well ſtated arguments hath and may through the bleſſing of God beat down the batteries, that the devil makes againſt the precious life of man, as mental diſcontents are moſt dangerous: ſo ſecrecy in this regard is moſt pernicious, becauſe the greateſt policy the devil hath, is to keep this fire within a mans heart: there he kindles a ſpark which ſoon blazes to deſtruction, eſpecially when melancholy blowes the ſpark; the more ſecret fire is, the more dangerous; a ſpark may eaſily be put out before it comes to a flame, but after it may be impoſſible; no bodily affliction like heart-trouble, yet theſe are not to be ſlighted. *Iob* and *Lazarus*, and many men under diſtracting pains, as the gout and ſtone, and

other

other violent distempers, hath found friends very necessary, when by a gentle hand their wounds dressed, their bodies supported, when by humouring and content they receive that pleasure, that is not only useful, but exceedingly necessary in such extremities.

The fourth fragrant flower we find in friendship is a companion in solitary and sad times, society being never more pleasing then in solitariness. I do not mean by solitariness, that retiredness appointed for special duty, and serious contemplation; but such as is the consequence of some cruel confinement, whereby we are denyed those innocent recreations and harmless diversions, which would repair nature, that is often tired in conflicting with those distractions and cares that constantly attend such a prison-state, were the heart always upon the wing and fit for divine contemplation, a cave that dark habitation might be as *Goshen*, a land of light: otherwise it is hard to improve solitariness to any advantage: as I would with much content enjoy my thoughts, and discourse with my self sometimes, so I would as gladly at other times speak my joyes, and sad apprehensions of things to my friend, by which I shall double the first, and may diminish the last; besides I shall have this advantage, if I speak my thoughts I shall see what they are by their dresse, whether trivial or weighty. I cannot always improve my reason alone, or be so taken with my own conceptions and apprehension of things as to believe them without exception or passible, unless confirmed by

by thoſe who are more judicious, or at leaſt more indifferent, then I can be in matters that ſo nearly concern me, arguments debated between two or more ſeems to be more clear, becauſe they have a greater teſtimony, than when there is not that advantage: a ſingle teſtimony will not be accepted in civil things: men can hardly perſwade ſingly in a matter of importance: we ſee our lawyers and doctors though never ſo learned are hardly creditted except they refer to Authors: nor are we without a divine teſtimony in this caſe, as the Scriptures, which declare that in the mouth of two or three witneſſes every thing ſhall be eſtabliſhed; the great conceit that ſome men have had of their private notions, which may be, have ſo tickled and pleaſed them that they have ſate down highly ſatisfied with the validity of them, hath been that which hath proved their greateſt prejudice, and often proved a deluſion, that pride hath flattered them into making that appear great to themſelves that looks throw a multiplying-glaſs which doubles the ſpecies, when indeed if it be rightly conſidered by an impartial reaſon and looked upon by a ſingle eye will appear little, and if rightly argued and diſcourſed by a ſecond perſon, who can impartially weigh both ſubſtance and circumſtance, will merit rather ſhame and conviction, than reputation and ſatisfaction. I cannot refreſh my ſelf with any lawful recreation without a companion, which will ſweeten my melancholy walks and ſhorten the long nights; my meat will not reliſh well, nor my ſleep refreſh and com-

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poſe me without a ſociable companion: my walks will be wearisome, my work will be tedious, my time will be long, my opportunity of doing and receiving good very ſhort: I can neither manage my general nor particular calling with profit and advantage: I fancy I ſhall live without being deſired, and dye without being lamented.

The fifth flower is a ſupply in the moſt uncharitable times: this muſt come in as a principal part of frendſhip, which is ever generous and free: a man will deny himſelf ſooner than his friend, and think it the beſt policy, becauſe his content is more than his money, which he can never enjoy, while he ſees his friend in want, how ſpeedily will help come? our Savrour obſerved this, (ſaith he) if a man come at midnight to his friend, he will ariſe in all haſt to give him what he needs. Men are not at liberty to give, or not to give: So ſoon as the frendſhip is made, we preſently come under an obligation, and may as well deny all other acts of friendſhip, as that, I would be aſhamed to own that friend, that ſhould not ſhare in my eſtate, or enjoy any thing in plenty while he is in penury, he that can keep his money, can keep his heart, and therefore not fit to be confided in. I have ſometimes thought the love of money hath been the cauſe why there is ſo little frendſhip amongſt men: many have bid fair for frendſhip but could never obtain it, becauſe the cares of the world, and the deceitfulneſs of riches have ſo incumbred the heart, that no place could be found for ſuch an intertainment.

ment. If your friend be right, there is no doubt of any thing within his power, he will rob himſelf rather than decline you, and will without diſpute make his eſtate if you need it more yours than his own.

The ſixth flower in this way is, the protection and ſafety we have in a true friend: he will venture with us and for us; you need not want a protector if the ſtrength of your friend can do it: he will accompany you in danger, and bring you out of it, if poſſible, though he loſe his life in the ſervice; he will preſerve your credit and think no act ſo honourable as to loſe his life for a generous friend. Many inſtances we have of this in hiſtory: a coward is too baſe for frendſhip: I would not lead my friend unto danger, nor would I impoſe any truſt in him that ſhould leave me there: If any thing can ſeparate friends, they bare only the name, never knew the nature of frendſhip: it is a miſtery ſtill, ſuch knowledg is too excellent for them, they cannot attain it: It is heroick and noble to prefer the life of my friend before my own, though I am as good as he; and hereby I ſhew my humility as well as frendſhip, and ſo add excellency to the action, becauſe humility and charity puts a value upon things, that otherwiſe would be equal: we are bound to dye in ſome ſenſe for all Chriſtians, and therefore more obliged to do ſo for a Chriſtian friend, who is to us in this ſtate of imperfection, the moſt perfect injoyment, and that which ſuppoſeth and includeth all things els that may render us happy.

The ſeventh and laſt flower this way of frendſhip is ſtrowed with, (to name no more becauſe I haſten) is this : we have a friend, that will be with us in life, and for us when we are dead. This is a flower of the greateſt fragrancy, you need not diſcompoſe your minde about your children, what ſhall become of them when you are gone, in reſpect of care and proviſion, ſince you have left half your ſelf behind : with how much ſatisfaction doth a man or woman die, beyond others, that hath a faithful friend, their cares are not about their children, they have left them in a ſafe hand, they neither fear cheats nor wrongs or any unkindneſs that can be avoided by the inſpection, care, and prudence of a faithful friend. *David* had a reſpect to the ſon of *Jonathan* & ſet him at his own table. Duration is that which heightens the value of any thing, things of ſhort continuance are not much deſirable ; though they are ſometimes pleaſant, they are not ſo profitable : would you leave a precious Jewel to poſterity when you are gone, make ſure of a true friend ? would you live when you are dead ? would you have a name that ſhould never be blotted out ? would you have your ends accompliſhed concerning your near and dear relations ? a true friend is moſt likely to effect theſe ends, who will extend your vertues, bury all your imperfections, and ingrave that praiſe and honour upon your tomb, that ſhall not be raſed for ever. poſterity are conſiderable, children lye near the hearts of parents ; yet notwithſtanding theſe, nor any thing elſe to an ingeni-

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ous man is ſo precious next to his ſoul, as reputation whereby he bloſſomes in the duſt, and is had in everlaſting remembrance. we come now to the ſixth thing promiſed; namely, how to govern our ſelves in the ſtate of frendſhip in order to the preſerving of it: and we muſt wiſely ponder ſuch things as theſe, and ſincerely practice them, as thoſe that are moſt grateful.

Firſt, ſet a value upon your friend above any earthly thing: you muſt love him as you love your ſelf: think him worthy of the beſt affections, and he muſt have it without reſervation, or exception: think no ſervice too hard, no ſufferings too much: make him equal to your ſelf in your care and thought: let nothing in the world ſtand in oppoſition to him, or in competition with him, there are 4. things that raiſes our value and eſteem; intrinſecal worth: uſefulneſs: propriety: and a real affection: he muſt be worthy, elſe not capable of frendſhip, (as hath been already ſhewed:) we have ſeen the qualifications, which ſpeaks him eminently uſeful: this worth being attended with benefit, our propriety in all which makes him incomparably alſo deſireable, and if real affection be added, that will challenge our higheſt eſteem and value.

Secondly, be not harſh in your reproofs: no friend is ſo perfect but may need it: but do it tenderly in the ſpirit of meekneſs. Saith *David*, if the righteous reprove me, it ſhall be baulm that ſhall not break my head: he doth not ſay, it ſhall not break my heart, by a ſunlike thaw, but it ſhall not break my brain (was his meaning,)

ing,) by diſtracting and perplexing thoughts, and It is more proper for reproof to break the heart then the head: that heing the genuine end aimed at among friends: but here we muſt be wiſe: diſcretion is very neceſſary in a matter ſo difficult as the well regulating of reproof, there are ſeveral methods of reproof, and you muſt ſeriouſly ſtudy which of them will ſuit the preſent occaſion, in this lies the excellency of a wiſe reprover: ſometimes words and arguments will do beſt, and are moſt expedient: and theſe ſeem moſt proper for men of patience and reaſon, who will attend and weigh things, in the ballance of a rectified judgement. *Solomon* ſpeaks of theſe when he ſaith, Reprove a wiſe man and he will love thee. A wiſe man loves the reproof when it is well managed and ſeaſonably applyed. Sometimes a look is ſufficient to reprove, our Saviour did but look upon *Peter*, and this work was done. Sometimes the contrary example will do much. Laſtly to reprove in the perſon of another, ſeems the moſt ſucceſſeful way of reproving, becauſe by this without any noiſe, or ungrateful reflection, you will ſeriouſly and ſeverely enough reprove. Thus *David* was reproved by *Nathan* the prophet: by this means a man is brought ſecretly to condemn himſelf, and ſave you the labour; never caſt any diſgrace upon reputation, that is a tender thing, a man would take it as kindly you ſhould touch his life as his credit: then be ſure what you tax him with be true: never go upon fancy and ſuppoſitions, this will ſpeak you raſh, and it will grieve your friend extreamly to be cauſeleſly

cauſeleſly impeached by you who are bound by all manner of obligation to make the moſt favourable conſtruction: charity as well as frendſhip enjoyns you, never to make an evil interpretation, where you can poſſibly make a good one: whenever you are tempted to make exceptions, ſuſpect your ſelf, may be you take offence where none is given: look into your heart, and ſee that you are free from pride & paſſion, pride will raiſe a ſtorm in the ſereneſt temper, paſſion will caſt a miſt upon the cleareſt underſtanding; beſides you prejudice your ſelf if you are not deliberate and careful, how abaſhed is a man when he hath reproved raſhly? with how much ſhame is he forced to detract and ſubmit, and inſtead of a Judge, as he was in the ſeat of reproof, now becomes a ſuppliant, where he is not always ſucceſful, may be the injury was ſo great that bare ſubmiſſion would not do it; there muſt be ſatisfaction: the firſt is ſhameful, the laſt chargable; and this, becauſe the offence may be aggravated by circumſtances which will admit of no repair, theſe might eaſily have been prevented at the firſt by a ſolid and religious deliberation: in all things ſudden and unexpected we ſhould ſuſpend judgment till reaſon be fully ſatisfied: we every day experience this, that what we madly reſolve with *Jonas*, we ſoberly repent with *Eſau*.

Thirdly, whatever you apprehend ungrateful in your friend, never reprove at a diſtance, or by proxy, much prejudice may be conveyed this way, I mean by theſe meſſages or written quarrels. Theſe are very dangerous and ſhake

the foundation of frendſhip: Inſtance,

Firſt, hereby you impeach your friend, and article againſt him, and that you cannot do without diſobliging words, which if by any accident made publick, they may admit of diverſe interpretations; which interpretations will be according to the fancies of thoſe perſons into whoſe hands they may unfortunately come, and from hence may ariſe this prejudice; the hazard or loſs of a reputation; you will afterwards but in vain ſadly lament: many ſhoot here in juſt, but kill in earneſt: Reputation is not to be dallied with, becauſe if it be once loſt, it is like yeſterday, that will never come again.

Again, you can hardly avoid the revealing of ſome ſecret, paſſion is a meer blab, & ſo inconſiderate that it will never make any reflections backward nor forward, as to think, what reaſon have I for it? or what prejudice may come by it? the diſcloſing of a ſecret is always diſobliging, and not to be excuſed, though it be accidentally, not intentionally done. That is a thing that may not be left to hazard: it is like the defiling of the marriage-bed, and of all crimes in frendſhip the moſt unpardonable, becauſe beſides much other prejudice, it blots and defaces your evidences and aſſurance of the affection of your friend; whom you have ſo juſtly incenſed, that much time may paſſe over before a right underſtanding will be fixed between you again, if ever: I ſaw a frendſhip broken by this, that it never peeced again. Nor is it without this inconvenience always attending it, that I do not only ſpeak unadviſedly

at the preſent, but leave it upon record, and that may be againſt me for ever, writings being for duration, as well as for ratification, and by this adventure we not ſeldom ſeal a prejudice and witneſs together againſt our ſelves, that may riſe up in judgment whenever the keeper pleaſes, and may poſſibly prove a Lion that may devour all our hope and comfort, when we leaſt ſuſpect it.

As I would not write quarrels, ſo I would not ſend them by the wiſeſt perſon I ever yet ſaw, I fancy I never met with any perſon prudent enough to make up differences between dear and intimate friends; my reaſons are theſe.

Firſt, friends cannot be more friends one to another then to themſelves, therefore they decline judgment in their own caſe, and addreſſe themſelves to a third perſon, not to be condemned, but to be vindicated, which they both expect: nor can this third perſon be a competent judge, becauſe he can never be rightly informed if there be any ſecrecy in the caſe, becauſe all friends lie under this reſtriction, they cannot reveal a ſecret that would widen the breach, and make it ſo much the more impoſſible ever to be mended, and would prove like the ſtopping of blood in the noſe, by wounding the heart.

I argue thus, this third perſon muſt be ſuch a perſon, as muſt have the command of both, otherwiſe he will be over-born, and then he muſt act as a mediator or a Judge; if as a mediator he muſt intreat both, can command neither, and then will very hardly reconcile them; they ex-

pecting one from the other, what he requires from both, that is compliance and ſubmiſſion: If he act as a judge, he muſt acquit or condemn, he cannot acquit both; there muſt be a fault ſomewhere, otherwiſe there could be no quarrel, nor can he condemn both with any kind of prudence, for then he leaves them, as he found them, diſſatisfied ſtill, if not about their guilt (for poſſibly they may be convinced they were both in a fault) yet about the meaſure they may diſpute; one will ſay he is not ſo much guilty as the other: now unleſs this laſt which is the guilt can be determined and aſcertained, nothing is done, and this cannot be done but by a definitive ſentence upon one of the two, which will be ſo far from making peace, that it will promote and aſcertain the quarel, becauſe before whatever judgment paſſed between them upon either was but judging in their own caſe, and might be contemned by either without any further breach, but now being condemned by a perſon mutually choſen, the judgment muſt ſtand againſt that perſon convicted, and ſo the quarrel muſt reſt groundedly on that ſide, which will hardly be ſubmitted to by the other, ſo then the reſult will be this, the quarrel that was only between two before, is now between three. *Solomon* ſays, he that meddles with contention, takes a bear by the foot; and may get a ſnap for his pains, but this is ſure he ſhall never paſs without a blot. It is moſt true, that as differences among friends ought with all prudence to be concealed, ſo if once they come to be publick, they can hardly

remain

remain friends. I would with much more content in this caſe make a new friendſhip than repair the old, this being more chargeable and hazardous, that being more eaſy and certain.

Fourthly, Do not readily accuſe your friend, nor hearken to them that doth it: the leaſt countenance in this caſe as it will incourage an enemy, ſo you your ſelf may be inſnared: with the well adviſed is wiſdom: if you argue wiſely you will never accuſe raſhly, ſee that there be good ground for an accuſation before you receive it, leaſt you fail of your evidence, and retreat with ſhame and loſſe: nor muſt you give an ear to others in this matter becauſe this may convey prejudice into your heart inſenſibly, and make ſo deep an impreſſion, which though never ſo falſe, and ungrounded will never afterwards give place to the greateſt truth, having taken the firſt poſſeſſion, nor be clearly raſed by the beſt policy, it may diſappear ſometimes, but like an apparition at other times it will appear again, and poſſibly prove a conſtant vaxation either to the fancy as to a mans ſelf, or by reflexions from others. It ſeems more prudence to ſtop the ear againſt an accuſation, then ſtudy the moſt compendious defence; becauſe a man is as likely to be corrupted as the accuſer is to be convinced, eſpecially if the laſt can more wittily manage the ſcandal, then the firſt can the truth, varniſhes will ſet off much, and men thtough careleſneſs ſometimes conſent to what they could not rationally believe, if they would take the pains to conſult reaſon; I think I would ſet my head and my heart at work rather

than

than by any consent of mine, give satisfaction to persons at enmity with frendship, or with my friend, as to hearken, much lesse give the least credit to their impeachments: I should be very unwilling so much to promote my own disquiet; who can have little peace if such an Achan lay in my bosom, which might secretly cut the knot of frendship, or raise such a storm, that could not easily be allayed.

Fifthly, do not in all companies commend your friend above an ordinary pitch: this may prove his greatest prejudice: he that riseth early in the morning to commend his friend, the wise man saith, *it shall be counted to him as a curse*: We have a remarkable instance of this in *Saul*, the women answered ane another as they played, saying, *Saul hath slain his thousands, and* David *his ten thousands, and* Saul *was very wroth, and this saying displeased him, &* Saul *eyed or envied* David *from that day forward*. Hereby you draw many envious persons nearly to inspect every of his actions, & in case of the least flaw appearing either in life or birth, improve them to his disadvantage: rather contemplate and imitate his perfections then discourse them, lest you meet with subtle men who are resolved in opposition to you (though may be no way prejudiced against him you pleade for at the present) who will be as industrious to fix a scandal as you are to attribute real worth, and they may haply finde more argumeuts for that aspertion, though false, then you can for the truth, especially if you undertake the defence of what you cannot unquestionably maintain, and

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ſo as your argument falls, the credit of your friend looſes, beſides you are apt to miſtruſt and heſitate about that you cannot ſay more for, then another can ſay againſt, and ſo inſtead of bringing your friend into reputation with others, he may looſe his credit with you; not becauſe he deſerves it, but becauſe you were not rightly informed and prepared to undertake ſuch diſputes: Let your friends good works commend him in the gates: all his praiſe-worthy qualities muſt be private, or publick, or both: if private, not always fit to be proclaimed, they being never ſo good, are liable to cenſure by them that like ſpiders ſuck poyſon where others finde honey: the excellency of frendſhip may be ſo interpreted that much prejudice may accidentally inſue thereby: ſome men are prone to cenſure, what they cannot underſtand, others willingly ſhut their eyes, becauſe they cannot look upon that without prejudice in another, which makes them ſo much more ſplendid than themſelves: It is with them, as with the weak eye which cannot behold the ſun in its body, not that there is any defect in the object but the defect is in the viſive faculty which ſhould receive the ſame.

Again, if they be pnblick, they need no pleader, they will plead for themſelves, and force a reputation from thoſe that are not wholy barbarous, or (that which is worſe) prepoſſeſſed with ungrounded prejudice. I never ſaw high commendations, but they were ſeconded with exceptions, the arguing of which have created many a quarrel, and ſet the end aimed at, at a greater diſtance.

Sixthly,

Sixthly, if you have been free and generous to your friend, never upbraid him with it: this is moſt baſe and diſingenious, and that which a noble ſpirit would bluſh to think of: nothing is more diſobliging than this, and ſpeaks a man of a lower ſpirit: hereby he doth not only undervalue his friend, but he diſcharges him of an obligation he greatly lay under before, and puts himſelf out of any expectation of a compenſation, let his civilities be what they will; I could never think my ſelf obliged where upbraided, that being a rate too dear for any courteſy: and in this caſe I may more juſtly expect ſatisfaction, than give it: I would never beſtow my bounty except I ſaw reaſon for it; and having given I ſhould think nothing more unreaſonable then to repine. Never look after gratuities when you have ſent them away, nor call them again by repentance, for nothing will return but a great damage, a juſt prejudice, and a ſpot no time nor endeavour will be able to wipe out.

Seventhly, never carry your ſelf ſo that your friend may fear you, this contrary paſſion will alter the ſtate of that relation, love being changed unto fear will frighten and amaze where it ſhould induce and incline. This is moſt oppoſite to love and ſpeaks it imperfect, otherwiſe it would caſt out all manner of ſlaviſh fear. I could never love heartily, where I could fear really: where love is turned into fear, equity changed into power, ſociety into obedience, there can never be a perfect friendſhip: here is too much care for kindneſs, inequality for amity, obedience for

love,

love, and ſpeaks my friend more a maſter than a ſociable companion. Certainly I could never comply here without flattery and vexation, there being a ſlavery in fear too baſe for friendſhip.

Eightly, never detract from the credit of your friend, but ſtill acknowledge his juſt deſerts; as it is flattery to raiſe his value beyond his juſt merits, ſo it is injuſtice to diminiſh his real worth, never believe his praiſe-worthy qualities your diſparagement; if you do, you are not only unjuſt but envious. I would rejoice as much in the commendation of my friend as my own, becauſe I can with freedom expreſſe my ſatisfaction in the applauſe of my friend, and augment it; when I ſhould think it more diſcreet and civil by a bluſhing ſilence to receive the ſame for my ſelf: I do oftner contemplate the goodneſs of my friend then his errours, becauſe I love pleaſure, and fear perplexity: I hate to be like the ungrateful raven, that flyes nimbly over many pleaſant things, and pitches with delight on a carcaſſe. I would rather convince my friend by a contrary example and behaviour than be too officious in ſearching into his defects, that may be he is as far from juſtifying, as I am from commending, and he needs no reproof being too ready to condemn himſelf, and yet at preſent cannot aſſume the title of conqueror; we cannot think we contract alliance with angels: in our beſt frendſhips many a ſlip muſt be winkt at, and a friend may challenge ſo much as this, *viz.* that we ſhould uſe all poſſible means to keep up the credit of him,

him, to whom we are so nearly related: nor can we be kind or just, if we do not improve all to his advantage in this regard.

Ninthly, never manage any dispute with passion, this will intangle the web of frendship, destroy the peace, and turn your harmony unto jangling: disputes are separating things, *Paul* and *Barnabas* lived friendly together, till dispute parted them, pride very often is at the bottom of disputes, and will contend for victory, and men will venture very hard for it: witness those sad dissentions in the Church of God at this day. I would rather consult my books, and learned authors, or rational strangers, or any indifferent person then with my friend about matters of difficulty, because I would not run the venture of contention; friends may deliberately argue, and convince one another, and this may augment their profit, and experience, but they must not proceed to a dispute, wherein there is a forcible opposition made on both sides; it will be more prudence to leave it to them that are better able to manage it, or to a more convenient season. I have observed that those that have seemed unperswadable while the dispute continued, afterwards upon a more mature consideration by the same arguments have been convinced; and was not this silent and peaceable victory better than that which might have ended in a quarrel, men are not willing to submit their reason, where they think they shall passe under any slight or undervalue, yet upon mature consideration and solid contemplation afterwards, it appearing necessary

ceſſary reaſon will force them to ſubmit, which they are willing to do when it may be done ſilently and without noiſe.

Tenthly, be not curiouſly inquiſitive after any thing you find an averſeneſs in your friend to reveal, and do not believe it a breach of frendſhip, if upon ſuch an attempt he denies you: it may be your humour and preſent capacity cannot bear it, or the ſeaſon is not fit for it; or ſhould he gratify your curioſity, he may be cruel in what you call kindneſs, confide ſo much in your friend, as to believe that he will conceal nothing from you, that will do you good to know, and what he doth in this particular is from prudence not perverſneſs. Inſtance in this one particular; I have committed a fault and have perhaps ingaged my reaſon and conſcience againſt me, and is not that enough, but I muſt engage my friend againſt me alſo. I ambition nothing more, (next to my intereſt in God and eternal concernments) then the good opinion of my friend, and ſhall I not preſerve it by all means poſſible? I will never betraymy ſelf to his cenſure: I had rather paſs under his approbation, than condemnation: the firſt will confirm the frendſhip, the laſt will looſen it: I never thought it civil to preſſe my friend beyond a voluntarie compliance, nor paſſionately to ſcrue a ſecret out of him: this were to betray my truſt and rob his cabinet becauſe he hath truſted his key with me, which he did not do to hazard his own intereſt, but to ſecure mine. It is true a friend muſt be truſted with ſecrets, yet it doth not follow that he muſt be entruſted

ed with all secrets. Instance, there are many things that I can neither in prudence, nor conscience reveal, that may be against the trust imposed in me, which though from an enemy, I must be faithful, & no obligation possible can releas me: this may be what I cannot disclose without betraying my self into those inconveniences, that nothing in frendship can repair, *Sampson* had a secret the disclosing of which proved his ruine. No man but hath something that is most proper for himself to know and no other: and I should think it the greatest bondage to be restrained here imaginable, my friend is not my confessor, nor a competent Judge in every case, he is a traytor and no friend, that would induce me (as *Dalila* did *Sampson*) to betray my self in any thing forbidden by conscience and prudence. These things must be left to the wisdom of your friend, who is not worthy of that relation, if he cannot manage this affair without prejudice to himself or his friend. Nor could I with reason conclude that man could keep my secrets that could not keep his own, or be faithful to me that betrayed himself.

Eleventhly, never indent nor impose on your friend after the friendship is made; that were to make propositions after the truce is concluded, which is very irregular, you had your liberty in your first choice: you might have made what exceptions you pleased: and if inequallity had appeared have deserted him without censure or prejudice, but now it is too late: by such an endeavour you extreamlie disoblige your friend, because you presuppose him unfit for that relati-

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on without manacles and bolts, and this ſpeaks, him a priſoner, where he ought to have the greateſt freedom; and plainly delares you ſelfiſh, wholly aiming at your own ſatisfaction, little regarding that of your friend; beſides you expoſe your judgement to cenſure by fixing, before you were in all points thorowly reſolved, in all things relating to this great concernment. Likewiſe you make your ſelf a judge of the qualifications proper for friendſhip, excluding your friend as being a novice in this point. Laſtly you plainly tell him, he is obliged, and you are not: he ſtands upon his good behaviour, and you at your liberty: thus you article with him: by all which you declare, you are unfixed till he anſwers all thoſe articles, and that he muſt ſtand and fall by your judgment. I love liberty as well as any perſon, yet would expect no more here than I would give: I would never ask of my friend what was ſlaviſh or unhandſom, or prejudicial to him, or any thing that may ſpeak me mercenary or uncivil; nor would I grant it if he deſired it of me, I may conceal my errors, but never commend them, nor communicate them, they do not deſerve an intereſt in a vertuous perſon that doth ſo.

Twelfthly, Never contend for ſuperority, ſince friendſhip hath made you equal; It is more prudence to ſhrink than ſtretch here; ſuch quarrels that ariſe about place and ſuperiority, are mechanick and baſe, and they that leaſt deſerves it moſtly contends for it. I would abate in this caſe rather than contend, yet ſhould I be no lo-

ser, for what I lost one way I should gain another (if humility be better then pride;) I would not grudge my place, where I could give my heart, nor fear any censure, because thereby I do not give away my right, or make him more deserving that takes it, but I lay this obligation upon my friend that *I* can deny my self any thing, him nothing.

Thirteenthly, In all differences between your friend and others endeavour to be absent (if possible,) if you cannot, be sure you be silent: by intermedling there you can do no good: if you speak for him you will be thought to be partial, if you be never so just; if you speak against him you can neither be friendly nor civil: and these two inconveniences will necessarily follow thereupon, the strengthning your friends enemy against him, and weakning your interest in your friend, beside his disappointment is so much the greater having this aggravation entailed upon it, that whereas your friend had but one to contend with before, (and that enemy, which he did not care were he satisfied or not) he hath now a friend also to perswade, lest he should by any means espouse the quarrel: it being not seldom the endeavour of an enemy so to widen the difference as they may take in our best friends: I do not wonder that I see wise men sometimes to seek to finde arguments to plead their innocency, when such crosse accidents as these fall out, in which men are surprized. It is probable a man may be provided with arguments enough for his adversary; but these may be too harsh and impertinent

pertinent for his friend, which he deſires to treat with more moderation than the other may deſerve, but now he is at a loſſe; for while he is making good his atgument with the one, he loſes it with the other, becauſe he may be urged to paſſion by his enemy, but bound to patience with his friend; and while he exerciſes patience to him, paſſion out-runs him in his adverſary, which may very well be becauſe he hath two parts to act, the adverſary but one; he hath not only paſſion to contend with againſt his enemy, but moderation to exerciſe towards his friend, therefore cannot keep equal pace with his adverſary; ſo his task is doubled. This is the reaſon men are argued many times of their right: paſſion is quicker-witted than patience in all haſty matters, and will not ſtay till patience can deliberately deliver it ſelf: paſſion is more ready with accuſations, than patience can be with vindications, there being much more of the uſe of reaſon in the laſt than in the firſt. Commonly men are generall in their aſperſions, which when they come to be divided and anſwered to particularly, requires much reaſon in order to the right arguing of them. I would never truſt that man that ſhould joyn in a quarrel, or be a voluntary evidence againſt his friend, this were a crime that could not be palliated by any pretence whatſoever. There are but two things I ever ſaw offered by way of defence in this caſe, neither of which can excuſe it: It may be (you will ſay) your friend contended with his ſuperiour, and did not obſerve his diſtance,

and you thought that you ſhould have been no leſſe uncivil if you had not at leaſt ſhewed your diſſent by way of reproof, *I* never ſaw ſuch civility ſeaſonable or grateful to either; for the firſt he thinks he deſerves it, and therefore will own it not courteſie, the other will believe it a breach of friendſhip, which ought to be conſidered before complements: this ſeems to be allowable only in parents, who ſometimes in quarrels among their children, may condemn the moſt innocent either out of complement to a father who may be honoured for his title, or by way of reproof to affrighten him from contention where he may be overmatched to his damage; there is no ſuch obligation in friendſhip, parents walk in a path of unſearchable liberty in this regard, and may diſpence with the rules of exact juſtice, there being none capable of queſtioning them, becauſe of their power and propriety which is ſupream; but friends are under reſtrictions & tyed up to laws that are indiſpenſable; But (may be) you will ſay in the ſecond place, your friend did not ſtate the caſe right, and therefore you could not underſtand his innocencie: if ſo, you had the leaſt reaſon to cenſure him: if your friend had not been readie with his arguments, you had the more reaſon to help him, or at leaſt have been ſilent till you could have been better informed: you know prejudice is a dangerous drugg, and like a pill eaſily ſwallowed, but like poyſon hardly purged out by the beſt arguments; nor will he that hath done the injury ſtay to cure a wound he hath deſigninglie made, but like a coward

ard ſecretly ſtrikes a trecherous blow, and runs away, being afraid to contend where he is ſure to be vanquiſhed: I could never take him to be my friend that could eaſily be brought to condemn me.

To avoid this and many inconveniences more, Never ambition to be with your frend in all companyes, nor dive into his tranſactions with all perſons without his conſent: this is to impoſe upon him, and entrench upon his freedom, which cannot be acceptable: men will not willingly be abridged of their liberty; nor can it be always civil either with reſpect to your friend or thoſe he converſes with: no man but hath ſomething he in prudence ought to manage himſelf alone, without the preſence of the deareſt friend. I would aſmuch deſire to diſcourſe my buſines with a ſtranger alone ſometimes, as at other times to enjoy my own thoughts without any interruption: and it is as neceſſary: it is poſſible the perſons with whom I converſe ſometimes, cannot have that freedom to diſcourſe matters of weight before a ſtranger, who though he be never ſo ingenious, cannot be fit to be truſted with their affaires, without juſt ſuſpicion and exception. I never thought it any breach of frendſhip to forbid the frequent opening of my letters by my beſt friend, believing it reaſonable to preſerve that priviledge to my ſelf; I never remember I ever made a quarrel with any friend about that, but certainly I have often ſignifyed my diſpleaſure at it. I conceive by the ſame rule, that all truths are not to be ſpoken at all times: ſo letters may

not be broken at all times, because hereby I am not only liable to prejudice my self, but all those that entrust me; and I must deal faithfully with every man as well as with my friend. It is possible *I* may be trusted with those affairs for some person that will think it as much against his interest as his inclination, to have them revealed to any, but what he had designed and prepared. My friend though he be bound to me, is not bound to all that converse with me, neither is he constrained by any manner of tye to fancy all that I fancy, or to make a quarrel with every person I cannot like; *I* confess *I* would not give that ground for suspicion to hold an intercourse by letters or otherwise, without his knowledge and approbation; yet in businesses that more particularlie concern my self, if they must be known (especiallie in those things, wherein there may be scruples,) *I* would willinglie be the relater my self; and this may be necessarie sometimes because business may be uncertainlie understood, or by the unfaithfulness of the relater so fallie represented, that it may admit of such interpretations as might much prejudice credit, and question conscience; not because there is any other reason for it, but the ignorance or malice of the informer. *I* have known little pettie discontents in letters, not handsomelie worded, made matmer of contempt and scandal, whereas if the person had been present that understood the meaning of it, he might have given such solid satisfaction, that might have answered all the cavils and exceptions with much ease, and obtained a cer-

tain vindication. *I* would never impoſe upon my friend, but would willingly abſent my ſelf at any time (if *I* ſaw it neceſſary) but moſt eſpecially in ſuch ſeaſons as theſe are; *I*nſtance when he is to converſe with his near relations privatelie: there are many reaſons to be given why a dear friend and neareſt relations ſhould not alwaies be pleaſant one to another. The perſons concerned may through Jealouſie be ungrateful, and a friend can hardlie carrie it ſo, as to give equal content in that caſe, or at leaſt would not willingly be at that trouble; neither would *I* deſire to be preſent when weightie buſineſſes that did no way concern me, were tranſacting between my friend and ſtrangers: above all, *I* would withdraw my ſelf, when *I* ſaw him ſeriouſlie inclined about matters of eternal concernment, and *I* would give him all the help poſſible there; and hereby *I* ſhould wonderfullie expreſſe my real and intire affection, alſo my own advantage would incline me to encourage him rather than divert him; being ſure of this, that his advantage will be my gain, becauſe he would certainly intereſt me in his prayers, and I ſhould partake of the benefits of his contemplations, and this may ſometimes be ſo ſeaſonable, that I would not be without it for all the world. I have ſeen private contemplations and meditations, through the bleſſing of God ſo improved, as to prove more effectual for the reſolving of ſome puzling ſcruples coming from a particular Chriſtian, than the advice of ſeveral Divines; and this comes to paſſe, becauſe experimental know-

ledg hath more credit, than that which is doctrinal: the one may floate in the head, the other sinks into the heart; and makes the face of a man to shine, like *Moses* conspicuously in his friendly conversation.

Fourteenthly, give sound and serious advice to your friend without obliging him to obedience, leave him to his libetty, why should not his judgment be as good as yours? draw your argument as fair as you can, it is no harm to aim at successe, but do not contend for it, nor be angry, if your counsel be neglected; advise is no empire: this is not the way to be honoured with victory to make your self a judge, If you give advice and exact obedience, you rather act like an ambitious man, than a kind and ingenious friend. Counsel is most taking, when propounded with humility and indifferency. I can perswade my friend to any thing, when I can command him to nothing: arguments they are sometimes like food, that in the first tast cannot be rellished, but afterwards is very delicious and pleasant to the pallat; or like some spirits, that are very unpleasant to the palate, but of great benefit after concoction to the stomach. I would leave my counsel as my books to be well scanned before I would expect either a complyance to the one, or an approbation to the other: and at last would not think the worse of my friend if he liked neither.

Fifteenthly, Never harbour any suspition of your friend; be well advised here: you cannot act more displeasing than in entertaining causeless

leſs ſuſpition, becauſe hereby you may wrong him, and impeach him when he is moſt innocent: and what is more thornie and wounding then cauſeleſs ſuſpition, it creates jealouſie and mi.truſt of that perſon who intends moſt unfeignedly; I would never make frendſhip where I could not confide without ſuſpition; becauſe if I can't be confident of his ſincerity, I cannot believe nor truſt him, nor count him honeſt, nor pay him that civility that frendſhip requires, If you have any temptation to this, argue it gravely and ſolidly: may be the defect is in the eye, not in the object: when we conſider the various accidents of everie day, in which no man is conſtantly pleaſed or diſpleaſed with the ſame things, we may ſuſpect our ſelves. Melancholy is verie ſuſpitious, and in that dark ſtate we ſtumble at every ſtraw: and becauſe my own diſtemper hath cait ſtumbling blocks in my way, ſhall I ſuſpect my friend of treacherie, and unfaithfulneſs, or want of real affection, *&c.* and ſay, becauſe I cannot always diſcern his ſincerity, (when happily I am blinded with prejudice, paſſion, or diſcontent, ſurely there is no ſuch thing:) O this were moſt unreaſonable: we may as well ſay, that half of the oare is broken, becauſe out of our ſight and in the water: and a blind man may as truly conclude, there is no ſun in the heavens, becauſe he cannot ſee it: or we may diſpute against the being of the ſun, becauſe it is under a cloud, or in an eccliſpe.

Sixteenthly, Never think a new friend better than an old; many things are moſt valuable for their

their age: frendſhip is one of theſe; an old friend like old wine is much better then new; It gathers ſpirits, as it expends days: without queſtion friendſhip grows more vigorous and active by the delightful intercourſe, and thoſe endearments it feeds upon. Frendſhip is not ſo perfect in its infancy, as in its riper years; it augments as thoſe worthy qualities it firſt pitched upon improves, and are more ſplendid: the hidden parts of frendſhip are not ſeen all at once, nor can be: they diſcover themſelves according to the accidents and times they are moſt welcome and neceſſary in: a friend acts many parts which require time and order: if you eſteem your friend worthy, he will appear much better by tryal, and experience, whereby you will be ſatisfied of his habitual worthineſs; he was new, you have kept him till he is old: ſay not now the new is better. I could never fancy any earthly thing in hope equal much leſs beyond that in hand; or expect happineſs in the change of what I was in a good meaſure ſatisfied in before; that proverb is not contemptible, ſeldom comes a better. I could never neglect and deſpiſe any whom I once thought worthy of my affection: nor think it prudence to part with my cabinet, in which my chief treaſure lies, becauſe the varniſh is worn off, & it is not ſo handſome as when it was new, I mean my ſecrets, which are my moſt precious jewels. One friend according to this meaſure is enough for my whole life, if death doth not ſeparate, nothing elſe ſhall by my occaſion or conſent. I cannot change but at a great uncertainty,

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for if I could not find reaſon to continue the old frendſhip, I ſhould find leſs to make another. It muſt be ſome errour in the firſt that induces me to make a ſecond, and that muſt be what I did not at firſt diſcover, and therefore cannot be certain, I ſhall not find the ſame defect in another; becauſe men act as their age and temper of body inclines them, and that may be very different at one time, to what it is at another. We cannot expect that pleaſure in age, we found in youth, nor that content in ſickneſs we found in health; all theſe things muſt be conſidered and allowed: If you have found a faithful friend, you have found a treaſure, & admit he may not be in all points what you would have him to be, he is too good to part with,& moſt likely your gain in the change will never recompenſe your loſſe, nor can you ever rationally think to gain credit with a new friend, when you have loſt it with the old, he may flatter you, but he will never truſt you: he may humour you, but can never honour you, nor hartily cloſe with you, having great grounds for ſuſpition, and fear of a heart breaking ſeparation.

Seventeenthly, Be free and generous: *A gift* (ſaith the wiſe man) *faſteneth friendſhip*: give bountifully and receive thankfully, the ſmalleſt kindneſs: think nothing too good or too great for your friend: nor eſteem that a recompence fit for kindneſs received, except you can equal or exceed it; better ſtill lie under an obligation than make a half ſatisfaction: nothing ſhort is accounted any thing in this caſe: it may undervalue

lue the gift, but never gratify the giver. I ſometimes take a ſmall gift kindely from my friend, becauſe it makes me no great debtor, and ſpeaks his love as truly as a greater, yet I would not give meanly, were I obliged and able to do better; and it is no crime in me to endeavour to outdo my friend in noble and generous actions: this ſeems a paradox becauſe we cannot underſtand how we ſpeak properly when we ſpeak of giving or receiving among friends, where hearts are united and conſequently they can have no divided intereſt, but all things are common; except we mean by it the ſignification of the thing which is more then the thing it ſelf, as a reall and ſincere affection: I would not value any courteſie or civility that did not bring more of affection than profit: I can eaſily compenſate the laſt and diſcharge my ſelf, but muſt lie under an eternal obligation for the other.

Eighteenthly, Never diſſemble with your friend, but deal plainly with him, eſpecially when he referrs himſelf to you: do not call bitter ſweet, and ſweet bitter: this is the worſe way of ingratiating your ſelf, and by this means you may prove a traytor to him if you can keep off evil, do it with all poſſible care and endeavour, but when you ſee it will come unavoidably, rather prepare him for it, than keep it from him: nothing more cruel than diſappointment; which no man oftner finds then he that is flattered into a belief of what is really impoſſible. It is as great a wrong to a man, to heap upon him unmeritted commendations, as to detract from his

juſt

juſt deſerts. I would not be the firſt that would impeach my friend, nor the laſt that would undeceive him, if I ſaw him inclinable to overvalue himſelf.

Nineteenthly, Let your ſpeech and communication be religious, ſolid and civil, it is *Pauls* advice, that *we be courteous*; there is much in this to promote content: words may be healing, and they may be wounding. *Solomon* obſerved, that *they are like honey*. *David* obſerves, *they are like arrows*, that ſhoots ſwiftly, ſecretly, and deadly, ſaith he, *they ſhoot arrows againſt me*, even bitter words: in order hereunto, ſhun all unfaithful repetitions. I mean by this, ſuch as for matter repreſents things abſolutely contrary to the meaning of them that ſpeak. It is uſual with us to wreſt words according to our own fancies: good meanings may be often ſo ill-worded, that they may prove matter of reproach and ſcorn; eſpecially becauſe often ſeconded by ſmart and cruel reflexions: acceptable words are very pleaſant; ſuch as theſe *Paul* refers to, when he ſays, *let your words be ſeaſoned with ſalt, adminiſtring grace to the hearers*: ſuch words as theſe leave a kinde of titillation and pleaſure upon the heart, which ſweetneſs abſence, and reconciles all croſſe accidents that are preſent whereas on the other ſide contrariwiſe evil words leave a diſrelliſh upon the heart, and extreamly imbitters and aggravates ſuch accidents: Evil words are the ground of all quarrels; it is exceeding neceſſary, as well as pleaſing, that there be a habit of good words among friends, becauſe the tongue

tongue is not seldom like an unruly and unfaithful servant, that very often runs without the consent of his master, and is not seldom prompted by passion; we think it a sufficient excuse, when the injury is done, to say, I was rash, and spake what I did not believe or think; This is breaking my head and giving a plaister, and very seldom signifyes any thing in reference to a reconciliation: besides passion doth not study privacy, and if a scandalous word reaches the ear of a third person, it may prove like a gangrene, that will admit of no cure, and surely provides work for the Devil and his imps, who would rejoice in such an opportunity, that they might aggravate things to a final separation. *Solomon* gives us a hint of this, and saith, *a talebearer separates chief friends*; and St. *James* tells us, *such a tongue is set on fire of hell*: therefore we had need have the more care, and conclude all our disputes with this exhortation of S. *Paul*, *Let all bitternesse, wrath, anger, clamour, evil speaking, be put away from you, and be kinde one to another, tender-hearted, forgiving one another, as God for Christs sake hath forgiven you.* Again, never passe sentence against your friend, or willingly be judge in any case that concerns him, especially if the matter be hidden and intricate, or if you finde in your heart the least partiality; otherwise you wrong your self and your friend; both your self in indulging a passion, your friend in condemning the truth, or at least injuring of it; which must needs suffer where partiality is concerned. If you must judge beeause your friend will have it so,

ſo, let him not loſe his end, who expects from you juſtice mixed with clemency and charity, and be as willing to clear as to condemn, if no cauſe very criminal appears.

Laſtly, baniſh all things that may alienate your heart from your friend. Entertain him kindly, let him have a ſeat in your heart: think of him with delight; love his company: bear with him, though he appear ſometimes not ſo amiable; commend him when he doth well; excuſe him when he is in fault: caſt the mantel of love upon his infirmities: win him rather by love then fear: ſtudy his humour: think it not beneath you to comply, though little reaſon induces you to it at that inſtance: contemplate all his vertues and imitate them: decline his errors, and by a contrary example convince him: live together: love & rejoice together: communicate your vertues, improve your ſociety to a mutual advantage: he only is fit for frendſhip that can do all thoſe offices for which frendſhip is excellent; treat your friend handſomly and nobly, multiply thoſe endearments upon him that ſhall make him your own inſeparably; improve ſociety by frequent commerce; nothing in this relation more endearing than repeated fruition; and in this reſpect frendſhip ſurpaſſes all other relations becauſe it is without diſguſt: ſtudy what friends you would have upon the exacteſt election, and be that, example is much: frendſhip is not for contemplation and ſhew, but for material comfort and mutual ſatisfaction, and is advantageous to the ſpiritual as well as rational parts, when religion and

reaſon

reason go hand in hand the friendship is most illustrious because singularly advanc't hereby. I come now to the Last thing promised, *viz.* the conclusion by way of commendation; here see the illustration and confirmation of the happiness, honour, and excellency of the capacity and state of friendship.

In order hereunto give me leave to set before you the best and highest example possibly in heaven or earth: the man Christ Jesus, who may if we consult reason and Scripture be verily concluded to contract a friendship with *John* the *Evangelist*. We do not find that our Lord took any delight in sensuall pleasures upon earth: yet it is more than probable, he had pleasure in this rational recreation of a moral friendship: which may easily reach our belief if we examine his own books, the holy Scriptures that testifie of him, if the cause may be concluded by the effect, the thing by its properties, then it will not be hard to prove, that there was a moral friendship between Christ and *John*, and that which seems to strengthen the argument may be this: if friendship be the improvement of the rational part, as it hath been already proved; then it must necessarily be in our saviour, who improved both naturals and spirituals to the highest perfections imaginable; nor is this any paradox, that Christ should improve in his naturals; for it is undenyable, he was a child and in minority before he came to riper years: and it cannot be thought that our Saviour had as much perfection in his reason when he was wrapped in his swadling bands

hands in the Inn, as he had when he was thirty years of age, teaching in the temple; without queſtion he improved in his reaſon as he multiplyed years, and had a more imperfect uſe of his reaſon in his youth than after he came to be a grown man: nor can it be abſurd to believe our Saviour having ſo ſweet a nature was not without ſome ſociable pleaſure, as a diverſion for the repair of his humane nature, which was often afflicted, vexed and grieved: and that his humane nature needed repairs, may be concluded by his eating, drinking, and ſleeping, *John.* 4.6. it is ſaid, *Jeſus being wearied, ſat down upon the well*: othertimes *he withdrew from the multitude, and conveyed himſelf from them, when they preſſed upon him*: and no diverſion ſo innocent, and had ſo litle temptation, as this of friendſhip. There are theſe ſeven arguments following, that ſeems to prove this, and they are all eminent properties of a moral friendſhip.

Firſt, the denomination given to *John*; that *he was the diſciple whom Jeſus loved*: we finde *John* among the diſciples rarely known by any other name, and this plainly diſcovers the love that our Saviour had to the perſon of *John* in a moral ſenſe, and this is moſt evident, becauſe it came within the obſervation of the reſt of the diſciples; for had it been Chriſts love to the ſoul of *John* that was intended by that appellation, that had been inward and ſpiritual, and could not have been underſtood by them; and we do not finde our Saviour by any declaration demonſtrate any ſuch thing; ſo that nothing can rationally be con-

cluded here, but that the disciples did gather this love of Christ to *John* from some outward and visible cause, as his friendly discourse and behaviour towards *John*, as also the intimacy that was observed between them; as lying in his bosome and constant communion, and his indulgence; all which we shall consider more particularly in the following arguments.

Secondly, the familiar converse between our Lord and *John* is another propertie, and eminently declares friendship: *John* is said to lye in the bosome of Christ, and this seems to import much intimacy, and much affection: we dearly love them we take into our bosomes; yet this is but an outward expression, and therefore may be a moral friendship, and the rather because these imbraces are the proper acts of a moral friendship: Now as the former denomination did expresse our Saviours transcendent kindnesse to *John* beyond the other disciples, so this doth no lesse speak the intimacy, that was between them beyond what was enjoyed by the rest of the disciples. It is probable *Peter* lay as near the heart of Christ as *John* in a spiritual sense, and many believers since; if we could not conclude our Saviours love to us but by such expressions, we must be shut up under despair; nor could the disciples themselves, have been without just cause of despondency, doubtless that which did satisfy their spirits was, they looked upon it only as an outward expression of his love to *John*, as also the delight he had in his person, happily for some obliging quality our Saviour saw in him, more than in the rest;

reſt; and this made them rather incline to honour, than envy *Iohn* who unqueſtionably was exceeding honourable and happy in this relation of friendſhip, wherein he ſtood towards our Saviour: And this may be the better credited if we conſider that it is not uſual with men to be unſatisfied with one another touching their elections of friendſhip, nor think themſelves diſobliged that they are paſſed by and others pitched upon; becauſe they allow a freedom to every man in that caſe according as his fancy and affection leads him.

The third Argument is drawn from the intereſt *Iohn* ſeemed to have in our Saviour above the reſt of his Diſciples, as appears in that caſe of *Iudas*, *Iohn* 13.26. and when our Saviour ſignified *that one ſhould betray him*, they were all amazed, ſaying, *is it I? is it I?* *Mark.* 14.19. and none preſumed to ask our Saviour a reſolution in this doubtful caſe: ſuch was the diſtance between our Lord and them; but this diſtance was not between *Iohn* and him, for the Diſciples no ſooner applyed themſelves to *Iohn* to move our Savior in the caſe, but the queſtion was immediatly anſwered: nor do we finde that *Iohn* uſed the leaſt ceremony in his addreſſes to our Lord, but with as much freedom as poſſible asked the queſtion of our Saviour; who readily anſwered, with as much ſatisfaction; and this is a notable property of friendſhip; becauſe this act carries in it the greateſt intimacy & propriety, both which muſt needs make up a full and perfect friendſhip, including every thing that can make that capacity happy.

Fourthly, It is very probable, *John* had more of the secrets of Christ than the rest; and this is no small property of friendship; the communion that passed between our Saviour and *Moses* and *Elias* in the Mount, was a secret many of the disciples knew nothing of, yet it was not peculiar to *John*; for *Peter* and *James* was there also: *Mark.* 9. 2. by which it appears Christ had peculiar favours which he contributed as he pleased, & I verily conceive that person who was most especially beloved, was not without peculiar discoveries, at least of those things which concerned his person: it's probable *John* knew more of our Saviours prudential proceedings, and moral transactions then the rest did. I conclude it from hence, because though the rest of the disciples were ignorant of this treachery of *Judas*, it is very like *John* was not; if so, he would not have needed an incitement to be resolved who should betray our Saviour, having the advantage of lying so near him as in his bosom; we may probably conjecture he would have readily asked that question, and we may as rationally conceive, that our Saviour had not only discovered this sad and perplexing providence publickly to all his disciples, but privately to *John* the beloved disciple: and there is the more credit to be given to this supposition, because we know that there can be no friendship where there is not a communication of affairs; and we find our Saviour did often discourse of his death to all his disciples, and therefore most likely to *John* the beloved disciple and friend of Christ: friends delighting as much

sometimes

ſometimes to diſcourſe their afflictions; as other times to diſcourſe their affections. it appears by what hath been already obſerved, that our Saviour had a friend, ſo I conceive we may without prejudice conclude, he did not d ny the uſe and benefit of him, as to ſocial ſatisfaction, ſervice, content, and pleaſure; yet notwithſtanding from all this, or any thing elſe, we connot conclude *John* had more knowledg in ſpiritual things than the other diſciples, who (we know) were ignorant of many truths and ſome fundamentals; for they dreamed of an earthly kingdom, that our Saviour ſhould have here on earth; and it was after his reſurrection before they were informed of many things touching him; and then our Saviour ſent his ſpirit that taught them all things: It is probable *John* was no more inſtructed, than the reſt before, becauſe if any of the diſciples had underſtood thoſe things, it is likely none would have been ignorant; for we ſee they were willing to inform each other by the diſcourſes that paſſed between them at the ſepulchre, & in their travail to *Emaus* about our Saviours death and reſurrection; nor do we ever finde that the diſciples did ever addreſſe themſelves to *John* to be informed of any of Chriſts miracles, or any hidden and divine thing; yet we know they often heſitated about ſuch things, and reaſoned among themſelves concerning them, ſo that the conjecture is pretty clear, that the outward acts of Chriſts prudential negotiations upon earth, as his travelling and healing and other outward acts may be better known to *John* the beloved diſci-

ple than any of the rest,

Fifthly, another argument of our Saviours affection to *John* may be drawn from his indulgence to *John*. We never read that he rebuked *John*, as he did *Peter* by any particular reflection. Christ severely checks *Peter* and calls him devil, *get thee behind me Satan*; No doubt but *John* was subject to mistakes, as well as *Peter*; for we find that *John* was as drowsy as the rest when Christ was in his passion, where it might have been expected he should have been most watchful above any of the rest of the disciples; yet we do not find that our Saviour takes any notice of this so as to reprove *John* more than the rest, and it is probable Christ may use more tenderness, because of the relation, though his want of watchfulness in such extremity of affairs, seems a great fault in *John*. A friend never inclines to grieve the heart of him he dearly loves, because the greater kindness the more wounding is any thing that looks like the contrary; our Saviour was tender towards *John*, who happily could not have born a reproof without much heart breaking trouble, because of his transcendent affection to his Lord. No person more considerate than our Lord, who was compassion it self; the man Christ Jesus was a man of bowels, as we perceive by his lamenting over *Jerusalem*, *Luk.* 19. 42, 48. yet we find that our Saviour was more compassionate to some, than others, according as his affections was set. The Jews observed he wept for *Lazarus*, when he was dead, and why so? because he loved him, as

appears

appears by that paſſage in *John* 11. 3. *Lord, him whom thou loveſt is ſick*, and we ſee by that paſſage of the young man in the Goſpel, that our Saviour could love a man for any worthy quality, or moral accommodation; the text ſaith, *he looked upon him and loved him*; not that he ſaw his own image upon his heart, (for this he had not, as is evident, becauſe he parted with our Saviour) but ſaw reaſon in his witty anſwers, which pleaſed our Saviour, ſo that he gave him an outward commendation ſuitable to his ſuperficiall acquirements.

Sixthly, the conſtant communion between our Saviour and *John* is another argument to prove the frendſhip. *John* was very rarely ſeparated from our Lord before his death and after his riſeing again while he was upon the earth. *Peter* took notice that this diſciple was following Chriſt after his ariſeing from the dead, and ſeems to be much concerned about him, how he ſhould be diſpoſed of, being to leave his dear Lord; and thereupon makes this queſtion to our Lord: *Lord, what ſhall this man do?* as if he had ſaid, our loſſe is great, but his much greater, as indeed it was; *John* 21. 22. our Saviours anſwer, ſeems to check *Peters* curioſity: *If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?* The methods of kindneſs between Chriſt and *John* was not fit to be enquired into; as is evident by our Saviours more than tacite rebuke to *Peter*. It is moſt probable that *John* ſaw our Saviour before any of the reſt after his reſurrection, becauſe he came with him, when our Lord appeared to

them, for *Peter* takes special notice, *John* 21.20. that he saw that disciple following our Saviour; by which it is evident he was not among them: and it is observable, that *John* is seldom called by the disciples or known by any other denomination but these, *viz.* the other disciple; or, the disciple whom Jesus loved. I conceive the disciples might so frequently give him those titles, either as titles of honour to signify the relation in which he stood to our Lord; or because it pleased our Saviour, that his affections to *John* should be observed, and taken notice of; probably that a suitable respect might be given unto him, as the friend of Christ: for our Saviour was not ashamed to own this relation, but publickly upon the crosse signified it to men and angels, as will appear further in the seventh and last particular, but I submit to better jugdments in this matter; and only give my notion of it, and what seems most rational to me: but this is evident: our Saviour and *John* had much communion, they were still together in his transfiguration, conversation, and communication: he never left our Saviour while on earth: you shall find him in the garden, and in the high-priests hall, where *Peter* denyed him in the one and deserted him in the other: he was with him at the crosse and at the sepulchre; and no wonder that our Saviour delighted in the society of that person he would take into his bosom; and *John* was so improved by this communion with his Lord, that he speaks and writes nothing but love, and this will appear a great confirmation of the friendship, if we compare it

with

with the frendſhips between ingenious men. Obſerve and you ſhall find that when frendſhip is in reality, it mightily ſweetens the nature of thoſe perſons, ſo that they cannot endure harſhneſs and croſſneſs, but endeavour all things with all perſons by love. Men in their communication and converſation are as much as they are with whom they converſe. There are no arguments more pregnant to prove the dear and near communion and union between our Lord and *Iohn*, than the ſtrains of love that runs through all his writings, by which we may judge of the intercourſe between our Lord and him; aud what manner of expreſſions they were that paſſed between them in their particular acts of frendſhip.

Seventhly and laſtly, the laſt argument may be drawn from our Saviours laſt act of frendſhip towards *Iohn*, and were ſufficient, had there been no more to prove this frendſhip, *viz.* his recommending his mother to *Iohn*, when he was upon the croſſe. *Iohn* 19. 26. 27. and breathing out his laſt breath expreſſed in this laſt paſſage; *woman, behold thy ſon*: and he ſaid to the diſciple whom he loved, *Behold thy mother*, and from that hour that diſciple took her to his own home: you, ſee here the union that was between our Saviour and *Iohn*; they were brothers; though the relation of brothers preciſely conſidered do not make friends, yet the relation of frends always makes brothers; our Saviour by this charge to *Iohn* did imply thus much; that though his mother had loſt him, ſhe had a ſon ſtill, that was obliged to take a ſpecial care of her upon a dou-

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ble account, partly in obedience to his dear maſter, who had laid that command upon him; but moſt eſpecially by that tye of frendſhip, that was upon him: ſo he takes his laſt farewell of *John* and his mother toge ther, expreſſing his natural affection towards the one, his frendſhip towards the other: There is no greater evidence of frendſhip than this, the confidence dying perſons have in their living frends, and the truſt they impoſe in them, as to their dear and near relations: and how ſecret ſoever friends may carry it in their lives, yet at their death they declare to all the world, who they take to be their moſt faithful friends, when they commit their deareſt relations to their charge, and beſtow their laſt breath upon them by a trembling farewell: we do not read that our Saviour ſpake one word more after he had taken his ſolemn farewel of his mother and *John* but this; *I thirſt*: and *It is finiſhed*: Thus you ſee the frendſhip between our Saviour and *John* clear'd. I ſhall draw to a concluſion of this whole diſcourſe, only give me leave to add theſe few words, which I hope will not be impertinent.

If frendſhip be the improvement of reaſon, the happineſſe of a ſociable ſtate, the pleaſure of our Lord, then it is great pitty this relation and ſtate of friendſhip is no more in credit in the world than it is, eſpecially among ingenious perſons, who ſeem to miſtake this great caſe, or think it too hard a task to accompliſh.

Firſt, believe that it is attainable, this is the firſt ſtep towards it; and that it is not a ſtudy too mean

mean for the greateſt prince in the world; and which is more, he can hardly be happy without it, if he conſiders the directions he may have in his weighty affairs by the wiſdom; the ſafety he he may promiſe himſelf in the faithfulneſs, the wonderful pleaſure and delightful diverſion he may enjoy in the ſociety and integrity of a ſuitable friend; I cannot believe but all perſons ſerious and judicious muſt need ambition this capacity, yet they do not all attain it, being poſſibly croſſed by accidents unfriendly and unreaſonable, in their endeavours after it, the ways of vertue being ſtrewed with thorns: well, if the way be not ſo grateful and eaſy, as that which is ſenſual, yet the end will be glory. Let this quicken your endeavours to that end which will crown your action; and when you have obtained perfection here, you will ſet to your ſeal, that this is true; that you have found an experiment that can ſweeten you ſorrows, divide your griefs, augment your comforts, gratify your affections, improve your religion and reaſon, and that capacity whereby you may live the life of angels, ſtill contemplating things that are excellent while on earth, and when you are dead, your name ſhall be as a precious ointment powred forth ſweet and pleaſant to all poſterity; like *Abel, who being dead, yet ſpeaketh.*

FINIS.

Errata.

PAge 7. line 3. for *are* reade *is*. p.8. l.33. for *ſome* r. *ſomething*. p.10. l. 14. for *hath* r. *have*. p.13. l.17. for *axes* r. *axis*. ibid. l.31. for *warmth*, r. *warm*. p.20. l. 17. for *the* r. *this*. p.22. l.29. for *as*, r. *or*, p.26. l.12. for *led* r. *are led*. p.30. l.23. for *and* r. *too*. p.31. l.18. for *live* r. *live to*. p.46. l.26. for *reaſon it* r. *reaſon for it*. p.48. l. 32. dele *their*. p.51. l.2. for *impudent* r. *imprudent*. p.51. l.14. for *is* r. *are*. p.65. l.17. for *that* r. *this*. ibid. l. 28. dele *and*. p.69. l.20. r. *the iron to*. p.89. l.18. for *that* r. *their*. p.98. l.9. for *that* r. *who*. p. 115. l.4. for *ſo ſpend* r. *ſuſpend*. ibid. l.14. dele *yet*. ibid. l. 33. for *or* r. *are*. p.120. l.25. for *and* r. *of*. p.126. l.2. adde *are*. p.131 l.24. dele *alſo*. p.71. l.10. for *affectionate* r. *affection*.